Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-19-2008
Trueman v. Upper Chichester
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-2762
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Trueman v. Upper Chichester" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 640.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/640
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-2762
___________
JEFFREY A. TRUEMAN,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF UPPER CHICHESTER; MICHAEL FANELLI, Police Officer, Badge Number
19, individually and as a Police Officer for the City of Upper Chichester;
DAVID J. MURPHY, Delaware County Regional Court Judge, Magisterial District No.
3202038, Individually and in his Official Capacity; G. MICHAEL GREEN, Delaware
County District Attorney; JACKSON M. STEWART, JR., Chief Deputy District
Attorney, Individually and in their official capacity for the office of the District Attorney
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-05085)
District Judge: Honorable Clifford Scott Green
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 23, 2008
Before: MCKEE, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Jeffrey A. Trueman, appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders
dismissing his complaint in part, granting judgment as a matter of law in part, and
entering judgment following a jury verdict on the remaining claims. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.1
I.
In the early morning hours of January 31, 2003, Trueman was driving in Upper
Chichester Township (the “Township”) when Police Officer Michael Fanelli, who was in
his police car on routine patrol, saw him drive through an intersection without slowing or
stopping at the stop sign. Officer Fanelli pulled his car behind Trueman’s and signaled
for him to pull over. When Officer Fanelli requested Trueman’s license and registration,
he noticed the smell of alcohol on Trueman’s breath. As a result, Officer Fanelli
conducted a field sobriety test. Trueman failed the test. Officer Fanelli then advised
Trueman that he was under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. In response,
Trueman asked Officer Fanelli, “Who sent you, Congressman Weldon?” (Compl. at ¶
11.) Trueman then made several threatening remarks to Officer Fanelli.
Trueman was taken to police headquarters and charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol (“DUI”), terroristic threats, and failure to stop at a stop sign. Prior to
trial on these charges, Trueman moved to suppress the evidence arising from the traffic
1
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
stop on the ground that Officer Fanelli did not have probable cause. Following a hearing,
the Honorable Robert C. Wright of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted
Trueman’s motion. Consequently, the District Attorney’s Office nolle prossed the
charges. Trueman then asked the District Attorney’s Office to investigate Officer
Fanelli’s conduct in connection with the traffic stop. The District Attorney’s Office
investigated the circumstances surrounding the arrest, but found no cause for disciplinary
action against Officer Fanelli.
II.
In December 2004, Trueman commenced an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
claiming that the traffic stop was part of a government conspiracy against him due to his
work as a veterans’ rights advocate. Trueman alleged federal civil rights violations under
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and also asserted several state law claims.
The complaint named as defendants: the Township of Upper Chichester and Officer
Fanelli; District Attorney G. Michael Green and Deputy District Attorney Jackson M.
Stewart, who were allegedly involved in both prosecuting Trueman and in investigating
Officer Fanelli; and Judge David J. Murphy, the Delaware County Regional Court Judge
who presided over Trueman’s arraignment.
In June 2005, the District Court found that Green and Stewart were entitled to
immunity and dismissed Trueman’s claims against them. The court later dismissed the
complaint as to Judge Murphy on the same ground.
3
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial against the Township and Officer Fanelli
(the “Township Defendants”). At the conclusion of the liability phase, the District Court
directed a verdict in favor of the Township. Therefore, the sole issue for the jury was
whether Officer Fanelli lacked probable cause to conduct the traffic stop in violation of
Trueman’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Officer Fanelli. Trueman then filed post-trial motions requesting a new trial and
renewing certain pre-trial requests. By order entered May 15, 2007, the District Court
denied the post-trial motions. The present appeal followed.
III.
