J-A07043-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ROBERT C. KNAPP AND DIANE S. KNAPP, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
HIS WIFE PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants
v.
DOUGLAS ADAMS
Appellee No. 1523 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order August 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Civil Division at No(s): 11792-2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 2, 2015
Appellants, Robert C. Knapp and Diane S. Knapp, appeal from the
August 18, 2014 order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee,
Douglas Adams in this defamation action. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court has set forth the relevant facts and procedural history,
as follows.
[Appellant], Robert Knapp, is a medical doctor
with a practice concentrated in Endocrinology, with
his office located in Bridgewater Borough.
[Appellee], Douglas Adams, is the Chief of Police of
Bridgewater Borough. Dr. Knapp claims that Chief
Adams is liable to him for an alleged defamatory
comment the Chief made during an interview that
aired on a WPXI news broadcast, on October 27,
2009, regarding indecent assault charges that the
police department filed against Dr. Knapp.
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By way of background, the Bridgewater Police
first received a complaint from one of Dr. Knapp’s
female patients in July 2009. The patient claimed
Dr. Knapp had inappropriate physical contact with
her during a medical exam. A few months later, the
police filed formal criminal charges of indecent
assault against Dr. Knapp based on the allegations of
this female patient.
A few days after the formal charges were filed,
on October 1, 2009, WPXI interviewed the patient
regarding her allegations and published a news
article on this story. Following this news report,
several other women came forward reporting similar
incidents with Dr. Knapp. Specifically, from October
2, 2009 through October 26, 2009, the Bridgewater
Police interviewed approximately 24 of Dr. Knapp’s
patients. Formal criminal charges were filed by the
Bridgewater Police on behalf of some of these
women on October 26, 2009. The criminal charges
all related to claims that Dr. Knapp had indecent
physical contact with these patients during their
medical exams.
After the additional formal charges were filed
against Dr. Knapp, on October 27, 2009, WPXI
interviewed Chief Adams in his capacity as
Bridgewater’s Chief of Police. That same day, the
news station televised a report during the 5:00
news, at which time the station aired portions of
Chief Adams interview.
Specifically, the relevant segment begins with
a voiceover of the reporter stating: “First, we
uncovered all of the police reports that are piling up
against a well-known Beaver County doctor. Then,
we were in place when Bridgewater physician, Robert
Knapp, along with his attorney, appeared before a
Beaver County magistrate to answer charges of
indecent assault against five of his female patients.”
This voiceover was accompanied by video
footage of multiple criminal complaints against Dr.
Knapp being set down in succession. Dr. Knapp’s
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attorney then made a brief statement, and the
voiceover came back on giving more background
details to the story.
The televised report next showed Chief Adams
making the statement at issue in this litigation: “In
my eyes, he definitely crossed the line. He’s a—he’s
a predator.” This single statement forms the basis of
Dr. Knapp’s defamation claim against Chief Adams,
and was the only alleged defamatory statement
contained in the pleadings.
Chief Adams statement also appeared on the
websites of WPXI and the Beaver County Times, and
on the front page of the Beaver County Times print
version. These written news reports also
summarized the nature of the allegations against Dr.
Knapp, and noted that a number of female patients
had reported similar allegations to the police.
Approximately one year later, on October 26,
2010, following his acquittal on the criminal indecent
assault charges, Dr. Knapp and his wife, filed an
action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania asserting claims of
defamation, violation of federal constitutional rights,
and loss of consortium. [On November 2, 2010,
Appellants’ amended their complaint.] The Federal
Court dismissed all of the federal claims with
prejudice, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over
the state law claims.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/14, at 1-4 (footnote omitted).
Subsequently, on October 6, 2011, Appellants filed a praecipe to
transfer the matter from federal court to the Court of Common Pleas
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103. On January 18, 2013, Chief Adams filed
an answer and new matter in response to Appellants’ November 2, 2010
amended complaint which alleged, inter alia, claims of defamation and loss
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of consortium. Appellants filed an answer to Chief Adams new matter on
February 4, 2013. Thereafter, on March 7, 2014, Chief Adams filed a motion
for summary judgment. In his motion Chief Adams argued he was entitled
to summary judgment on the bases: (1) he prefaced the statement by the
words “in my eyes” signaling it was “an expression of his opinion”, (2) he is
entitled to immunity as public official, and (3) he is entitled to summary
judgment on the loss of consortium claim on the basis that Dr. Knapp’s
defamation claim is meritless. Chief Adams’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
3/7/14, at 4-5, ¶¶ 13-15. A hearing was held on April 16, 2014, and on
August 18, 2014, the trial court granted Chief Adams’ motion for summary
judgment.
