Hedgepeth v. Tennessee

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0197P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0197p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ ;  ANDREW HEDGEPETH, CELIA  BURSON, DAVID MCCLEARY,  and GAYNELL METTS, on  No. 99-5166 behalf of themselves and all  others similarly situated, > Plaintiffs-Appellants,     v.   STATE OF TENNESSEE, STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT    OF SAFETY, and MIKE GREEN,  in his official capacity as  Commissioner of the State of  Tennessee Department of  Safety, Defendants-Appellees.  1 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. No. 97-02825—Jerome Turner, District Judge. Argued: March 14, 2000 Decided and Filed: June 12, 2000 1 2 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 19 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. Before: RYAN, MOORE, and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges. Because the essential character of Tennessee’s assessment for disabled parking placards is regulatory, I would hold the _________________ Tax Injunction Act inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ suit. COUNSEL ARGUED: Michael F. Rafferty, HARRIS, SHELTON, DUNLAP & COBB, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellants. Mary M. Collier, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CIVIL LITIGATION & STATE SERVICES DIVISION, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael F. Rafferty, HARRIS, SHELTON, DUNLAP & COBB, Memphis, Tennessee, Alex Saharovich, NAHON & SAHAROVICH, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellants. Mary M. Collier, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CIVIL LITIGATION & STATE SERVICES DIVISION, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. FARRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RYAN, J., joined. MOORE, J. (pp. 15-19), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. _________________ OPINION _________________ FARRIS, Circuit Judge. BACKGROUND Andrew Hedgepeth, Celia Burson, David McCleary, and Gaynell Metts are disabled individuals who brought this action on September 12, 1997, under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., against the State of Tennessee, the State of Tennessee Department of * The Honorable Jerome Farris, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 18 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 3 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. Tennessee’s assessment for disabled parking placards Safety, and Mike Green, the Commissioner of the Tennessee therefore has all the characteristics of a regulatory fee. First, Department of Safety. although Tennessee’s assessment was imposed by the Tennessee legislature, the responsibility for administering and The State of Tennessee charges a sum for the issuance and collecting the assessment lies with a regulatory agency, the renewal of disabled parking placards pursuant to the Disabled Department of Safety. Second, the assessment is imposed on Drivers Law of 1975, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-21-101, et seq. only a narrow class of persons. Finally, as I have explained, The placards allow disabled persons equal access to public the assessment is connected to the cost of the program, thus and private facilities by making available various parking suggesting a regulatory purpose. accommodations. The State of Tennessee Department of Safety charges disabled persons (or those who provide At bottom, Tennessee’s assessment is analogous to a transportation services for them) a fee of $20.50 for vehicle license or permit fee, which is a paradigmatic regulatory fee. registration and for a placard that is valid for two years, and See National Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, $3.00 for replacement or renewal of the placard every two 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) (“Taxation is a legislative years thereafter. Plaintiffs contend that the State’s fees are function . . . . A fee, however, is incident to a voluntary act, surcharges that discriminate against individuals with e.g., a request that a public agency permit an applicant to disabilities in violation of the ADA. The force of Plaintiffs’ practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a contention is that a public entity may not permissibly charge broadcast station. The public agency performing those the disabled for measures taken to provide the services normally may exact a fee for a grant which, nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act. See 42 presumably, bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f). The complaint seeks other members of society.”). As with a permit fee, damages under the ADA, as well as declaratory and injunctive Tennessee’s assessment is voluntary and is charged for the relief. privilege of obtaining a benefit. While the State may generate some additional revenue from the program, the program The State moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of confers a benefit on the disabled passenger different from that Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) arguing that: (1) the district court enjoyed