IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-50590
Summary Calendar
WAYNE R. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JACK V. STRICKLAND; JACK MARSHALL;
ROBERT M. ROLLER; NANCY S. FULLER;
ROBERT E. VALDEZ; WALTER STEELE;
DONATO RAMOS; JULIE E. VAUHGAN;
U. LAWRENCE BOZE; ALBERT WITCHER;
THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF TEXAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. A-02-CV-97-SS
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January 6, 2003
Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Anderson appeals the district court’s pretrial dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
action on various grounds. As a threshold matter, Anderson asserts that the district court’s dismissal
of his claims against the members of the Board of Law Examiners for the State of Texas (“the
Board”) on immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim did not constitute a dismissal of his
claims against Jack Marshall. However, the district court’s judgment made clear that Marshall was
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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included among those individual defendants who were dismissed on immunity grounds and for failure
to state a claim. Furthermore, whether a Board member or not, Marshall was clearly a governmental
officer serving as an agent of the Board and, thus, Anderson’s claims against Marshall in his official
capacity for nonprospective relief constituted claims against the Board itself. See Burge v. Parish of
St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 468 (5th Cir. 1999); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 n.10 (1989). Anderson does not assert in this appeal that the district court erred in
dismissing his claims against the State of Texas, the Board, and the Board members in their official
capacities (except with respect to claims for prospective relief). Anderson has therefore abandoned
any challenge to the dismissal of those claims. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1993).
"To plead a constitutional claim for relief under [42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff must] allege
a violation of a right secured . . . by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . ." Johnson
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1994). In the instant case, Anderson failed to
allege that the defendants excluded him from the practice of law in violation of his due process rights,
as his complaint did not assert that he filed with the Board a formal application to take the Texas bar
examination, which would have triggered the due process protections of the Rules Governing
Admission to the Bar of Texas. See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam. of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S.
232, 238-39 (1957). Given his failure to assert that the defendants denied a formal application by him
to take the Texas bar examination, Anderson’s complaint did not allege a violation of his right against
cruel and unusual punishment. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609 (1993). Since
Anderson’s complaint failed to allege that a Texas citizen in his situation would be exempt from the
requirements to which he was subject, Anderson failed to state a claim under the Privileges and
Immunities clause. See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1030 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991). Anderson’s
complaint did not assert that the defendants penalized him for leaving Kansas and taking up residence
in Texas, and, thus, Anderson failed to allege a violation of his constitutional right to travel. See
Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418 (1981). Finally, Anderson’s summary and conclusional assertion
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that the defendants’ actions were motivated by gender bias was insufficient to state an equal
protection claim. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 n.15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 53 (2001); Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
Because Anderson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint failed to state a constitutional claim, the
district court did not err in dismissing Anderson’s claims against the individual defendants in their
official capacities for prospective relief and against the individual defendants in their personal
capacities. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Sojourner T. v. Edwards, (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
court of appeals may affirm district court’s judgment on any ground supported by the record). The
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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