Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-29-2004
Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch Dist
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 03-3912
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"Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch Dist" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 424.
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PRECEDENTIAL Michael I. Levin
Paul N. Lalley
UNITED STATES COURT OF Levin Legal Group, P.C.
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006
Attorneys for Appellee
No. 03-3912
OPINION OF THE COURT
DAVID ANGSTADT
and BARBARA ANGSTADT, SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Parents and Natural Guardians of
Appellants David and Barbara
Megan Angstadt, A M inor,
Angstadt brought suit on behalf of their
Appellants
daughter, Megan Angstadt, against the
v.
Midd-West School District (the “School
District” or “Midd-West”) for civil rights
MIDD-WEST SCHOOL DISTRICT
violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
and for violations of the Pennsylvania
On Appeal from the United States
Public School Code of 1949, 24 Pa. Cons.
District Court for the Middle District of
Stat. Ann. §§ 1-101, et seq. The District
Pennsylvania
Court granted the School District’s motion
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-02170)
to dismiss 1 and the Angstadts appeal this
District Judge: Hon. James F. M cClure,
Jr.
1
The District Court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR the state law claims both because it had
34.1(a) July 15, 2004 dismissed those claims over which it had
original jurisdiction and because the state
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and law claims were complex. The court
WEIS, Circuit Judges noted that it had dismissed all federal
claims and, quoting the statute that gives
(Filed: July 29, 2004 ) it discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
that “raises a novel or complex issue of
Jeffrey C. Dohrmann State law,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1),
Rieders, Travis, Humphrey, Harris, concluded that “any question regarding
Waters & Waffenschmidt charter schools in Pennsylvania is a
Williamsport, PA 17701 novel and/or complex issue of State
law.” App. at 19. It also stated that the
Attorney for Appellants charter school question predominates
decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to a significant portion of its curriculum and
28 U.S.C. § 1291. to deliver a significant portion of
instruction to its students through the
I.
Internet or other electronic means.” 24 Pa.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-1703-A.
HISTORY
Once enrolled at WPCCS, which
The Angstadts sued the School does not have a basketball team for female
District based upon its refusal to permit students of Megan’s grade and age, Megan
Megan to participate in interscholastic continued to play interscholastic basketball
basketball. Megan is currently seventeen for Midd-West at the beginning of the
years old and has never been enrolled in 2001-2002 school year. However, the
the School District, which is her “school School District “refused to allow [her] to
district of residence.” App. at 6. Instead, continue to practice, play and compete in
she was home schooled from the third interscholastic basketball . . . for the
grade to the eighth grade. During her remainder of the 2001-2002 school year
seventh and eighth grade years (1999-2000 and the 2002-2003 school year by claiming
and 2000-2001), Midd-West allowed that [she] has not met the . . .
Megan to play interscholastic basketball, requirements.” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 18).
granting her an exception to its provision The Angstadts contend these requirements
disallowing students not enrolled in the are “unreaso na bl e, a rb itra ry and
School District from participating in its capricious.” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 18).
extracurricular activities.
Pursuant to the Pennsylvania
In 2001, she stopped home School Code, made applicable to cyber
schooling and began attending Western charter schools by 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School § 17-1747-A,
(“WPCCS”) as a ninth-grade student.
. . . . no school district of
WPCCS was and is a duly chartered and
residence shall prohibit a
certified cyber charter school pursuant to
student of a charter school
the Pennsylvania School Code. The School
from participating in any
Code defines “cyber charter school” as “an
extracurricular activity of
independent public school established and
that schoo l district of
operated under a charter from the
residence: Provided, That
Department of Education and in which the
the student is able to fulfill
school uses technology in order to provide
all of the requirements of
participation in such activity
and the charter school does
over the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § not provide the same
1367(c)(2). It therefore dismissed Count extracurricular activity.
IV of the complaint without prejudice.
2
24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-1719-A(14) District Court denied the requested
(emphasis added). The Angstadts allege te mpor a ry r e str a ining or de r a n d
that Megan “has met all charter school, preliminary injunction.
cyber charter school, Pennsylvania
The School District referenced two
Department of Education, and PIAA
letters, entered into the record in the first
[Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
action, which set forth the requirements
Association] requirements, and all
imposed on Megan under 25 Pa. Cons.
reasonable requirements placed upon her
Stat. Ann. § 17-1719-A(14) in order to
by [the School District], to practice, play
qualify for extracurricular activities. In
and compete in interscholastic basketball
their responsive pleadings, the Angstadts
. . . .” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 19) (emphasis
contended that the District Court could
added). The implication of this statement
consider the letters as materials outside the
is that there were requirements Megan did
pleadings only after converting the motion
not meet.
to dismiss to a summary judgment motion
The Angstadts filed their initial to afford them an opportunity to submit
complaint, along with a request for a additional materials under Federal Rule of
temporary restraining order and a Civil Procedure 56.
preliminary injunction, on January 29,
The District Court granted the
2002, seeking to compel the School
motion to dismiss, holding that the
District to permit Megan to participate in
requirements for participation were not
interscholastic basketball. The District
disputed by the Angstadts and were
Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
integral to the complaint, and that the
February 4, 2002 and denied the request
Angstadts had failed to state a claim on the
for a stay, after which the Angstadts
First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal
voluntarily dismissed their complaint on
Protection grounds pleaded.
the ground that the Pennsylvania
legislature amended the Charter School II.