A. Dismissal of District Attorney Green, Deputy District Attorney Stewart, and
Delaware County District Justice Murphy
Trueman first challenges the District Court’s orders dismissing his claims against
Green and Stewart, who were allegedly involved in both prosecuting Trueman and in
investigating Officer Fanelli. The District Court found that their actions were entitled to
the protections of absolute immunity. We agree that Green and Stewart were absolutely
immune from suit for actions taken in connection with prosecuting Trueman, as it is well
established that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for conduct “fairly within
the prosecutor’s function as an advocate.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273
(2006) (internal quotations omitted). We are less certain, however, that this immunity
extends to Green’s and Stewart’s alleged failure to conduct an internal investigation into
Officer Fanelli’s misconduct. See id. (explaining that a prosecutor’s administrative duties
4
that do not relate to his preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial
proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity) (citation omitted). We need not reach
this question, however, because Trueman’s bare allegations do not state a cognizable
constitutional violation. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (holding that,
before ruling on immunity in § 1983 cases, the court must first determine whether the
facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right).
Regarding Trueman’s claims against District Justice Murphy, we find, for the
reasons stated by the District Court, that District Justice Murphy was entitled to the
protections of judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978)
(internal quotations omitted); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir.
2000).
B. Motion to Amend the Complaint
Next, Trueman claims that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his
pre- and post-trial requests to amend the complaint. Trueman first sought leave to amend
in May 2006, approximately six months after discovery had been closed. At that time,
Trueman argued that through discovery, he had obtained additional evidence in support of
his theory that the arrest was politically motivated. In light of this new evidence,
Trueman sought to add several new defendants to the complaint. The Township
Defendants opposed the request, arguing that it would be prejudicial to allow Trueman to
add entirely new parties after the end of discovery and while their fully-briefed motion for
5
summary judgment was outstanding.
By order entered July 26, 2006, the District Court denied Trueman’s motion on the
ground that “the proposed amended Complaint would add new parties and new theories
of liability not presently the subject of this lawsuit.” After the trial, Trueman renewed his
request to file an amended complaint, and the District Court again denied the request.
We conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in denying
Trueman’s requests to amend his complaint. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 15(a) favors allowing amendment “when justice so requires,” a district court has the
discretion to deny such a request if amendment would result in “undue prejudice” to the
opposing party. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Cornell & Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)
(stating that “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an
amendment”). We agree with the District Court that allowing Trueman to add new
parties and new theories of liability so late in the game would have significantly altered
the scope of the case to the prejudice of the defense.
We also agree with the District Court’s decision to deny Trueman’s post-trial
request to amend. In making his post-trial request, Trueman argued that the District
Court erred in denying his first request because the additional defendants and claims
“would be necessary to advance justice in this civil rights action.” Given that the District
Court acted within its discretion in denying the first motion as unduly prejudicial to the
6
defense, as discussed above, we agree with the District Court that Trueman failed to
present any compelling reason why he should have been able to amend after judgment
was entered against him. See Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Motion for Recusal
Next, Trueman challenges Judge Green’s refusal to recuse himself from the case.
According to Trueman, Judge Green was unable to approach the case with objectivity
because he had previously presided over—and dismissed—another one of his cases. We
disagree.
In July 2006, Trueman sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states that
“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Recusal of a judge
is proper only if “it appears that he or she harbors an aversion, hostility or disposition of a
kind that a fair minded person could not set aside when judging the dispute.” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 557-58 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, Trueman
failed to cite any conduct by Judge Green that might raise questions as to his partiality;
rather, Trueman claimed that the Judge was biased solely because he had previously
issued an adverse ruling against him. Without any other indication that Judge Green
harbored a bias against him, there was simply no basis for the Judge to have recused
himself. See id.
7
We note that, in his appellate brief, Trueman now cites several examples of
allegedly prejudicial comments. For instance, Trueman claims that, when he failed to
follow the proper procedure for admitting a document into evidence, Judge Green
remarked, “that’s not the way you do it, but—,” which caused several jurors to laugh at
him. (Appellant’s Br. 27-28.) Trueman also cites as an example of Judge Green’s bias
his instruction to Trueman to follow the court’s rulings or else he would be held in
contempt. (Id. 12-13.) We are not persuaded that these comments, or any of the others
referenced in Trueman’s brief,2 demonstrate that Judge Green was biased.
