In the Matter of the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.R., and D.R., and H.A.R., H.G.R., H.O.R., and N.R., Children: S.R. and D.R. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 29 2015, 9:19 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT S.R. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Shawna D. Webster Gregory F. Zoeller
Webster & Webster, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Vincennes, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT D.R. Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Andrew K. Porter
Indianapolis, Indiana
Feavel & Porter
Vincennes, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination September 29, 2015
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of S.R., Mother, and D.R., 42A01-1501-JT-34
Father, and H.A.R., H.G.R., Appeal from the
H.O.R., and N.R., Children: Knox Superior Court
S.R. and D.R., The Honorable
W. Timothy Crowley, Judge
Appellants-Respondents,
Trial Court Cause Nos.
v. 42D01-1403-JT-6
42D01-1403-JT-7
42D01-1403-JT-8
Indiana Department of Child 42D01-1403-JT-9
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

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 Kirsch, Judge.

[1] S.R. (“Mother”) and D.R. (“Father”) (together, “Parents”) appeal the juvenile

court’s order terminating their parental rights to their children, H.A.R., H.G.R.,

H.O.R. and N.R. (collectively, “the Children”). Parents each raise several

issues in their respective briefs, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:

I. Whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
was required to make reasonable efforts with Father toward
reunification with the Children while Father was incarcerated;
and

II. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the
termination of Parents’ parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[3] H.A.R. was born on November 23, 2006, H.G.R. was born on October 2, 2007,

H.O.R. was born on September 9, 2009, and N.R. was born on August 20,

2012. Both Mother1 and Father are the biological parents of the Children and

were married, but separated, at the inception of this case. However, at the time

of the final termination hearing, Parents’ marriage had been dissolved.

1
Mother is also the biological mother of H.H., who was fifteen years old at the time of the termination
proceedings. Father is not the biological father of H.H. The status of Mother’s parental rights to H.H. is
unclear from the record.

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[4] On February 27, 2013, DCS received a report that Father was neglecting

H.A.R. by not providing the proper nutrition and care she required as a child

with special needs and various medical conditions. After an investigation by

DCS, the Children were allowed to remain in the care of Mother, who was told

to seek assistance from DCS if needed. On April 1, H.G.R. was bitten on the

cheek by a dog. Mother did not initially take her to the doctor, but did take her

at some point to the emergency room where she was treated for an infection. A

report was made to DCS regarding this dog bite incident.

[5] On April 3, 2013, the Children were removed from Mother’s care and placed

with Father. The next day, DCS filed a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”)

petition, alleging that Mother neglected the Children as they had poor hygiene

and dirty clothing, that Mother and the Children were living with Mother’s

brother who had molested H.H., Mother’s fifteen-year-old daughter, that

Mother was “drug-affected,” and that Mother often was absent from the home,

leaving H.H. to care for the Children. DCS Ex. 5. At a detention hearing held

on April 4, 2013, the juvenile court removed the Children from Father’s care

due to his failure to attend the hearing and to make sure the Children attended

school. On May 15, 2013, Parents entered into a written stipulation admitting

the CHINS allegations, and the Children were adjudicated as CHINS.

[6] On June 12, 2013, a dispositional hearing was held, and the juvenile court

ordered Parents, in pertinent part, to: (1) secure and maintain stable housing

and a legal course of income; (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation and

follow all recommendations; (3) not consume, manufacture, trade, distribute, or

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 sell any illegal controlled substances; (4) submit to random drug and alcohol

screens; (5) complete a psychological evaluation and follow all

recommendations; (6) attend all scheduled visitations with the Children; (7)

ensure the Children’s medical and mental health needs are met; and (8)

complete any program recommended by the DCS Family Case Manager

(“FCM”) or other service provider. On March 11, 2014, DCS filed its petition

to terminate the parental rights of Parents. Termination hearings were held on

July 23, October 7, December 3, and December 5, 2014.

[7] During the hearings, the following testimony and evidence was presented.

DCS referred Mother for a mental health evaluation, home-based case

management services, a substance abuse evaluation, random drug screens, and

visitations with the Children. Mother failed to comply with the mental health

evaluation. Beginning in April 2013, Heather Ray (“Ray”) provided Mother

with parent aide services to address employment, transportation, sobriety,

community resources, coping skills, and discipline techniques. In 2013, Mother

was compliant 98% of the time in meeting with Ray, but in 2014, Mother was

only compliant 51% of the time. Mother made progress toward her goals, but

could not maintain that progress. She was assigned a new parent aide in March

2014 because she was not happy with Ray. In August 2014, the new parent

aide tried to get Mother into a halfway house that would help her get into

substance abuse programs, but Mother never followed through. Because

Mother did not attend her meetings consistently, her case with parent aide

services was closed in October 2014.