On September 15, 2014, Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and
on September 16, 2014, the trial court filed an order stating its August 18,
2014 memorandum opinion shall serve as its opinion pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellant Procedure 1925(a). Said order did not
require Appellants to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). Nevertheless, on October 3, 2014,
Appellants filed a Rule 1925(b) statement.
On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review.
[1.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of
law when it ruled that Adams’ statement “in my eyes
… he’s a predator” operated as a defense to the
claim of defamation because the otherwise
defamatory statement was preceded with signal
words which is not in accord to the precedent set
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forth in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S.
1, 18-19 (U.S. 1990)?
[2.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of
law when it refused to consider the entire statement
made by Adams in the same news broadcast as part
of the context in which the beginning of his
statement was made pursuant to Baker v.
Lafayette College, 532 A.2d 399, 402 ([Pa.]
1987)?
[3.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of
law, and also abused its discretion, when it
determined on summary judgment that the
statements made by Adams were incapable of
defamatory meaning, when those statements were
false and derogatory, and provably lowered
[Appellant Dr. Knapp]’s personal and professional
reputation in the eyes of the community?
Appellants’ Brief at 4.
We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review.
“[O]ur standard of review of an order granting
summary judgment requires us to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law[,] and our scope of review
is plenary.” Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d
795, 797–798 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
“We view the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be
resolved against the moving party.” Barnes v.
Keller, 62 A.3d 382, 385 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Larrimore, 987 A.2d 732, 736
(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “Only where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
be entered.” Id. The rule governing summary
judgment has been codified at Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 1035.2, which states as follows.
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Rule 1035.2. Motion
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but
within such time as not to unreasonably delay
trial, any party may move for summary
judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue
of any material fact as to a necessary
element of the cause of action or defense
which could be established by additional
discovery or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery
relevant to the motion, including the
production of expert reports, an adverse
party who will bear the burden of proof
at trial has failed to produce evidence of
facts essential to the cause of action or
defense which in a jury trial would
require the issues to be submitted to a
jury.
Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.
“Where the non-moving party bears the
burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely
on his pleadings or answers in order to survive
summary judgment.” Babb v. Ctr. Cmty. Hosp.,
47 A.3d 1214, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 412 (Pa. 2013).
Further, “failure of a non-moving party to adduce
sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case
and on which he bears the burden of proof
establishes the entitlement of the moving party to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
Thus, our responsibility as an appellate
court is to determine whether the record either
establishes that the material facts are
undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of
facts to make out a prima facie cause of
action, such that there is no issue to be
decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence
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that would allow a fact-finder to render a
verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then
summary judgment should be denied.
Id., citing Reeser v. NGK N. Am., Inc., 14 A.3d
896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Jones v.
Levin, 940 A.2d 451, 452–454 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(internal citations omitted).
Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636, 638-639 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Instantly, we recognize that each of Appellants’ three issues are
interrelated. First, Appellants asserts the trial court erred in holding that the
“statement made by Adams were opinions and, as such, were not subject to
defamatory meaning.” Appellants’ Brief at 15. Second, Appellants argues
the “trial court erred when it refused to consider the other factual allegations
in Adams’ statement made in the same news broadcast as part of the
context in which the alleged defamatory statement was made.” Id. at 16.
Finally, Appellants argues the “statement made by Adams is not capable of
defamatory meaning.” Id. at 19. Accordingly, we begin by examining Chief
Adams’ statement to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in
granting summary judgment on the basis that there was no issue of material
fact regarding its defamatory meaning.
“Defamation, … is the tort of detracting from a person’s reputation, or
injuring a person’s character, fame, or reputation, by false and malicious
statements.” Joseph v. Scranton Times, L.P., 959 A.2d 322, 334 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal dismissed, 982 A.2d 1223 (Pa.
2009). In a defamation case, the plaintiff first bears the burden of proving
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the cause of action, if properly pled, the defendant must then prove the
following elements.
§ 8343. Burden of proof
(a) Burden of plaintiff.--In an action for
defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving,
when the issue is properly raised:
(1) The defamatory character of the
communication.
(2) Its publication by the defendant.
(3) Its application to the plaintiff.
(4) The understanding by the recipient of its
defamatory meaning.
(5) The understanding by the recipient of it as
intended to be applied to the plaintiff.
(6) Special harm resulting to the plaintiff from
its publication.
(7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged
occasion.
(b) Burden of defendant.--In an action for
defamation, the defendant has the burden of
proving, when the issue is properly raised:
(1) The truth of the defamatory
communication.
(2) The privileged character of the occasion on
which it was published.
(3) The character of the subject matter of
defamatory comment as of public concern.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343.
