MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Sep 30 2015, 9:51 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Mary Beth Ramey William H. Kelley
Ramey & Hailey Kelley & Belcher
Indianapolis, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana
Nicholas F. Baker
The Hastings Law Firm
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Matthew Longest, Deceased, September 30, 2015
by Robert Longest, Court of Appeals Cause No.
Administrator of the Estate and 47A01-1501-CT-35
Parent of Matthew Longest, and Appeal from the Lawrence Circuit
Robert Longest, Jr., Court
Administrator of the Estate of The Honorable Lori Thatcher
Maribel Longest, Deceased and Quillen, Special Judge
Parent of Matthew Longest, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellants-Plaintiffs, 47C01-9910-CT-894
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v.
Lisa M. Sledge, a minor and
Roger Brown and Donna Sledge,
a/k/a Donna Sledge Brown,
Appellees-Defendants.
Barnes, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Robert Longest, Sr., as the administrator of the Estate of Matthew Longest, and
Robert Longest, Jr., as the administrator of the Estate of Maribel Longest,
(collectively “the Longests”) appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of Lisa
Sledge, Robert Brown, and Donna Sledge Brown (collectively “the Appellees”).
We reverse.
Issue
[2] The Longests raises two issues. We address the dispositive issue, which is
whether the trial court properly determined that the Child Wrongful Death
Statute (“CWDS”) did not apply to the Longests’ cause of action.
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Facts
[3] In 1998, Matthew was twenty, living with his parents, Robert, Sr., and
Maribel,1 and working as a hod carrier, for his father, a journeyman mason.
Hod carriers “mix mud, set up walls, start materials ahead of the mason, [and]
keep them supplied with mortar . . . .” Tr. p. 89. Matthew was learning the
trade as his father’s apprentice. Through this “on-the-job training,” Matthew
could eventually take a qualification test to become a journeyman mason. Tr.
p. 57. Alternatively, the union offers an apprenticeship program, which is a
four-year program, with monthly progress reports and a classroom component.
Both paths can lead to an individual becoming a journeyman mason.
[4] On April 21, 1998, Robert, Sr., was driving, and Matthew was a passenger
when they were involved in a head-on collision with a vehicle driven by sixteen-
year-old Lisa Sledge. Matthew was killed in the accident, and Robert, Sr., was
seriously injured.
[5] In 1999, the Longests filed a lawsuit, which included a wrongful death claim,
against the Appellees. In 2001, the trial court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the Appellees on the basis that the Longests was not
entitled to recover under the CWDS because Matthew was not enrolled in a
vocational school or program at the time of his death. In 2012, a bench trial
were held regarding liability and damages, during which the Longests asked the
1
During the course of litigation, Maribel passed away.
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trial court to reconsider its prior summary judgment order. The trial court
rejected this request but found in favor of the Longests on the issue of liability.
The Longests appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Appellees on the CWDS claim.
[6] On appeal, the Longests argued that Matthew’s informal, non-union
apprenticeship was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether he was enrolled in a vocational school or program at the
time of his death as required by the CWDS. We concluded, “provided that the
non-union apprenticeship qualifies as a vocational program, we have little
difficulty concluding that Matthew was ‘enrolled’ for the purposes of the
CWDS.” Longest v. Sledge, 992 N.E.2d 221, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
denied.
[7] On remand, findings and conclusions were requested and, following the trial,
the trial court found in part:
At the time of this tragic accident Matthew was not “enrolled” in
a “vocational school or program”. Only two witnesses testified
at trial about Matthew’s employment and on the job training,
(Robert Longest Senior and Robert Longest Junior). It is
undisputed that at the time of the accident Matthew was
employed as a hod carrier with strictly on the job training and
there was no classroom work, no completion of any application
forms and no creation of any documentation for any enrollment
in any program and no record for any actual program. In fact,
the only items contained in Matthew’s personnel or employment
file were the standard bookkeeping payroll documentation for tax
withholdings, hours and wages as would be the case of any
employee. There were no application forms, no self-study
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programs, no record keeping, no requirement to study textbooks,
no requirement to complete a module of questions, no study of
materials, no classroom activity, no classroom instructions, no
curriculum, nothing to sign and no grades or graduation
certificates.
[8] App. pp. 295-96. The trial court concluded that the Longests “have not met
their burden of proving that Matthew was enrolled in an institution of higher
education or in a vocational school or program at the time of the accident.” Id.
at 296. The Longests now appeal.
Analysis
[9] In reviewing findings and conclusions issued pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule
52(A), we apply a two-tiered review, and affirm if the evidence supports the
findings and the findings support the judgment. Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d
600, 603-04 (Ind. 2014). We may not set aside findings or a judgment unless
they are clearly erroneous, and we must give due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge witness credibility. Id. (citing Ind. T.R. 52(A)). Findings
are clearly erroneous only when they have no factual support in the record, and
judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly
found facts. Id. at 603-604.
[10] The relevant version of the CWDS defines “child” as “an unmarried individual
without dependents who is: (1) less than twenty (20) years of age; or (2) less
than twenty-three (23) years of age and is enrolled in an institution of higher
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education or in a vocational school or program.” Ind. Code 34-1-1-8(a) (1997).2
In the Longests’ first appeal, we concluded:
“enrollment” does not necessarily require any written record,
particularly where the circumstances indicate such records would
be unnecessary or superfluous. Here, . . . Robert Sr. attested that
there is no formal enrollment process for non-union, on-the-job
apprenticeships like the one in which Matthew was participating.