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[8] Mother completed an initial substance abuse evaluation on April 30, 2013 and

was diagnosed with Methamphetamine Dependency and Adjustment Disorder.

Mother was recommended to complete an intensive outpatient program

(“IOP”), which she began on May 13, 2013. However, she left because she felt

uncomfortable due to a family member being part of the group. Instead,

Mother was to attend individual meetings with a counselor, but she missed four

appointments and was discharged for noncompliance. She began services for a

second time on November 6, 2013, but was again discharged for

noncompliance on November 20. Mother attempted services for a third time in

March 2014 after a second evaluation, but she cancelled or failed to attend

several appointments and had not attended since July 2014.

[9] Mother also received treatment at another facility, and eventually completed

the treatment program and was recommended to attend ninety AA/NA

meetings in ninety days, but her attendance was sporadic. Mother relapsed on

April 30, and May 20, 2014 by taking methamphetamine. Between June 15,

2013 and September 14, 2014, Mother had thirteen positive drug screens, which

were all positive for methamphetamine and some were also positive for

amphetamine, ephedrine, or alcohol. Ten of these positive drug screens

occurred after she had completed treatment. Mother also failed to show for

eight drug screens and failed on eighteen occasions to contact her service

provider to inquire as to whether she needed to take a drug screen.

[10] From December 4, 2013 until September 17, 2014, Mother’s visitation with the

Children was supervised by parent aide Ray. Mother was 90% compliant with

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 attendance at the visitations in 2013 and 84% compliant in 2014. However, her

visitations with the Children never moved past being supervised due to Ray’s

concerns. These included that Mother had to be reminded how and when to

feed H.A.R. through her feeding tube and when to change N.R.’s diapers.

Mother also did not properly administer medication into H.A.R.’s port and did

not communicate well with H.A.R., who was not able to communicate in the

same way as the other Children. Mother also failed to bring extra clothing for

the Children, and the visitations had to end early when H.O.R. had an

accident. Additionally, Mother admitted that she was sometimes high on drugs

during the visitations.

[11] On September 17, 2014, Mother was arrested for a probation violation and was

released on November 30, 2014. At the time of the termination hearing,

Mother was living with her boyfriend and his sixteen-year-old son in a two-

bedroom mobile home, which the FCM thought was inappropriate and too

small for two adults and six children. Prior to living with her boyfriend,

Mother was living with her brother and then her father, sleeping on either the

couch or the floor. Mother was not employed at the time of the termination

hearing, and during the underlying case, she was only employed for two to

three months. Further, DCS had concerns about Mother’s boyfriend because

he tested positive for methamphetamine, made service providers feel

threatened, and argued with Ray during visitations.

[12] Turning to Father’s situation, DCS referred Father for a mental health

evaluation, home-based case management services, a substance abuse

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 evaluation, random drug screens, and visitations with the Children. Father

completed a mental health evaluation, but failed to follow through with any of

the recommendations. From April 3, 2013 until July 24, 2014, Father worked

with parent aide Ray whose goals were to assist Father with employment,

vocational rehabilitation, parenting skills, budgeting, discipline, and domestic

violence education based on issues between him and his girlfriend. He was

only 55% compliant in 2013 with these services and only 40% compliant in

2014 and made no progress toward his goals.

[13] Father did not attend an initial substance abuse evaluation and several

subsequent appointments, but eventually had an initial assessment in April

2014, which resulted in diagnoses of alcohol dependency, adjustment disorder

with anxiety, and depression. Father was recommended to participate in IOP,

but failed to follow through, and his case was eventually closed. Between

September 2013 and July 2014, Father had six positive drug screens, which

were positive for various substances including hydrocodone, THC,

amphetamine, and methamphetamine. He also failed to report or was unable

to be located for twenty-six drug screens.

[14] Ray also supervised Father’s visitations with the Children from November 2013

until July 2014. He was only 64% compliant in attendance for the visitations in

2013 and 50% compliant in 2014. When he attended visitations, Ray had

concerns, which included that it took Father longer than it should have for him

to feed H.A.R., and he did not come prepared with things needed to feed the

Children. Father did not progress past supervised visitation with the Children.

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[15] Father had several criminal convictions, which included operating while

intoxicated, public intoxication, and resisting law enforcement. He was

incarcerated in July 2014 for a probation violation and had an expected release

date of January 2015. While incarcerated, Father did not receive any services

from DCS and did not voluntarily participate in any other programs. DCS did

not offer Father any services during his incarceration due to his previous non-

compliance with drug screens, visitation, and parent aide services.