by the general public. Cf. United States v. River Coal did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the State’s Co., 748 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that mining charges were “taxes” for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act; reclamation fees were taxes, and so nondischargeable in (2) the court lacked jurisdiction because the State is immune bankruptcy, by distinguishing reclamation fees from permit from such a lawsuit under the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) fees: “[The reclamation fee] is imposed as an additional Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. charge on operators who have already received permits. Unlike the permit fee, the reclamation fee does not confer a The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint on benefit on the operator different from that enjoyed by the December 28, 1998. It determined that the State’s assessment general public when environmental conditions are improved. for the disabled parking placards was a tax for purposes of the On the contrary, it is an involuntary exaction for a public Tax Injunction Act and that Plaintiffs had a “plain, speedy, purpose . . . .”). and efficient remedy” to contest the matter at the state level. Alternatively, the district court held for purposes of appellate review that the complaint should also be dismissed on 4 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 17 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. grounds of Eleventh 2 Amendment immunity1 and the statute became law provided for a renewal charge of $3 bi-annually, of limitations. rather than $5. J.A. at 57 (Irwin Dep.). DISCUSSION The plaintiffs argue that this form shows a correlation between the cost of the renewal program and the revenue I. Whether the Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over generated therefrom. A $5 assessment would have generated Plaintiffs’ Complaint Pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act. $500,000 in revenue bi-annually and resulted in a large revenue surplus. However, the plaintiffs explain that the $3 A. Standard of Review renewal charge that was eventually enacted into law generates only $300,000 in revenue, essentially “cover[ing] the We review de novo a district court's order dismissing a Division’s cost of administering the program.” Appellant’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Br. at 16. While the correlation is not exact, the fiscal note Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit support form does reveal a relationship between2 the Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990). When the assessment and the cost of the renewal program. In defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction through a conjunction with the earlier version of the statute the form motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of suggests that the ultimate purpose of the assessment is to establishing jurisdiction. See id. The district court's factual defray the3 costs of administering the disabled parking placard findings made in resolving a motion to dismiss are reviewed program. for clear error while its application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. See RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1135 (6th Cir. 1996). 2 B. The Tax Injunction Act We are unfortunately presented with little information regarding the cost of the initial placard issuance program. The State contends that the The district court’s jurisdiction turns on the application of actual cost of the placard is 45.4 cents. J.A. at 54 (Irwin Dep.). Because the $20.50 assessment significantly exceeds the actual cost of the placard, the Tax Injunction Act, which provides that “[t]he district the State argues that the assessment is best seen as a general revenue courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, raising measure. The majority agrees, stating that “[t]he only evidence in levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, the record regarding any costs associated with the State’s disabled parking speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such program is the actual cost of the disabled parking placard.” Ante, at p. 10. State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The purposes of the Act are “to However, the actual cost of the placard is not the only cost associated with the regulatory program, as is evidenced by the fiscal note support form. 1 3 Although the district court dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. The majority believes that the fiscal note support form does not P. 12(b)(1), the court addressed the State’s contention regarding Eleventh support an inference that the monies collected from the renewal program Amendment immunity for purposes of appellate review. However, we help to defray the program’s cost, explaining that we do not know the hold this issue in abeyance pending the disposition of three other cases, reasons why the Tennessee legislature decided to reduce the amount of and thus decline to discuss Eleventh Amendment immunity here. the assessment from $5 to $3. The legislature’s rationale for reducing the 2 amount of the assessment is, however, immaterial. The important fact is In light of our determination regarding the Tax Injunction Act, we that, as enacted, the amount of revenue collected from the program do not reach the issue of the applicable statute of limitations for claims roughly parallels the cost of the program’s administration, which is brought under Title II of the ADA. suggestive of a regulatory purpose. 