NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0191n.06
Filed: March 11, 2009
No. 06-5941
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. On Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Western
MUJAHID MUHAMMAD, District of Tennessee
Defendant-Appellant.
/
BEFORE: RYAN, SILER, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
RYAN, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Mujahid Muhammad, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the statements he made to a police officer after he
was stopped outside an apartment building and then arrested. We conclude that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Muhammad for a brief investigatory
inquiry, and we will affirm the district court’s refusal to suppress the statements.
I.
In the late morning of May 7, 2003, Officer Tommie Jones of the Memphis,
Tennessee, Police Department received a call from the manager of Pershing Park
Apartments asking him to investigate a group of young men who were loitering outside the
apartment complex and playing loud music. Apartment residents had experienced trouble
in the past with loitering and burglaries. Officer Jones and another officer responded to the
call in separate vehicles.
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As Officer Jones drove into the apartment complex, he saw three men standing near
a car in the parking lot of the building. Jones parked his patrol car and instructed the men
to stay where they were. Two complied, while the third, later identified as the defendant
Muhammad, walked away from the group and towards the apartment building. Jones
called out to Muhammad to remain where he was, but Muhammad did not respond.
Instead, he walked to the building and entered a corridor where there was a stairwell.
From where Officer Jones was standing, he could see Muhammad through large
glass windows. He watched Muhammad ascend the stairs, bend over, and then turn
around and come back down the stairs, exit the building, and walk towards him. Officer
Jones stopped Muhammad and then patted him down.
Jones then placed Muhammad in the back of the patrol car and went into the
building and up the stairwell where he had seen Muhammad bend over. There, he found
a .22 caliber pistol on the landing at the top of the stairs. The officer then returned to the
patrol car and told Muhammad that he was going to issue him a citation for possessing the
weapon. At this point, Officer Jones obtained a written release of rights from Muhammad
and then questioned him about the firearm.
Muhammad admitted that the firearm was his and told Jones that he had a prior
robbery conviction for which he had served four and a half years in prison. Since
Muhammad was carrying some identification documents, Officer Jones did not take him
to the police station, but instead issued Muhammad a misdemeanor citation for unlawful
possession of a weapon in a public place and released him. Muhammad was later
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and requested a jury trial.
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Before trial, Muhammad moved to suppress the firearm discovered at the scene as
well as the statements he made to the officer. The district court denied the motions and
the case proceeded to trial. The jury convicted Muhammad of being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the court sentenced him to 77
months’ imprisonment. Muhammad then filed a timely appeal. He has now abandoned
his challenge to the constitutionality of the seizure of the firearm, and seeks only
suppression of the statements he made to Officer Jones. Muhammad argues that the
initial stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the statements he made should
have been suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule.
II.
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo. United States v. Dotson, 49 F.3d 227, 229 (6th Cir. 1995). The issue whether
a police officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop is reviewed de
novo. Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
Under the Fourth Amendment, in order to justify a brief investigatory stop, an officer
must have a reasonable suspicion based on objective facts that the individual is engaged
in criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). We assess the
reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion based on a totality of the circumstances. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). An officer is entitled to rely upon his observations
and may also draw upon his own experience and specialized training to make inferences
and deductions about a subject’s suspicious behavior. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981).
III.
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The district court did not err in its conclusion that Officer Jones had a reasonable
basis to suspect that Muhammad was involved in criminal activity, justifying a brief
investigatory stop. First, Officer Jones was responding to the apartment manager’s
request to investigate the loitering group of men. Second, when Officer Jones approached
the group to ask them questions, he saw Muhammad walk away and ignore his request to
stop. While evasive behavior and refusal to answer police questions may not of
themselves provide reasonable suspicion, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983),
such conduct is pertinent to an officer’s decision whether to make an investigatory stop.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000). Jones saw Muhammad enter the
building, go up the stairs, bend over, return back downstairs towards him, and exit the
building. From these actions, Jones inferred that Muhammad may be involved in criminal
activity warranting a brief investigation. Jones therefore had a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity may be afoot and was justified in briefly detaining Muhammad, including
placing him in the police car, in order to investigate what Muhammad was apparently
attempting to hide.
Once the gun was discovered in the building of the place where Jones had seen
Muhammad bend over, Jones clearly had sufficient reason to continue to hold Muhammad
while issuing the citation, obtaining Muhammad’s written waiver of his rights, and asking
him questions about the firearm.
We conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress
Muhammad’s inculpatory statements.
IV.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.