[16] Before his incarceration, Father had been living with his girlfriend on an

intermittent basis. He received approximately $710 per month in Social

Security benefits. Father previously worked between eight to fourteen hours a

day for a man doing construction, concrete work, and working on cars.

However, Father had a falling out with the man and was no longer employed

by him at the time of the hearing.

[17] H.A.R. was born with severe cognitive disability, had a feeding tube through

which she received her food, and was not able to communicate verbally. When

the Children were still in Parents’ care, H.A.R.’s teacher had serious concerns

regarding her care due to H.A.R. coming to school very dirty with soiled

clothing that the teacher would change and wash for her. H.A.R.’s feeding tube

was sometimes bloody and always dirty. She was also underweight, and the

school nurse would have to weigh her weekly. The teacher stated that Parents

did not always send in the liquid formula H.A.R. required, and the school nurse

would have to buy some because H.A.R. was hungry and would cry and reach

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 for her feeding tube. H.A.R. also required glasses and braces for her legs that

Parents did not provide for her.

[18] When DCS received the report in February 2013 concerning H.A.R. being

taken to the hospital, she was diagnosed with failure to thrive. Father had been

feeding her tomato juice through her feeding tube instead of the Boost formula

she needed. H.A.R.’s teacher noticed a huge change in the child within two

weeks of being removed from Parents’ home. H.A.R. was able to communicate

her needs and had been given leg braces and glasses.

[19] At the time of removal from Parents’ care, the Children all had poor hygiene,

dirty clothes, and an odor. The Children’s heads had been shaved due to issues

with lice. Since removal, H.A.R. has been placed with foster mother, K.S.

Children H.G.R., H.O.R., and N.R. were originally placed with foster mother,

M.W., and were removed due to M.W.’s health, but were eventually placed

back in M.W’s care. At the time of the termination hearing, H.G.R. was placed

with H.A.R. in K.S.’s home. All of the Children were bonded to their foster

mothers, and since being removed from Parents’ care, the Children are clean

and have improved drastically overall.

[20] DCS was never able to recommend that Children be returned to the care of

Parents due to Parents’ failure to maintain sobriety, noncompliance with

services offered, and inability to maintain stable housing and employment. Ray

testified that she did not believe it was safe to return the Children to Parents’

care based on Parents’ inability to properly and adequately care for the

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 Children. Tr. at 207, 220. The FCM testified that termination was in the

Children’s best interests because the Parents had failed to reunify with the

Children during the twenty months the case was pending, and the Children

needed permanency. Id. at 324. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) also agreed

that termination was in the best interest of the Children based on the Children’s

need for permanency and Parents’ lack of adequate housing, unemployment,

and continued positive drug screens. GAL Ex. A at 16. The GAL was further

concerned with Parents’ ability to manage the Children’s medical and

therapeutic needs. Id. At the time of the termination hearing, DCS’s plan for

the Children was adoption, and their current foster mothers were willing to

adopt.

[21] On December 29, 2014, the juvenile court issued its findings of fact,

conclusions, and order terminating Parents’ parental rights to the Children.

Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Reasonable Efforts
[22] Father argues that DCS failed to provide him reasonable efforts toward

reunification when it did not offer him services once he became incarcerated.

He asserts that DCS had an obligation under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-

5.5(b) to provide reasonable efforts towards reunification and that ceasing to

provide any services to him while he was incarcerated was “an absolute failure

on . . . DCS’s part to make all reasonable efforts towards reunification.”

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 Appellant’s Br. at 20. Father contends that, although he was never fully

compliant with services prior to incarceration, he did comply at some level, and

DCS should have provided him an opportunity toward reunification even

though he was incarcerated. He further claims that DCS’s failure to provide

services infringed on his constitutionally protected right to raise his own

children.

[23] Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5(b) states that DCS “shall make reasonable

efforts to preserve and reunify families.” However, the law concerning

termination of parental rights does not require DCS to offer services to the

parent to correct the deficiencies in childcare. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000); see In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

(concluding that although “the record supports Father’s assertions that the DCS

did not actively promote the development of his relationship with H.L. . . . the

absence of services was due to Father’s incarceration and he does not point to

any evidence that he specifically requested . . . services”); Rowlett v. Vanderburgh

Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)

(stating that DCS was not required to provide Father with services directed at

reuniting him with his children), trans. denied.

[24] Here, prior to his incarceration in July 2014, Father had over a year to

participate in services and work toward reunification with the Children.