16 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 5 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. In the instant case, there is a connection between the promote comity and to afford states the broadest assessment and the costs of the regulatory scheme. First, the independence, consistent with the federal constitution, in the evolution of the statutory provision at issue shows that the administration of their affairs, particularly revenue raising.” charge for parking placards is connected to cost. The current Wright v. McClain, 835 F.2d 143, 144 (6th Cir. 1987). language reads: “If the applicant is eligible for a disabled license plate, the placard shall be furnished without charge. To date, there are two federal circuit courts that have If the applicant has not applied for vehicle registration, then addressed the precise issue of whether assessments imposed the cost of the placard shall be the same as the regular fee for for disabled parking placards constitute taxes or fees under passenger motor vehicles, as provided in § 55-4-111.” TENN. the TIA.3 See Hexom v. Oregon Dep’t of Transp., 177 F.3d CODE ANN. § 55-21-103 (1998). However, as first enacted, 1134 (9th Cir. 1999); Marcus v. Kansas, Dep’t of Revenue, the Disabled Drivers Law of 1975 did not specify an amount 170 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit in Hexom to be charged for placards, but provided that “[t]he actual cost held that the $4.00 fee was not designed to raise revenue. See of the placard shall be paid by the handicapped driver.” Hexom, 177 F.3d at 1139. Rather, the fee was designed to TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-21-103 (1980 Replacement). The fact pay for the costs of a special program, and thus was not a tax that the early version of the provision tied the assessment to for purposes of the TIA and did not preclude federal court cost suggests that the purpose of the assessment is jurisdiction. See id. The Tenth Circuit also concluded that regulatory.1 the $5.25 assessment was not a tax because it was “expressly tied to the administrative costs of a specific regulatory scheme Additionally, the plaintiffs point to a fiscal note support and, therefore, its essential character [was] regulatory.” form that was prepared by the Division of Title and Marcus, 170 F.3d at 1312. Registration to comment on the fiscal effect of Senate Bill No. 1831. The bill proposed that the Disabled Drivers Law be amended to provide for the renewal of permanent placards every two years for a fee of $5. J.A. at 56-57 (Irwin Dep.); 85 (Fiscal Note Support Form). The Division of Title and Registration estimated the fiscal impact of the bill to be 3 $204,100 bi-annually. J.A. at 86 (Fiscal Note Support Form). At least three district courts have also confronted the issue. While With a charge of $5 per placard, it was estimated that the bill the courts are split in their determination, it appears that one of the would generate $500,000 in revenue during that same time guiding factors is the cost of the assessment, and whether the cost is period. J.A. at 86 (Fiscal Note Support Form). The bill that nominal or exacts a greater amount for general revenue raising purposes. See Thrope v. Ohio, 19 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (“the [$5.00] placard surcharge is not a ‘tax’ for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act, because it is charged only to the applicants for a placard and 1 designed to cover the regulatory costs of administering the program”); The majority disagrees with this reasoning; it states that, because Lussier v. Florida, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 972 F. disabled passengers must pay the same amount for a placard that all Supp. 1412, 1420-21 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that $13.50 of the $15.00 persons must pay to register their vehicles, “[d]isabled persons are merely disabled person parking permit fee was not used to defray administration being taxed in the same way that non-disabled persons are being taxed.” expense and was, therefore, a tax within the meaning of the TIA); Rendon Ante, at p. 10 n.5. The majority’s conclusion rests on the premise that the v. Florida, 930 F. Supp. 601, 604-05 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding disabled “regular fee for passenger motor vehicles,” TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-21- parking permit fee to be a tax where the $15.00 surcharge was not 103 (1998), is a tax within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, which assessed for regulatory reason and bore no relationship to cost of is not at all clear. regulatory program). 6 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 15 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. 