FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 09 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN D. ROQUEMORE, No. 08-56894
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00068-IEG-AJB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2010 **
Pasadena, California
Before: RYMER and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and McNAMEE, *** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Stephen M. McNamee, United States District Judge
for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
John D. Roquemore appeals the district court’s decision affirming denial of
his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security
Income by the Commissioner of Social Security. We affirm.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) offered clear and convincing reasons for
rejecting Roquemore’s pain testimony to the degree that it conflicted with his
residual functional capacity (RFC). See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th
Cir. 1996). Specifically, the ALJ noted that treatment of Roquemore’s
impairments had been conservative in nature, consisting of only medication and
physical therapy; that he had been encouraged by health practitioners to get more
exercise, including swimming, biking, and walking; and that the medical evidence
in the record does not support the conclusion that Roquemore’s condition limits his
daily activities to the degree that he claimed. These reasons are supported by the
record and identified which symptom testimony was not credible and what facts in
the record led to that conclusion. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th
Cir. 1996).
Roquemore argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the side effects
of his medications. However, Roquemore fails to identify any objective evidence
of side effects. He points only to his own subjective claims of drowsiness and
decreased concentration. Nothing in the record suggests that Roquemore’s ability
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to work was affected by his medications. Therefore, the ALJ was not required to
include a discussion of side effects. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217
(9th Cir. 2005) (“Preparing a function by function analysis for medical conditions
or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the record is
unnecessary.”).
Next, Roquemore argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not based
on substantial evidence. But Dr. Sabourin’s June 2005 evaluation was consistent
with the RFC found by the ALJ, as was an evaluation conducted by two state
agency physicians. Dr. Gillick noted that Roquemore’s right shoulder showed
marked dysfunction, but ultimately concluded that Roquemore was still capable of
performing light or sedentary work. Roquemore claims that the ALJ erred by
failing to offer evidence that Dr. Gillick used the definition of light or sedentary
work as it is understood by the Commissioner, yet points to nothing that would
indicate that Dr. Gillick relied on a different definition. Cf. Valentine v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To establish eligibility for
Social Security disability benefits, a claimant has the burden to prove he is
disabled.”).
Finally, Roquemore argues that the ALJ erred by relying exclusively on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“grids”) in determining that he could perform
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other work. We disagree. A vocational expert is not required when a claimant’s
nonexertional limitations are not “‘sufficiently severe’ as to significantly limit the
range of work permitted by the claimant’s exertional limitations.” Hoopai v.
Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the ALJ determined that
Roquemore could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and
that “other limitations would have very little or no effect on the unskilled
occupational base, including the ability to ascent or descend scaffolding, poles and
ropes.” He is thus able “[t]o perform substantially all of the exertional
requirements of most sedentary and light jobs.” Social Security Ruling 83-14; see
also Social Security Ruling 85-15 (“If a person can stoop occasionally . . . the
sedentary and light occupational base is virtually intact.”).
AFFIRMED.
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