2
We pause to specifically address one of Trueman’s arguments. In his brief, Trueman
alleges that the following comments by Judge Green at the end of the trial “prove gross
judicial bias and prejudice,” and show that the court had a “pre-determined position” on
the case:
THE COURT: Well, you know, we’re not really here, and you make that
argument about whether you can see the sign. The question is whether you
can see the lights of a vehicle going through without stopping at an
intersection at which you, from years of patrolling, now is a controlled
intersection. . . . I mean, whether you can see the sign or not, if you know
it’s a controlled intersection then you see a vehicles’ headlights continually
moving and going through that, that would be the failure to stop. I don’t
know why you have to see the sign to know it.
TRUEMAN: Well, with all due respect, in that premise, why was I not found
guilty in the criminal proceedings?
THE COURT: You may have just got lucky.
(N.T., 11/29/2006, at p. 119.) Even assuming that these remarks could arguably be
construed as improper, we point out that they were made during the hearing on the
Township Defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion, and were therefore spoken outside the
presence of the jury.
8
D. Trueman’s Request to “Enter Into the Record” his May 11, 2005 Discovery
Motions
Trueman’s next point of error concerns the District Court’s denial of his request to
“enter into the record” certain motions that he had improperly filed during discovery. It
appears that, in May 2005, Trueman drafted a document entitled “motion to compel
discovery, motion to strike frivolous statements, motion for Rule 11 and 37 sanctions . . .
arising from bad faith and improper litigation by Defendants.” Although the motions
were dated May 11, 2005, they were not entered on the docket until November 8, 2005.
Whether the delay in docketing was due to clerical error or Trueman’s own improper
filing is unclear. In any event, at some point in November 2005, Trueman, apparently
under the impression that the motions still remained undocketed, requested the District
Court to “enter his May 11 Motions into the Court record.”
Before considering Trueman’s docketing request, the District Court considered the
motions themselves and, by order entered November 21, 2005, denied them on the merits.
The same day, the District Court denied as moot Trueman’s request to “enter his May 11
Motions into the Court record.” In denying the latter motion, the court explained that the
documents had indeed been docketed, and had been fully considered on the merits.
Trueman then filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the District Court’s second
order and a “stay” of the first. Trueman argued that he properly filed his motions back in
May 2005 and that the clerk’s office made a mistake. The District Court denied these
requests. Trueman subsequently attempted to appeal from the District Court’s order, but
9
we dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Trueman now claims that the
order has ripened for review, and argues that Judge Green’s “unwillingness to remedy the
critical ‘docket error’” resulted in “manifest injustice.” (Appellant’s Br. 15.)
We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s order denying Trueman’s
motion. As noted above, Trueman’s motions were indeed docketed and then considered
on the merits. Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed as moot Trueman’s
request to have them docketed and properly dismissed Trueman’s request to stay its order
denying the May 11 motions.
E. Denial of Motion Requesting Jury Visit to Site of Traffic Stop
Prior to trial, Trueman filed a motion requesting leave of court to “grant a jury
visit” to the scene of the traffic stop. Trueman explained that his strategy at trial would
be to show that Officer Fanelli falsely accused him of running the stop sign on Cherry
Tree Road in retaliation for his work as a veterans’ rights advocate. According to
Trueman, Officer Fanelli, from his vantage point on Weir Road, could not possibly have
seen him running the stop sign. Thus, Trueman claimed, it was crucial for the jury to visit
the site to see that Officer Fanelli’s account of the incident was untenable. Judge Green,
however, denied the motion, ruling that Trueman could instead use photographs and
diagrams as necessary to depict the intersection at trial. Given that such an on-site visit
would be highly out of the ordinary, the District Court acted well within its discretion in
denying this request. Furthermore, we have reviewed the photographs and diagrams
10
submitted as evidence, and find that they sufficiently depict the scene of the traffic stop.
