IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
COREY LEWIS, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 368, 2015
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware,
§ in and for New Castle County
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. 1306017893
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: August 5, 2015
Decided: October 12, 2015
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 12th day of October 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Corey Lewis, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”). The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm
the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Lewis’ opening
brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In July 2013, Lewis was indicted for Carrying a Concealed Deadly
Weapon (“CCDW”), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited,
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Receiving a Stolen
Firearm, Driving a Vehicle with a Suspended or Revoked License, No Proof of
Insurance, and Spinning Tires. These charges arose from a traffic stop. On
December 2, 2013, Lewis pled guilty to CCDW and PFBPP. As part of the plea
agreement, the State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges, to
seek habitual offender sentencing for the CCDW count but not the PFBPP count,
and to cap its sentence recommendation at thirteen years of Level V incarceration.
Lewis agreed that he was a habitual offender.
(3) On February 14, 2014, Lewis was declared a habitual offender and
sentenced to a total of sixteen years of Level V incarceration, suspended after
thirteen years for decreasing levels of supervision. Lewis did not file a direct
appeal.
(4) On January 7, 2015, Lewis filed his first motion for postconviction
relief under Rule 61. Lewis argued that his counsel was ineffective because he
failed, despite Lewis’ request, to file a motion to suppress a gun discovered during
an inventory search of the car that Lewis was driving, without a license, at the time
of his arrest. Lewis also requested an evidentiary hearing and filed a motion for
appointment of counsel.
(5) On April 14, 2015, a Superior Court Commissioner recommended that
the Superior Court deny Lewis’ motion for postconviction relief, request for an
2
evidentiary hearing, and motion for appointment of counsel. The Commissioner
found that Lewis’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim was barred by his
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. The Commissioner also found that
Lewis had not established grounds for appointment of counsel.
(6) On June 3, 2015, Lewis filed a motion to amend his motion for
postconviction relief. Lewis sought to add a prosecutorial misconduct claim based
on differences between the affidavit of the car owner included with his motion for
postconviction relief and the police report. Lewis claimed that the differences
showed that the police officer who found the gun during the inventory search
committed perjury.
(7) In an order dated June 15, 2015, the Superior Court accepted the
Commissioner’s recommendation, found the motion to amend to be without merit,
and denied Lewis’ motion for postconviction relief. On June 26, 2015, Lewis filed
a motion for reconsideration. Lewis stated that he had not received the
Commissioner’s recommendation and he would have objected to the
recommendation if he had received it. In a letter dated July 2, 2015, the Superior
Court sent Lewis the Commissioner’s recommendation and denied his motion for
reconsideration as not ripe. This appeal followed.
(8) As the State points out, Lewis filed his notice of appeal from the
Superior Court’s July 2, 2015 order denying his motion for reconsideration, rather
3
than the Superior Court’s June 17, 2015 order denying his motion for
postconviction relief. Lewis, however, filed his notice of appeal within thirty days
of the June 17, 2015 order denying his motion for postconviction relief and the
argument section of his brief is devoted to the substantive merits of his motion for
postconviction relief and his motion to amend his motion for postconviction relief.
Under these circumstances, we address the substantive merits of Lewis’ arguments
that the Superior Court erred in concluding that his motion to amend was without
merit and in denying his motion for postconviction relief.
(9) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1 The procedural requirements of
Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive issues are addressed.2 In his
opening brief, Lewis argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
file a motion to suppress a gun discovered during an inventory search. Lewis also
argues that there was prosecutorial misconduct because the police officer who
conducted the search lied in the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant and in his
police report.
1
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
2
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
4
(10) Both of Lewis’ claims are barred by his knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary guilty plea,3 which Lewis does not challenge. The Truth-in-Sentencing
Guilty Plea Form, plea agreement, and plea colloquy reflect that Lewis knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea for CCDW and PFBPP. During
the guilty plea colloquy, Lewis’ counsel stated that he had explained the trial rights
Lewis was waiving by pleading guilty and the collateral consequences of the plea.
Lewis affirmed that he reviewed and discussed the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea
Form with his counsel, he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, he
understood the range of sentences, and he was guilty of CCDW and PFBPP. In the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Lewis is bound by these
statements.4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
3
See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 2009 WL 1640021, at *1 (Del. June 9, 2009) (holding defendant’s
voluntary guilty plea barred claim that his counsel was ineffective in suppression proceedings);
Cooper v. State, 2008 WL 2410404, at *1 (Del. June 16, 2008) (concluding ineffective assistance
of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file motion to suppress was barred by knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea).
4
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 2008).
5