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Instantly, Appellants argue the trial court erred as a matter of law in
finding that Chief Adams statement was an opinion, and therefore was not
defamatory. Appellants argue “the trial court relied on the flawed
assumption that, if a potentially defamatory statement is preceded by
certain signaling words, the statement is a non-actionable opinion.”
Appellants’ Brief at 15. Appellants further argues that in Milkovich v.
Loarin Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the United States Supreme Court
held that words signaling an opinion, created “at best, the rebuttable
presumption that the statement is intended by the speaker to be an
opinion.” Id. at 16.
In Milkovich, the Supreme Court held that there is no “wholesale
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion.’”
Milkovich, supra at 18. The Court clarified as follows.
If a speaker says, “In my opinion John Jones is a
liar,” he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to
the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if
the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or
incomplete, or if his assessment of them is
erroneous, the statement may still imply a false
assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements
in terms of opinion does not dispel these
implications; and the statement, “In my opinion
Jones is a liar,” can cause as much damage to
reputation as the statement, “Jones is a liar.”
…
[W]here a statement of “opinion” on a matter of
public concern reasonably implies false and
defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials,
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those individuals must show that such statements
were made with knowledge of their false implications
or with reckless disregard of their truth. Similarly,
where such a statement involves a private figure on
a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must show that
the false connotations were made with some level of
fault[.]
Id. at 18-19, 21.
However, our Supreme Court cautioned as follows.
A critical factor in determining whether a
communication is capable of defamatory meaning …
is the nature of the audience hearing the remarks.
[O]pinion without more does not create a cause of
action in libel. Instead, the allegedly libeled party
must demonstrate that the communicated opinion
may reasonably be understood to imply the
existence of undisclosed defamatory facts justifying
the opinion.
Baker v. Lafayette Coll., 532 A.2d 399, 402 (Pa. 1987) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Applying the aforementioned standards to the instant matter, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law
in granting summary judgment.1 At the April 16, 2014 summary judgment
____________________________________________
1
We note that the law relied upon by the trial court regarding the higher
standard in matters of public concern would only apply if the parties in this
case were in inverse positions, i.e. had Appellant made defamatory
statements against Chief Adams, a public figure. See Trial Court Opinion,
8/18/14, at 6. Accordingly, Lewis v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 833 A.2d
185 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 844 A.2d 553 (Pa. 2004), and the
trial court’s reasoning based on the facts therein, are inapplicable.
Nevertheless the trial court’s subsequent analysis accurately reflects the law
of this Commonwealth, and we agree with its ultimate resolution. See
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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hearing, counsel for Chief Adams, Karin Romano, Esquire (Attorney
Romano), argued as follows.2
As is reflected in the, the footage of the news report,
the statement was prefaced by a voice over, which
referred to a number of police reports which were
filed against Dr. Knapp.
There was a statement that charges of
indecent assault had been filed on behalf of five of
his patients. There was a statement that Dr. Knapp
was contesting the charges and maintained that he
would be exonerated, and immediately proceeding
[sic] the statement, there was a voice over that
since early October, six women had accused Dr.
Knapp of molesting them during appointments.
It’s at this point in the broadcast that Chief
Adams is shown stating, “In my eyes he definitely
crossed the line. He’s a predator,” and that’s the
defamatory statement that’s alleged in the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
generally Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/14, at 6-8. Further, although not the
basis for the trial court’s ruling, McKibben v. Schmotzer, 700 A.2d 484,
(Pa. Super. 1997) held that an exemption for “the doctrine of absolute
privilege for high public officials” is “unlimited and exempts a high public
official from all civil suits for damages arising out of false defamatory
statements and even from statements or actions motivated by malice,
provided the statements are made or the actions are taken in the course of
the official’s duties or powers and within the scope of his authority, or as it is
sometimes expressed, within his jurisdiction.” Id. at 488. Further, the
McKibben Court noted that “the parameters establishing ‘high public official’
status would be delineated by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
Nevertheless, we need not reach this exception as we conclude that the trial
court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in granting
summary judgment on the basis that Chief Adams’ statement was an opinion
based on disclosed facts, and therefore no issue of material fact exists.
2
Appellants’ Brief in Support of Summary Judgment contains a DVD copy of
the full segment which aired on October 27, 2009. See Appellants’ Brief in
Support of Summary Judgment, 3/7/14, at Exhibit K.
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pleadings, and that Dr. Knapp himself testified as the
basis of his claim.
Following the statement in the news report,
there’s a voice over that the Bridgewater Chief of
Police told me the women say Knapp groped,
fondled, and kissed them at some time during their
exams, and immediately following this, Chief Adams
himself is shown stating, “Indecent conduct, you
know, just different unethical touching of their body
parts that shouldn’t have happened for the type of
exam they went in for.”