1. Whether Tennessee’s Assessment is a Fee or a Tax ________________ The issue is whether the State’s $20.50 assessment for DISSENT disabled parking placards and $3.00 assessment for renewal ________________ or replacement is a tax or a regulatory fee. If the assessment is a tax, then the Act applies and operates to bar federal KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. jurisdiction unless the state fails to provide a plain, speedy The State of Tennessee charges disabled passengers an and efficient remedy.4 See Wright, 835 F.2d at 144-45. “It is assessment for the privilege of obtaining a disabled parking elemental . . . that the label given an assessment by state law placard. Unlike the majority, I believe that, regardless of is not dispositive of whether the assessment is a ‘tax under where the monies are deposited, Tennessee’s assessment state law.’ Rather, the definition of the term ‘tax’ is a clearly constitutes a regulatory fee rather than a tax. I question of federal law, and the issue here is whether the therefore conclude that the Tax Injunction Act presents no bar assessment is a tax within the meaning of that term as to federal court jurisdiction, and I respectfully dissent from employed by Congress in the Tax Injunction Act.” Id. at 144 the majority’s holding to the contrary. (citations omitted). The majority reasons that Tennessee’s assessment is a tax The leading decision is San Juan Cellular Telephone Co. v. because, pursuant to Tennessee’s statutory scheme, the Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico, 967 F.2d 683 (1st monies collected from the issuance of disabled parking Cir. 1992). The court explained that, placards are deposited into general state funds rather than into a special fund earmarked for the administration of the placard [t]he classic “tax” is imposed by a legislature upon many, program. This heavy reliance on the disposition of the funds or all, citizens. It raises money, contributed to a general obscures the principal inquiry, which “centers on function, fund, and spent for the benefit of the entire community. requiring an analysis of the purpose and ultimate use of the The classic “regulatory fee” is imposed by an agency assessment.” Collins Holding Corp. v. Jasper County, 123 upon those subject to its regulation. It may serve F.3d 797, 800 (4th Cir. 1997). It is true that the assessments regulatory purposes directly by, for example, deliberately at issue are deposited into a variety of state funds that benefit discouraging particular conduct by making it more the public generally. However, the fact that the assessments expensive. Or, it may serve such purposes indirectly by, are commingled with other monies in a general fund for for example, raising money placed in a special fund to public benefit does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that help defray the agency’s regulation-related expenses. the dominant purpose of the statute is revenue raising. “Rather than a question solely of where the money goes, the Id. at 685 (citations omitted). issue is why the money is taken.” Hager v. City of West Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 870-71 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Hexom v. Oregon Dep’t of Transp., 177 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 4 The TIA has also been broadly interpreted to bar suits for 1999) (“The question, in the long run, is not simply where the declaratory relief, injunctive relief, as well as monetary relief when there money is deposited at some point; it is what the purpose or is an adequate remedy in state court. See California v. Grace Brethren use of the assessment truly is.”). Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-10, 102 S. Ct. 2498, 2507-09 (1982); National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 586-88, 115 S. Ct. 2351, 2354-55 (1995). 14 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 7 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s The Sixth Circuit has adopted the First Circuit’s approach conclusion is at odds with the plain, unambiguous language in determining whether an assessment is a “tax,” utilizing the of § 9-8-307(a)(2)(A). They contend that their action often cited three-factor test: “(1) the entity that imposes the unquestionably arises out of the issuance of a permit or assessment; (2) the parties upon whom the assessment is license. Although we agree that the language is ambiguous imposed; and (3) whether the assessment is expended for and subject to the interpretation adopted by Plaintiffs, we general public purposes, or used for the regulation or benefit conclude that the proper interpretation of the statute does not of the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed.” preclude Plaintiffs from bringing this action before the Claims American Landfill, Inc. v. Stark/Tuscaranwas/Wayne Joint Commission. Solid Waste Management Dist., 166 F.3d 835, 837 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bidart Bros. v. California Apple Comm’n, 73 The jurisdiction of the Claims Commission to entertain F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1996)); see San Juan Cellular Tel. claims against the State must