Law to authorize cyber charter schools.
DISCUSSION
They filed their second complaint,
initiating the instant action, on November We exercise plenary review of a
27, 2002, again seeking a temporary dismissal order pursuant to Federal Rule of
restraining order, a preliminary injunction Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
and other relief to compel the School
A. Motion to Dismiss and Summary
District to permit Megan’s participation in
Judgment
interscholastic basketball competition.
This complaint alleged that the School The Angstadts argue that because
District violated Megan’s rights to First “[i]n determining whether a claim should
Amendment freedom of association, Due be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a court
Process, and Equal Protection. The looks only to the facts alleged in the
3
complaint and its attachments without District, was improperly considered by the
reference to other parts of the record,” District Court.
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &
We do not agree that the District
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.
Court accepted the School District’s
1994), the District Court erred in
characterization of the requirements as
considering information set forth outside
falling into five over-simplified and rather
the complaint. However, we have
benign catego ries, “ w ithout even
recognized that “[a]lthough a district court
reviewing the documents on which that
may not consider matters extraneous to the
representation was based.” Appellants’
pleadings, a document integral to or
Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). First,
explicitly relied upon in the complaint may
there is no basis for the implication that
be considered without converting the
the District Judge, who presided over the
motion to dismiss into one for summary
action in which the two letter documents
judgment.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v.
were of record, was unfamiliar with the
Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)
documents on which the summary was
(internal quotation marks and citations
based. In fact, many of the requirements
omitted) (emphasis deleted).
are set forth in the relevant statutes. Such
The gravamen of the Angstadts’ requirements include full-time attendance
complaint is that the requirements for with attendance meaning “a minimum of
participating in extracurricular activities 180 days of instruction,” App. at 46
are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, (quoting 22 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Code
but the Angstadts neither enumerate the 11.1); a day of instruction meaning “time
requirements generally nor specify the in the school day devoted to instruction
requirements to which they object. These provided as an integral part of the school
requirements were integral to the program under the direction of certificated
complaint, as the Angstadts’ claim could school employees,” App. at 46; a
not be evaluated without some reference to curriculum appro ved by and in
them. In light of the Angstadts’ failure to conformance with the regulations of the
enumerate them for the District Court, the State Board of Education and the
School District sensibly undertook to do Pennsylvania School Code, App. at 49
so. The Angstadts do not dispute the (quoting PIAA Bylaws, Art. IX, § 1); and
factual accuracy of the twenty-nine “passing at least four full-credit subjects or
requirements set forth by the School the equivalent. Eligibility shall be
District in the two letters previously cumulative from the beginning of a
referenced, dated October 23, 2001 and grading period, shall be reported on a
November 30, 2001. Instead, the weekly basis, and shall be filed in the
An gstad ts contend that the lis t principal’s office.” App. at 50 (quoting
summarizing these requirements into five PIAA Bylaws, Art. IX, § 1).
general categories, provided by the School
Having put the re l e v a nt
4
requirements at issue, the Angstadts sports. Furthermore, for the reasons that
cannot now claim that their own failure to follow, the Angstadts’ complaint fails to
enumerate these requirements creates an state a claim upon which relief may be
issue of fact precluding dismissal. The granted, and this failure could not have
District Court accepted the School been cured by additional factual evidence.
District’s summary of the five categories
B. Freedom of Association
of requirements as:
The Angstadts argue that
1. Megan must have achieved
“educational choices of the type and nature
at least the 9th grade level
at issue in this matter are within the scope
academically;
of constitutionally protected associations
2. Megan’s curriculum must be and that [the School District’s] actions
similar to the curriculum, interfere with or chill those rights as
i n c l u de t h e p h y s ic a l exercised by the [sic] Megan and her
education course, for the family.” Appellants’ Br. at 24. The
students enrolled in Midd- School District respo nds that the
West; “Angstadts do not allege that M egan is
unable to attend WPCCS as a consequence
3. M eg a n a n d W P C C S must
of the [School] District’s requirements . .
provide verifiable
. ; they have not, in fact, been deprived of
attendance documentation;
the educational alternative of attending a
4. Mega n and WPC CS mus t cyber charter school by reason of the
document on-going passing [School] District’s implementation of its
grades; requirements for participation in its
extracurricular activities.” Appellee’s Br.