F. Trueman’s Proposed Questions for Voir Dire
Trueman next claims that the District Court abused its discretion in precluding him
from asking the jury certain questions during voir dire so that he “could seat a fair and
impartial jury.” (Appellant’s Br. 22.) Prior to trial, Trueman submitted a list of
approximately 70 questions concerning the potential jurors’ general understanding of the
law, individual life experiences, and prior jury service. When the jury selection process
was about to begin, Judge Green explained to Trueman that he would ask the proposed
jurors whether they knew any of the parties to the litigation, and explain to them generally
what the case was about. Judge Green then stated:
I will not go into the political backgrounds or anything of jurors, unless it’s
something relevant. And I see nothing here that’s relevant. I would give
you an opportunity at the end of my questioning the jury to suggest
questions that you would like me to ask the jury. And certainly I would try
to ask the jury those questions.
(N.T., 11/28/2006, at pp. 32-33.) Although it is not entirely clear from the transcript,
Judge Green was most likely reviewing Trueman’s list of proposed questions when he
stated, “and I see nothing here that’s relevant.” Trueman did not object to the court’s
relevancy ruling. The Judge then proceeded with the voir dire proceedings, during which
only one juror was stricken for cause, and neither Trueman nor the Township Defendants
used any of their peremptory challenges. It does not appear that Trueman requested any
other questioning or made any other objections to the voir dire procedure.
11
Thus, it appears that Trueman never objected to the District Court’s decision to
preclude his proposed questioning. Furthermore, to the extent that Trueman wished to
obtain additional information from the proposed jurors after the court had concluded its
questioning, Trueman apparently declined to do so. As a result, he has relinquished the
opportunity to challenge this issue on appeal. See United States v. Urian, 858 F.2d 124,
126 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant failed to preserve the issue of whether the
district court erroneously refused to ask certain questions of the prospective jurors).
G. Subpoena of V’ERPA Member, Leigh E. Wise
Trueman’s next issue on appeal is “whether Judge Green’s allowing of an untimely
subpoena upon V’ERPA member Leigh E. Wise was highly prejudicial and obstructed
Appellant’s rights to a fair trial?” 3 (Appellant’s Br. 18.) It appears that, sometime prior
to trial, Trueman identified Wise as a potential witness, but did not allow the defense to
depose her. As a result, on the first day of the trial, the defense sought to depose Wise
before she took the stand. At that time, the defense also argued to the court that Wise
should not be allowed to testify at all:
Leigh Wise is going to get up there, she’s not a lawyer, and she’s going to
pontificate on the law. . . . I have to depose her, if she’s going to testify.
But she shouldn’t even be allowed to testify, Judge, she knows nothing
about Mr. Trueman and what took place that night that Fanelli stopped him.
(N.T. 11/27/2006, at p. 9.) In response, Trueman conceded that Wise did not have any
3
Trueman is the founder of an organization known as Veterans Equal Rights
Protection Advocacy, Inc. (“ V’ERPA”), of which Wise is a member.
12
personal knowledge of the traffic stop, but explained that she had “personal knowledge of
the damages that resulted from the illegal stop.” The District Court then held that Wise
could testify as to damages, but would not be permitted to testify during the liability phase
of the trial.4
On appeal, Trueman claims that the “Wise-subpoena highly prejudiced” him and
caused “grave damage to his constitutional due process rights to execute his [case-in-
chief] to its completion.” (Appellant’s Br. 20.) Although Trueman expresses his
objection to the issuance of the subpoena, it appears that he really means to challenge the
court’s decision to preclude him from presenting Wise’s testimony during the liability
phase. Given that, as noted above, Trueman informed the court that Wise’s testimony
went solely to damages, it is difficult to see how he was prejudiced by the court’s
decision. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion here.
