FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 25 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RENE BOISVERT, No. 13-15208
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-04263-EDL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LARS LOHAN, DBA California Trace &
Recovery; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Elizabeth D. Laporte, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 21, 2015***
Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Rene Boisvert appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with the enforcement of a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
state court judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003). We
may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.
& Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
Dismissal of Boisvert’s state law claims was proper because Boisvert failed
to allege facts sufficient to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a pleading must offer more than
“labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed
liberally, a plaintiff still must present factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief); see also Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713, 718-19 (Cal.
2006) (explaining that “communications with some relation to judicial proceedings
[are] absolutely immune from tort liability” under the California litigation privilege
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Boisvert’s Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims because Boisvert failed to allege with
sufficient particularity a pattern of racketeering activity cognizable under the RICO
statute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (allegations of fraud must be “state[d] with
2 13-15208
particularity”); Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d
397, 405 (9th Cir. 1991) (Rule 9(b)’s requirements apply to allegations regarding
fraudulent predicate acts in RICO actions).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint
without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(while leave to amend should be given freely, district court may dismiss without
leave where amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
We reject Boisvert’s contentions that defendants failed to follow the local
rules and filed improper successive motions, and that he was improperly denied
discovery.
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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