We decline to impose such a rigid requirement in this case,
particularly in light of the fact that Matthew was learning the
trade under the supervision of his own father. Rather, we
conclude that in this context, to be “enrolled” in a vocational
program means no more than to be actively participating in such
a program. Robert Sr. testified that Matthew was continuously
participating in the apprenticeship at the time of his death. Thus,
provided that the non-union apprenticeship qualifies as a
vocational program, we have little difficulty concluding that
Matthew was “enrolled” for the purposes of the CWDS.
Longest, 992 N.E.2d at 227.
[11] The law of the case doctrine mandates that an appellate court’s determination
of a legal issue binds the trial court and ordinarily restricts the court on appeal
in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and relevantly similar facts.
Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ind. 2003). Although a court has the
2
In 1998, the CWDS was recodified as Indiana Code Section 34-23-2-1, effective July 1, 1998. The statute
now defines a “child” as “an unmarried individual without dependents who is: (1) less than twenty (20) years
of age; or (2) less than twenty-three (23) years of age and is enrolled in a postsecondary educational
institution or a career and technical education school or program that is not a postsecondary educational
program.” There is no dispute regarding the application of the prior version of the CWDS.
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power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any
circumstance, courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances such as where the initial decision was “clearly erroneous and
would work manifest injustice.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because we decided
the issue of Matthew’s enrollment as a matter of law in the Longests’ first
appeal, the issue of enrollment was not available for reconsideration by the trial
court and, in the absence of a compelling reason, we will not reconsider this
conclusion. Thus, the trial court’s finding on remand that there was no
application forms or documentation of enrollment is not relevant because the
issue of enrollment was resolved in the first appeal.
[12] The only issue properly before the trial court was whether Matthew’s
apprenticeship was a vocational school or program under the CWDS. On this
issue, we observed in the Longests’ first appeal:
Moreover, we believe the legislature’s decision to delay the age of
majority for the purposes of the CWDS from age twenty until age
twenty-three where the decedent is enrolled in an “institution of
higher education or in a vocational school or program” reflects
its intention to allow recovery when a decedent was in active
pursuit of any of a broad range of educational goals—ranging
from college degrees to trade designations and other, less
traditional certifications like those at issue in Sweet [v. Art Pape
Transfer, Inc., 721 N.E.2d at 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)]. We
believe that disallowing coverage based solely on a program’s
informality and focus on real-world, on-the-job training as
opposed to classroom learning would ignore the practical realities
of many courses of vocational study and exclude those in pursuit
of a number of traditional trade designations from the operation
of the CWDS. In light of the statute’s broad language and
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express inclusion of vocational programs, we do not believe this
to have been the legislature’s intent.
None of this is to suggest, however, that merely adding an
element of on-the-job training will transform what would
otherwise be nothing more than a job into a vocational program.
Here, Matthew was simultaneously working as hod carrier and
pursuing his informal apprenticeship under his father’s
supervision. Provided Matthew successfully completed the
apprenticeship and demonstrated the requisite skill, he would
have attained the title of journeyman mason and been eligible for
union certification. As Robert Sr. attested, “[w]hether working
for me or for Wilhelm, and whether in the union’s formal
apprentice program or through the less formal, but equally
accepted on-the-job training, Matthew was working toward the
completion of his apprenticeship and becoming a mason.”
Appellant’s Appendix at 63. Based on these facts, we conclude that
the evidence most favorable to the Longests as the non-moving
parties is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the informal, non-union apprenticeship was a vocational
program for the purposes of the CWDS.
Longest, 992 N.E.2d at 228 (second alteration in original).
[13] At the trial on remand, Robert, Jr., and Robert, Sr., testified about the
apprenticeship path to becoming a journeyman mason and the on-the-job
training that it involves. They testified that the union recognizes
apprenticeships and the union program as the two paths to becoming a
journeyman. Robert, Jr., described the apprenticeship as “working under other
journeyman to learn how to do the trade. . . . There’s a period of time to where
you’re going from starting to a process of learning how to become a skilled
craftsman in a trade-in whatever trade it is.” Tr. p. 21. He also testified that
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becoming a journeyman mason increased one’s pay by 60%-75%. Robert, Sr.,
described the steps of progression in learning the trade as beginning as a hod
carrier and then learning to use a trowel. He also explained that a dexterity test
was required to obtain a journeyman card. He testified that Matthew was in
the phase of learning how to use the tools.
[14] It is true, as the trial court found, that the apprenticeship program in which
Matthew was participating did not include any specific record keeping,
textbook or other study materials, classroom component, or grades. However,
the undisputed evidence showed that there are two paths to becoming a
journeyman mason, that Matthew was participating in one of the paths, and
that after his apprenticeship he could eventually complete the necessary testing
to become a journeyman mason. Given the narrow issue before the trial court,
we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the Longests had “not
met their burden of proving that Matthew was enrolled in an institution of
higher education or in a vocational school or program at the time of the
accident.” App. p. 296. The undisputed evidence showed that the informal,
non-union apprenticeship was a vocational program because it could ultimately
lead to Matthew obtaining his journeyman’s card.
Conclusion
[15] The trial court improperly concluded that the Longests failed to meet their
burden of establishing that Matthew’s apprenticeship was a vocational program
under the CWDS. We reverse.
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[16] Reversed.
Najam, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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