Coleman v. Textron, Inc.

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-25-2006

Coleman v. Textron Inc
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 05-2332

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"Coleman v. Textron Inc" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1042.
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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 05-2332

RICKY COLEMAN; MARY B. BRAGGS;
STANLEY E. BATES

v.

TEXTRON, INC.; TEXTRON, INC. 1,
a/k/a/ d/b/a TEXTRON LYCOMING;
TEXTRON LYCOMING; AVCO CORPORATION

Ricky Coleman; Stanley E. Bates
Appellants

On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-08881)
District Judge: Hon. Clifford Scott Green

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 19, 2006

BEFORE: McKEE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
and McCLURE,* District Judge

(Opinion Filed: May 25, 2006)

* Hon. James F. McClure, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
 OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

This is a race discrimination case. Appellants Ricky Coleman and Stanley Bates

appeal from summary judgments entered by the District Court on two of their claims: (1)

that they were discriminated against in the negotiation and implementation of a settlement

agreement between their employers and the National Labor Relations Board which

resolved a dispute regarding outsourcing; and (2) that they were victims of a hostile work

environment. We will affirm.

I.

Appellants insist that the District Court committed reversible error by allowing

appellees to rely in support of their motion for summary judgment on appellants’ first

claim upon an affidavit of their deceased Vice President of Human Resources submitted

to the NLRB in 1997. In appellants’ view this affidavit was not admissible in evidence.

We need not resolve that issue, however, because appellees submitted ample admissible

evidence, independent of the challenged affidavit, to satisfy their burden under

McDonnell-Douglas of coming forward with “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

its settlement practices.” Op. at 13. Appellees having come forward with sufficient

evidence to support a finding that such “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” existed,

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the burden shifted to appellants to show that appellees’ proffered reason was pretextual.

The District Court in this case granted summary judgment because “Plaintiffs [had]

offered no evidence that Defendants’ proffered reason for Plaintiffs’ treatment was

pretextual.” App. at 13. We Agree.

II.

In order to be successful with a hostile work environment claim against an

employer, a plaintiff must prove five things:

(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination . . . ; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person . . . in that position; and (5)
respondeat superior liability existed.

Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1997). Here, the District Court granted

summary judgment because appellants had failed to “satisfy the 5th prong of the hostile

work environment test – the existence of respondeat superior.” App. at 9. It accepted

appellants’ description of their work conditions as true, but correctly found that they had

tendered no evidence tending to show “that the employer had knowledge of the

discrimination.” Id. In their briefing before us, appellants have identified no such

evidence, and we have found none.

III.

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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