NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United
To be citedStates Court
only in accordance of R.Appeals
with Fed. App. P.
32.1Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 28, 2007∗
Decided October 25, 2007
Before
Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge
Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
No. 07-1851
Appeal from the United
SHAWN JOHNSON, States District Court for the
Petitioner-Appellant, Southern District of
Indiana, Evansville
v. Division.
ALAN FINNAN, No. 3:05-CV-175-RLY-WGH
Respondent-Appellee. Richard J. Young, Judge.
Order
After our remand for further proceedings in this collateral attack on a prison disciplinary
board’s decision, see Johnson v. Finnan, 467 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006), the “Final Reviewing
Authority” within the state’s prison system dismissed the disciplinary proceeding and rescinded
all sanctions that had been imposed. The district court then dismissed the federal case as moot,
∗ This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating
Procedure 6(b). After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
No. 07-1851 Page 2
and Johnson has appealed a second time.
The district judge should have allowed Johnson to respond before dismissing the case, but
the error was harmless. A federal court hearing a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. §2254 reviews
custody (here, a revocation of good-time credits), and when custody ends (here, by restoration of
the credits) the federal proceeding becomes moot.
Johnson contends that he suffers collateral consequences, but that doctrine is inapplicable
when the custody stems from prison discipline. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
Moreover, the only collateral consequence that Johnson identifies is a loss of prison wages.
Money differs from custody; indeed, the opportunity to earn wages while in prison is not a form
of liberty or property to which the due process clause applies. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995); Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc). So there would be
nothing to this suit even if it were recast as one under 42 U.S.C. §1983 rather than 28 U.S.C.
§2254.
AFFIRMED