UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4026
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
THURMAN LEE JONES, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:09-cr-00055-FL-2)
Submitted: August 27, 2015 Decided: September 29, 2015
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thurman Lee Jones, Jr. pleaded guilty to use of a firearm
during a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2012). The district court sentenced Jones to 60
months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised
release. Following Jones’ release from incarceration, he
incurred four state criminal convictions. The district court
revoked his supervised release and sentenced Jones to 24 months
of imprisonment, followed by one year of supervised release, and
Jones now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal, Jones challenges the district court’s finding
that one of his violations was a Grade A violation under the
Sentencing Guidelines because it was a crime of violence
punishable by a term exceeding one year of imprisonment. Jones
also argues that the court failed to adequately explain the
sentence.
We review a sentence imposed as a result of a supervised
release violation to determine whether the sentence was plainly
unreasonable, generally following the procedural and substantive
considerations employed in reviewing original sentences. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a
district court must consider the policy statements in Chapter
Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory
factors, “the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke
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its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to
the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal
quotation marks omitted). While the court must provide a
statement of reasons for the sentence imposed, this statement
“need not be as detailed or specific” as that required for an
original sentence. See United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
547 (4th Cir. 2010).
Under the Guidelines, conduct constituting a federal or
state offense punishable by a term exceeding one year of
imprisonment that is a crime of violence is a Grade A violation.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.1(a) (2014). The
determination of the grade of the violation “is to be based on
the defendant’s actual conduct,” rather than the conviction
incurred for the conduct. USSG § 7B1.1(a) cmt. n.1. A crime of
violence is defined as any offense punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, that “(1) has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson,
or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” USSG § 4B1.2(a).
In reviewing the district court’s calculations under the
Guidelines, “we review the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United
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States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We will “find clear error only if, on
the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 631. We
have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court did not err in classifying Jones’ violation as a
Grade A violation under the Guidelines. We further conclude
that Jones has not demonstrated that the district court’s
explanation for the sentence constituted reversible error. See
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547-48 (4th Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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