be determined from the Co., 967 F.2d at 685. Additionally, if “the assessment falls language of Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307 in its near the middle of the spectrum between a regulatory fee and entirety. The primary rule of statutory construction is to a classic tax, the predominant factor is the revenue’s ultimate ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. See First use. When the ultimate use is to provide a general public American Nat’l Bank-Eastern v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp, benefit, the assessment is likely a tax, while an assessment 782 F.2d 633, 636 (6th Cir. 1986). In ascertaining this intent, that provides a more narrow benefit to the regulated we look to the general purpose to be accomplished by the companies is likely a fee.” American Landfill, Inc., 166 F.3d legislation. See id. Section 9-8-307(a)(3) states, “[i]t is the at 838 (citations omitted). Fees can serve regulatory purposes intent of the general assembly that the jurisdiction of the as distinguished from general public purposes in two ways: claims commission be liberally construed to implement the either by discouraging particular conduct through the device remedial purposes of this legislation.” Following the statute’s of making it more costly, or by generating income ear marked mandate, we construe jurisdiction liberally and resolve that to cover the cost of the regulation. See San Juan Cellular Tel. the collection of taxes charged for the disabled parking Co., 967 F.2d at 685. placards can be adequately challenged before the Claims Commission with a subsequent appeal to the Tennessee state The record demonstrates that the State’s assessment is a tax courts. The district court properly determined that it was rather than a fee. Under the statutory scheme imposed by the without subject matter jurisdiction. Tennessee legislature, the $20.50 disabled placard assessment and the $3.00 renewal assessment are apportioned into the CONCLUSION State’s highway fund, the general fund, the police pay supplement fund, and the trooper safety fund. See Tenn. The State’s assessment against disabled persons for the Code Ann. §§ 55-4-103, 55-4-111, 55-6-107, 55-21-103. parking placards is a tax for purposes of the Tax Injunction Specifically, the assessment is allocated as follows: Act. We conclude that the Plaintiffs had a plain, speedy and efficient remedy before the Claims Commission. The district 1. The $20.50 placard fee collected by county clerks court properly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter and remitted to the Title and Registration Division jurisdiction. of the Tennessee Department of Safety or remitted directly to the division by applicants is deposited in AFFIRMED. 8 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 13 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. the State of Tennessee Treasury and is allocated in several types of claims that may be brought before the Claims the following manner: Commission, while Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8- 307(a)(2) limits the type of claims that may be brought. The (A) There is $18.75 registration tax provided by limiting provision provides: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-21-103(b)(2)(A)(i) and 55-4-111(a)(1). Of this $18.75 the first $1.00 is No item enumerated in this subsection shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the interpreted to allow any claim against the state on police pay supplement fund. Of the $17.75 account of the acts or omissions of persons, partnerships, remainder, ninety-eight percent (98%) is corporations or other entities licensed or regulated by distributed to the general highway fund and two agencies of the state, notwithstanding any negligence percent (2%) to the general fund. This committed by the state in the course of performing distribution is made pursuant to Tenn. Code licensing or regulatory activities. No item enumerated in Ann. § 55-6-107, which directs the proceeds of this subsection shall be interpreted to allow any claims any tax collected under Title 55, chapter 4 to be against the state arising out of or resulting from: used for the general public benefit in highway and improvement projects and in retirement of (A) The issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, state debt. or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or (B) The $0.75 reflectorization fee collected revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-4-103(f)(2) similar authorization . . . . is sent to the General Fund earmarked for use in the salary supplement for law enforcement Tenn. Code. Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(2). members of the Department of Safety. (C) The $1.00 reflectorization fee provided by The district court agreed with the State’s interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-4-103(f)(1) is allocated the statute, and concluded that Plaintiffs had a plain, speedy to the General Fund. and efficient remedy. It ruled that “Defendants [were] correct that plaintiffs [were] not making a claim on account of the 2. The $3.00 fee charged upon renewal of an expired acts of any such entity,” and “[t]hus, the first sentence of placard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-21- Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307(a)(2) [did] not preclude 103(f)(1) is allocated to the Highway Fund and the plaintiffs from bringing their claim before the General Fund in the same manner as the $17.75 Commissioner.” Additionally, the district court stated that the registration tax. language of § 9-8-307(a)(2)(A), which precludes claims against the state “arising out of or resulting from . . . [t]he The State’s assessments are allocated in a manner that make issuance . . . of . . . any . . . license,” did not preclude it clear the ultimate purpose of the assessments is to benefit Plaintiffs’ claim because they were not seeking damages the general public of the State of Tennessee. As such, the based on the issuance of a license. Rather, Plaintiffs’ claim assessment must constitute a tax under the TIA. See was based on the State’s practice of charging disabled American Landfill, Inc., 166 F.3d at 839-40 (“The revenue’s individuals for a parking placard which allegedly violated the ultimate use as a benefit shared by the public and not just the ADA. waste disposal facilities dictates that the assessment here is a 12 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 9 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. purpose was unrelated to the costs associated with the tax.”). The State’s highway fund, the general fund, the police disabled placard program; and finally, the assessment was a pay supplement fund, and the trooper safety fund “relate tax within the meaning of the TIA. directly to the general welfare of the citizens of Tennessee and the assessments to fund them are no less general revenue 2. Whether Plaintiffs Have a Plain, Speedy and raising levies simply because they are dedicated to a particular Efficient Remedy Under State Law aspect of the commonwealth.” Wright, 835 F.2d at 145. Although the assertion of federal jurisdiction may interfere There is simply no evidence to support Plaintiffs’ with state tax assessment and collection, such jurisdiction will contention that the funds collected from the placards are paid nonetheless exist if the state fails to provide a “plain, speedy into a special fund to benefit the regulated entities or to defray and efficient remedy” in state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The the cost of regulation. Plaintiffs, however, have submitted a plain, speedy and efficient remedy contemplated by the TIA 1994 “Fiscal Note Support Form” to infer the legitimacy of merely requires that the state provide certain minimal their contention. This document provides that the fiscal procedural protections against illegal tax collection. See impact of a proposed amendment to the Disabled Drivers Law Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512, 101 S. Ct. changing the term “handicapped” to “disabled” pursuant to 1221, 1229 (1981). The state need only provide a full hearing the ADA and charging a renewal fee of $5.00 per placard at which a taxpayer may present and secure a judicial every two years would be $204,000 bi-annually with an determination at which he or she may raise any and all estimated revenue of $500,000. The Disabled Drivers Law constitutional objections to the tax. See id. Furthermore, we was ultimately amended to provide for a renewal fee of $3.00 have concluded that “[s]tate procedures that call for an appeal bi-annually. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-21-103(f)(1). The to a state court from an administrative decision meet these argument, asserted by Plaintiffs and adopted by the dissent, minimal criteria.” Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Tennessee State that the revenue generated by a $3.00 bi-annual assessment Bd. of Equalization, 11 F.3d 70, 72 (6th Cir. 1993). ($300,000) supports a relationship between the assessment and the cost of the renewal program ($204,000), is Whether the State of Tennessee provides a “plain, speedy speculation. See infra pp. 16-17. We do not know the and efficient remedy” in state courts depends on the reasons why the legislature decided to reduce the $5.00 interpretation of the Tennessee statute which both allows and amount to the $3.00 amount; what we do know is that the limits monetary claims brought before the Claims renewal amount charged is ultimately used to support the Commission. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307. This statute highway fund and the general fund. See supra p. 8. provides that the Tennessee Claims Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim “for the recovery of taxes Plaintiffs’ further contention that the revenues generated by collected or administered by the state.”7 Tenn. Code Ann. these assessments do not affect the State’s budget in “any § 9-8-307(a)(1)(O). Tennessee, however, has not declared material way” also finds no support in the record. As we itself subject to suit in all actions to recover taxes. Rather, recently explained, the TIA “makes no exception for Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307(a)(1) sets out a list of challenges to taxes which constitute a small portion of a state’s revenue sources rather than a large portion.” American Landfill, Inc., 166 F.3d at 840. 