However, Father was not compliant with the services offered to him by DCS in

that time period. During that time, he failed to submit to twenty-six drug

screens, failed to complete substance abuse treatment, failed to complete a

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 mental health evaluation, only attended 65% of the visitations in 2013 and only

50% in 2014, and only attended 58% of the parent aide sessions in 2013 and

only 40% in 2014. Father also admitted at the hearing that he did not request

services from DCS while incarcerated and failed to participate in any programs

offered in jail. Tr. at 474-75. “[A] parent may not sit idly by without asserting

a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied

services to assist him with his parenting. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d at 201.

[25] Father also contends that his parental rights were violated because mere

incarceration is insufficient to warrant termination of his parental rights.

However, his argument is incorrect because his parental rights were not

terminated based on his mere incarceration. Father became incarcerated in

July 2014, over a year after the underlying CHINS case began. The evidence

showed that he was not compliant with the services offered to him prior to his

incarceration, including continuing to use controlled substances, failing to

consistently attend visitations and other services, failing to maintain stable

housing and employment, and not complying with recommendations of his

substance abuse evaluation. We, therefore, conclude that Father’s parental

rights were not terminated based on his mere incarceration, and DCS did not

violate his rights by not offering him services during his incarceration.

II. Sufficient Evidence
[26] We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly

deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental

rights. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. When
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 reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258,

265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence

and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id.

Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the

evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 14.

[27] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights to the Children, the juvenile court

entered specific findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment

contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered

standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d

143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98,

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s

decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150,

1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[28] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In

re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). These parental interests, however, are

not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining

the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re J.C., 994

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 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In addition, although the right to raise

one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home

available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is

unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[29] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2).

Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section

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 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

[30] Initially, Father contends that the evidence presented did not support the

juvenile court’s finding that he was not “willing, or able, to do the things

necessary to bring about reunification” with the Children. Appellant’s App. at

19. He contends that he, at some level, complied with the dispositional decree

and participated in many of the requirements, and therefore, the evidence did

not support this finding. We disagree. The evidence showed that Father failed

to submit to twenty-six drug screens, did not attend meetings, failed to complete

a mental health evaluation, only contacted the FCM minimally, was never

more than 64% compliant in visitations with the Children, and was never more

than 58% compliant in parent aide services. We conclude that the evidence

supported this finding by the juvenile court.

[31] Both Parents argue that DCS failed to prove the required elements for

termination by sufficient evidence. Specifically, they contend that DCS failed

to present sufficient evidence that the conditions that resulted in the Children

being removed would not be remedied. They further allege that DCS failed to

present sufficient evidence that termination of their parental rights was in the

best interests of the Children.

[32] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that

led to a child’s removal and continued placement outside the home would be

remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs.,

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 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, “we must ascertain what conditions

led to their placement and retention in foster care.” Id. Second, “we

‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will

not be remedied.’” Id. (citing In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010)

(citing In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))). In the second

step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination

proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and

balancing a parent’s recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of

conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect

or deprivation.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989

N.E.2d at 1231). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has

discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only

shortly before termination.” Id. Although trial courts are required to give due

regard to changed conditions, this does not preclude them from finding that a

parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior. Id.

[33] In the present case, the evidence showed that, on February 27, 2013, DCS

received a report that H.A.R. had been admitted to the hospital and diagnosed

with failure to thrive due to the fact that Father had been feeding her tomato

juice through her feeding tube instead of nutritional formula she needed. At

that time, there were also concerns about Mother’s drug use, housing situation,

and leaving H.H., her fifteen-year-old daughter, to care for the Children. On

April 1, 2013, DCS received a report that H.G.R. had been bitten by a dog and

that Mother had failed to seek immediate medical attention and the bite had

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 become infected. The Children were removed from Mother’s care and placed

with Father, but were taken out of his care just a few days later due to Father’s

failure to attend the detention hearing and to ensure the Children’s attendance

at school. The CHINS petition alleged that Mother neglected the Children as

they had poor hygiene and dirty clothing, Mother and the Children were living

with Mother’s brother who had molested H.H., Mother’s fifteen-year-old

daughter, Mother was “drug-affected,” and Mother often was absent from the

home, leaving H.H. to care for the Children. In its detention report, the reasons

for removal by DCS were Mother’s refusal to cooperate and comply with DCS,

the Children’s poor hygiene, Mother’s failure to submit to any drug screens,

Mother’s living situation, and H.H. was often left to care for the other Children.