In opposing summary judgment, [Appellant]
has focused primarily on this later statement, which
I’ll refer to as the unethical touching statement, and
for brevity I’ll refer to the former statement as the
predator statement, and [Appellant] is now
contending that the unethical touching statement is
defamatory in itself.
We think it’s clear from the context of the
broadcast, as, of course, reflected in the video
footage, that Chief Adams was simply describing the
nature of the allegations that were made when he
referred to the indecent contact and unethical
touching, and those allegations are also reflected in
the police reports that have been submitted in our
appendix as Exhibt H and Exhibit I.
The other major problem with [Appellant]’s
argument is that the later statement regarding
unethical touching and being unrelated to the type of
examination they went in for is that that statement
was never raised at any point in the proceedings
until now, their brief in opposition to summary
judgment.
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N.T, 4/16/14, at 6-8.3
In concluding summary judgment was proper, the trial court reasoned
as follows.
First, the statement was prefaced with the
words “in my eyes,” which signifies an opinion.
Additionally, the statement was made in response to
an interview by WPXI regarding multiple allegations
against Dr. Knapp. The broadcast states as many as
30 women made allegations of inappropriate
touching by Dr. Knapp, and criminal charges had
been filed on behalf of some of those women on the
basis of those allegations. These reports summarize
the nature of the allegations against Dr. Knapp, and
note that a number of the female patients had
reported similar allegations to the police.
The [trial c]ourt believes the factual basis
of Chief Adams’ statement was disclosed in the
police reports, criminal charges, and both the
televised and written news reports. There was
____________________________________________
3
Appellant’s counsel acknowledged to the trial court that Dr. Knapp’s
complaint and subsequent arguments are based solely on the “predatory
statement.” See N.T., 4/16/14, at 19 (regarding the “unethical touching”
counsel stated “I never said that was defamation. … I just said the predator
statements []”). Therefore, our review is confined solely to the first
statement. Further, Chief Adams Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment contains the criminal complaints filed prior to Chief Adams
interview, where the complainants assert allegations of inappropriate
touching by Dr. Knapp which were the basis of Chief Adams subsequent
statement. See Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/7/14,
at 3, n.2 (“One such patient reported that [Appellant] placed his hands on
her thighs, spread her legs, and told her that she was beautiful and could be
a model. … Several patients reported that [Appellant] had them in a seated
position during breast exams, which reportedly consisted of him grabbing or
squeezing their nipples, or ‘caressing’ their breasts. … Several patients
reported [Appellant] kissed them or attempted to do so, and one patient
reported that [Appellant] initiated intercourse with her, which thereafter
occurred on an ongoing basis during her appointments[]”).
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no suggestion in the broadcast that Chief
Adams relied on hidden facts or false facts to
form his opinion. In fact, the news broadcast
even displayed images of the criminal
complaints against Dr. Knapp before
broadcasting Chief Adams’ statement. Chief
Adams’ statement was clearly based on the
numerous reports and charges against Dr.
Knapp, all of which were disclosed. Thus, as a
matter of law, the [trial c]ourt finds Chief
Adams’ statement was an opinion, and the
factual basis for the opinion was disclosed.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/14, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. As trial counsel for
Chief Adams noted, “the statement of opinion by Chief Adams is surrounded
by factual basis for that opinion.” N.T., 4/16/14, at 10. Further, counsel
correctly noted that the broadcast stated “that as many as 30 women had
made allegations to this effect of inappropriate physical conduct of physical
conduct or physical contact during medical exams, and that criminal charges
had been filed on behalf of five of those women on the basis of those
allegations.” Id. at 10-11; see also Chief Adams Brief in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, 3/17/14, at Exhibit H and I. Additionally, previous
news reports had covered the pending criminal allegations against Appellant.
Id. at Exhibit D, “Woman Speaks to WPXI, Accuses Doctor of Groping Her,”
10/1/09, at 1 (wherein a complainant told the media Dr. Knapp straddled
her while she was lying on her stomach, rubbed her upper back, squeezed
her buttocks, pulled her head towards his, and tried to kiss her).
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The aforementioned evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Chief Adams’ statement, “[i]n my eyes, he definitely crossed the line. He’s a
– he’s a predator[,]” was an opinion of Chief Adams based on facts known to
him and the public at the time said statement was made. See Baker,
supra. Accordingly, there was no issue of material fact for a jury to decide.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion or commit an error of law when it denied Appellants’ motion for
summary judgment. See Cadena, supra. Accordingly, the trial court’s
August 18, 2014 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/2/2015
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