5. Me gan must mainta i n an
at 18-19. We agree.
average or above citizenship
grade. To determine whether the School
District’s refusal to allow Megan to
App. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
participate in interscholastic basketball
Because Megan did not receive any violates her right to association, we must
internet instruction or attend any “real identify the precise nature of the
time” courses, which meant that all of her associational right in question, the extent
attendance and class time was self-verified to which the state action regulates that
instead of verified by certified instructors, right, and thus the appropriate level of
and because she studied a curriculum scrutiny under which to view that state
provided by the University of Missouri and action.
not approved by the State Board of
As the right to education is not
Education, the School District deemed her
constitutionally protected, San Antonio
ineligible to participate in interscholastic
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
5
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), we turn to whether for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of
there is a protected intimate, as opposed to Phila., 874 F.2d 156, 162-63, 168 (3d Cir.
expressive, association right at issue. The 1989). Under the rational basis standard,
right of intimate association extends to the Angstadts had the burden of
“child rearing and education.” Bd. of Dirs. overcoming the presumption of rationality,
of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, see Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581,
481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). In Pierce v. 594 (3d Cir. 1985), and their bare legal
Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534- conclusion that the requirements that they
35 (1925), the Supreme Court struck down failed to enumerate are “unreasonable,
a state statute that “unreasonably arbitrary and capricious,” App. at 31
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and (Compl. ¶ 18), is insufficient to rebut the
guardians to direct the upbringing and presumption of rationality. Because the
education of children under their control.” burden on the Angstadts’ right to educate
Megan, to the extent there is a burden, is at
That statute, however, made public
best incidental, the District Court did not
education compulsory, subject to specific
err in dismissing the complaint as to the
exceptions, thereby directly impacting the
right of association claim.
right of parents to educate their children in
the manner they desired. Here the C. Due Process
regulation in question – the requirements
The Angstadts’ due process claim
placed upon students who wish to
can be summarily dismissed. They
participate in interscholastic basketball –
concede that “no property interest exists in
does not impact the Angstadts’ ability to
participation in extracurricular activities,
educate their daughter in the manner they
including sports, as a general principle,
choose.2 At best, the regulation’s impact
under the United States Constitution.”
on the Angstadts’ right to rear Megan is
Appellants’ Br. at 29. Even if the state
attenuated.
statute were to be viewed as giving Megan
Furthermore, state action that a property interest in participating in
incidentally affects the parent-child extracurricular sports, the statute expressly
relationship is subject to minimum conditions that participation on the proviso
scrutiny, requiring only that the action “that the student is able to fulfill all of the
rationally advance a legitimate government requirements of participation in such
interest. See Phila. Police & Fire Ass’n activity.” 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-
1719-A(14). The Angstadts’ assertion that
Megan has m e t a ll “reasonable
2 requirements,” suggests that they concede
There is no constitutionally
that she has not met all of the
protected right to play sports. Thus the
“requirem ents of participation” for
fact that the requirements regulate
interscholastic basketball. It follows that
Megan’s ability to play basketball is of
Megan has no property interest for which
no legal consequence.
6
due process must be afforded. Thus, we Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). The
agree with the District Court that the School District put forth five interests
Angstadts fail to state a due process claim animating the list of requirements. As
upon which relief may be granted. stated by the District Court, they are:
D. Equal Protection (1) ensuring that its student
athletes have the academic
The Angstadts allege that the
eligibility to play high
“unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious
school sports; (2) ensuring
requirements to practice, play and compete
that its athletes meet its
in interscholastic basketball” deprive
ph ysical education
Megan “of equal protection of the law
requirements; (3)
based upon [her] status as a cyber charter
discouraging students from
school student.” App. at 36 (Compl. ¶ 41).
cutting class or taking
We apply the highly deferential, rational-
unauthorized trips away
basis standard of review because the
from school during the
School District’s requirements do not
school day; (4) encouraging
burden any fundamental constitutional
students to maintain passing
right, and the difference between cyber-
grades[;] and (5) promoting
school students and physical-school
good citizenship.
students is not a suspect classification,
such as those based on race, alienage, or App. at 17 (citations omitted). These
national origin. Moreover, there is no reasons provide a rational basis for the
differing or unequal treatment because the requirements for participation in extra-
requirements imposed upon cyber-school scholastic events by cyber-students as well
students are no different than those as physical-school students.3
imposed upon physical-school students.
Because the Angstadts fail to
The additional difficulty that cyber-school
allege, as a preliminary matter, that the
students may face is insufficient to plead
state action differentially regulates cyber-
an equal protection violation absent
school students and physical-school
membership in a suspect classification.
students, which is a non-suspect
In any event, the Angstadts’ claim classification, and because the complaint
cannot pass the rational-basis threshold. could not defeat rational-basis review, we
“Under rational-basis rev iew, th e affirm the decision of the District Court as
challenged classification must be upheld to the equal protection claim.
‘if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.’” Donatelli v.
3
Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993) Whether they violate the
(quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Pennsylvania Public School Code is a
matter for the state courts to resolve.
7
III.
CONCLUSION
The District Court did not err when
it dismissed the Angstadts’ First
Amendment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
We will therefore affirm its order
dismissing the action, without prejudice to
the Angstadts’ right to file their state
claims in state court.
8