[34] As to Mother, the evidence at the termination hearing showed that, although

she complied somewhat with the services offered to her by DCS, she was only

51% compliant with the parent aide services in 2014 and these services were

closed due to noncompliance in October 2014. Mother failed to complete

substance abuse treatment three separate times, and although she eventually

completed treatment on her fourth attempt, she continued to test positive for

methamphetamine ten times after completing treatment. She also did not

follow through with attending ninety AA/NA meetings in ninety days as she

was recommended to do after treatment. She further failed to attend at least

eight drug screens and failed, on eighteen separate occasions, to contact service

providers about whether she needed to take a drug screen.

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[35] Mother also failed to maintain stable employment and adequate housing. She

was not employed at the time of the termination hearing and had only been

employed for approximately three months during the pendency of the case.

Additionally, at the time of the hearing, Mother was living in a two-bedroom

mobile home with her boyfriend and his sixteen-year-old son, which was not

adequate housing for two adults and six children. DCS also had concerns

regarding Mother’s boyfriend due to his arguing with service providers and

testing positive for drugs. Mother’s failure to engage in services, continued

drug use, and inability to maintain stable housing and employment reflect an

unwillingness to modify her behavior to provide a safe and secure home for the

Children. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the juvenile court

did not err in finding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions

that resulted in the removal and the reasons for continued placement of the

Children outside the home would not be remedied.

[36] As to Father, the evidence at the termination hearing showed that Father failed

to complete a mental health evaluation and failed to complete substance abuse

treatment. In not completing substance abuse treatment, Father failed to

address his issues with both drugs and alcohol and, therefore, continued to test

positive for controlled substances. Father also failed to maintain stable housing

and employment. At the time of the termination hearing, Father was

unemployed, and his housing was not stable as he was only living “off and on”

with his girlfriend. Tr. at 266. Additionally, Father did not consistently attend

visitation with the Children, and when he did, the service providers had

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 concerns about his ability to care for the Children, particularly in feeding

H.A.R. Father was also only minimally compliant with attending parent aide

services and made no progress toward his goals. Further, at the time of the

termination hearing, Father had violated his probation and was incarcerated

with an expected release date of January 2015. Based on the evidence

presented, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that there

was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal

and the reasons for continued placement of the Children outside the home

would not be remedied.

[37] Parents next argue that insufficient evidence was presented to prove that

termination is in the best interest of the Children. In determining what is in the

best interests of the child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the

evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id.

Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child’s emotional

and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927,

930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). The trial court need not wait until the

child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social

development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child

relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an important

consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of

the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s

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 best interests. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798

N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[38] Here, the evidence presented showed that Parents were not able to provide for

the Children’s needs and to provide them with the necessary stability and

permanency. At the time of the termination hearing, both Parents were

unemployed and neither of them had adequate and appropriate housing for the

Children. Additionally, Father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing and

was not due to be released until January 2015. Further, both Parents continued

to test positive for controlled substances. A parent’s historical inability to

provide a suitable environment along with the parent’s current inability to do

the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best

interests of the children. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[39] There was also evidence that Parents were unable to comprehend and provide

for the Children’s medical and therapeutic needs. H.A.R has special needs and

is fed through a feeding tube. There was concern regarding whether Parents

were able to take care of these needs. During visitations, Mother had to be

reminded to feed H.A.R. and was not able to properly administer medication

through H.A.R.’s port. Father had issues in feeding H.A.R. in that it took him

much longer to feed her than it should have, and it was due to him feeding her

tomato juice instead of her formula that she was admitted to the hospital and

diagnosed with failure to thrive in February 2013. Additionally, the Children

had been attending mental health appointments, and there was concern that

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 Parents would not be able to get the Children to their necessary mental health

and medical appointments.

[40] Both the FCM and the GAL recommended termination as being in the

Children’s best interests due to the Children’s need for permanency and

Parents’ failure to do what was necessary for reunification, such as maintaining

stable housing and employment and remaining drug free. DCS, likewise, was

never able to recommend that the Children be returned to Parents’ care due to

Parents’ failure to maintain sobriety, noncompliance with services offered, and

inability to maintain stable housing and employment. Ray testified that she did

not believe it was safe to return the Children to Parents care because of Parents’

inability to properly and adequately care for the Children. Tr. at 207, 220.

Based on the above, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to

prove that termination was in the best interest of the Children. In arguing that

termination was not in the best interests of the Children, both Mother and

Father assert that they had a strong bond with the Children and severing that

bond would be harmful to the Children. However, this is just a request for us to

reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.

[41] We will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear

error’-- that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been made.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)

(quoting In re Egly, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Based on the record

before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of Parents’

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 parental rights to the Children was clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the

juvenile court’s judgment.

[42] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

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