7 The decision of the Claims Commission is appealable to the state court of Tennessee. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. McReynolds, 886 S.W. 2d 233, 237-38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). 10 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State No. 99-5166 No. 99-5166 Hedgepeth, et al. v. State 11 of Tennessee, et al. of Tennessee, et al. The only evidence in the record regarding any costs the privilege of parking in handicapped parking spaces.” associated with the State’s disabled parking program is the This contention, however, fails to address the district court’s actual cost of the disabled parking placard. The Director of conclusion that the instant circumstance is inapposite to that the State of Tennessee Department of Safety, Title and of Collins Holding Corp. v. Jasper County, 123 F.3d 797, 800 Registration Division testified that the cost of the permanent (4th Cir. 1997) (stating the proposition that when “the placard was 45.4 cents ($0.454) and the disabled license plate assessment covers only a narrow class of persons and is paid was $1.32. While we do not dispute that there must be other into a special fund to benefit regulated entities or defray the administrative costs associated with the program, we do not cost of regulation, it sounds like a fee.”). Plaintiffs have know the source or the amount of those administrative costs. successfully shown that only a narrow class of persons is Plaintiffs have simply failed to demonstrate that the $20.50 is charged with the assessment, but they plainly fail to present some approximation of the costs associated with the any facts to show that the assessments are “paid into a special program.5 See Thrope, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 823. The fund to benefit regulated entities or defray the cost of substantial difference between the actual cost of the regulation.”6 Id. permanent placard or license plate and the amount that must be paid to obtain one supports a conclusion that the Using the three-factor inquiry outlined in San Juan Cellular assessment is for general revenue raising purposes. See id. Telephone Co. and adopted by this circuit leads to the same conclusion. Both the first and third factors weigh heavily in Plaintiffs contend on appeal that “the State’s targeting of a favor of the State. Not only did the State of Tennessee narrow class is expressly prohibited by Congress in the ADA, authorize and legislate that the assessments be charged against and it overlooks the fact that the charge is in the nature of a disabled persons, but they also provided the manner in which privilege fee in that the charge for the parking placard is for they were to be allocated to benefit the general public. Although the second factor, the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed, weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs, the 5 district court properly determined that “[s]tanding alone, the Tennessee derives the $20.50 for the disabled parking placard and vehicle registration from the amount charged for the registration of all fact that an assessment targets only a narrow class of people Class C passenger motor vehicles. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 55-21- is not enough to characterize the assessment as a fee. See 103(b)(2)(A)(i) (“If the applicant has not applied for vehicle registration, Wright, 835 F.2d at 144-45 (holding that fees charged to then the cost of the placard shall be the same as the regular fee for parolees were taxes for purposes of the TIA).” passenger motor vehicles, as provided in § 55-4-111.”). The dissent reasons that the original enactment of the Disabled Drivers Law of 1975, Based on the evidence in the record, the district court which provided that the actual cost of the placard be paid by the disabled driver, tied the amount assessed to the costs of the program, and thus properly concluded that the ultimate purpose of the State’s suggests that the purpose of the assessment was regulatory. See infra assessment was for general revenue raising purposes; such p. 16. This reasoning, however, does not overcome the insurmountable fact that the current version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-21- 103(b)(2)(A)(i) requires disabled persons who receive disabled parking 6 placards upon registration to pay the same approximate amount required The dissent would rather focus the inquiry on “why the money is of non-disabled persons to register their vehicle. Further, the collected taken” instead of “where the money goes.” Infra p. 15. Although such monies from the disabled persons are distributed in the same way as non- inquiry is entirely appropriate, the answer inexorably leads us to the disabled persons. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-4-111(a)(2), 55-6-107(a). evidence in the record which shows us that the money is taken to benefit Disabled persons are merely being taxed in the same way that non- the general welfare, and not to defray the specific costs of the disabled disabled persons are being taxed. parking placard program.