H. Denial of Motion to Subpoena Congressman Curt Weldon
In addition to Ms. Wise, Trueman also identified former Congressman Curt
Weldon as a potential witness at trial. Trueman believed that Congressman Weldon was
part of the alleged government conspiracy to stifle his work as a veterans’ rights
advocate, and that, as part of the conspiracy, Congressman Weldon sent Officer Fanelli to
arrest him under the pretense of a traffic violation. Prior to trial, Trueman confirmed his
intention to subpoena Congressman Weldon and informed the court that some type of
4
It appears that Wise was never actually deposed. (N.T., 11/28/2006 at pp. 168-69.)
13
incident with the Congressman—which Trueman believed was somehow relevant to the
present case—had recently occurred in Russia. The District Court denied Trueman’s
request to subpoena Congressman Weldon, explaining to him as follows:
Listen, the police misconduct here, as you have charged it in your
complaint, is the arrest of you for inappropriate reasons. . . . Now if you
think that now, since Congressman Weldon has been the subject of some
publicity, that you’re going to try all of the allegations about Mr. Weldon in
this case, that’s not going to happen. . . . You’re going to—I’ll let you
proceed according to your complaint. But as to what Mr. Weldon did or did
not do in regard to someone in Russia, is not going to be a subject matter of
this suit.
(N.T., 11/27/2006, at pp. 22-23.)
We are unable to find any abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision. As
noted above, Trueman apparently believed that Congressman Weldon was behind the
traffic stop. We see no indication in the record, however, that Trueman had any evidence
whatsoever tying him to the arrest. Without any such evidence, the District Court
appropriately determined that Congressman Weldon’s testimony was not relevant. See
Fed. R. E. 401.
I. Exclusion of Trueman’s Proposed Police “Expert”
Trueman also sought to introduce retired police officer Steve Copeland as an
expert witness at trial. According to Trueman, Copeland would have testified that Officer
Fanelli failed to follow proper safety procedures when he conducted the stop.5 Prior to
5
It is not entirely clear what the basis for Copeland’s testimony would have been. At
the pre-trial hearing, Trueman told the court that, “Mr. Copeland, after he reviewed the
evidence, said that he would be willing, based off of facts of the egregiousness, to testify
14
trial, the Township Defendants sought to preclude Copeland’s testimony on the ground
that Trueman had failed to provide an expert report or curriculum vitae on his behalf. At
the pre-trial hearing, Judge Green stated that, although Copeland might be permitted to
testify as a fact witness to those facts of which he had personal knowledge, the court
would not permit him to opine that Officer Fanelli failed to take sufficient safety
precautions because it was not a proper subject for expert testimony. Judge Green then
stated that he would take the issue under advisement, and refrained from making a final
ruling at that time.
Now Trueman claims that the District Court’s decision to prohibit Copeland’s
testimony denied him a fair trial. As an initial matter, we note that it is not clear from the
record whether the District Court ever actually reached a final decision on the issue; our
review of the trial transcript does not reveal any further discussion of the matter.
Moreover, to the extent that the District Court did decide to exclude Copeland’s
testimony, we see no error there, as an opinion that Officer Fanelli put himself in danger
during the arrest would not be probative of the issue at trial, namely, whether there was
probable cause for the arrest. See Fed. R. E. 401.
J. Exclusion of Judge Wright’s Order Granting Trueman’s Motion to Suppress
in the Underlying Criminal Case
as an expert police office of 33 years, that he would never make a traffic stop based off of
exhibit P-1. Nobody would.” (N.T., 11/27/2006, at p. 53.) Exhibit P-1, however, is a
police log entry by Officer David R. DiSands, the officer who transported Trueman from
the police department to the courthouse for arraignment.
15
Next, Trueman claims that the District Court erred in precluding him from
introducing into evidence Judge Wright’s order in the underlying criminal case finding
that the traffic stop was illegal. At trial, Trueman presented as a witness Thomas T. Bush,
Chief of Police for the Township. During Chief Bush’s testimony, Trueman attempted to
have him read into the record Judge Wright’s order. When the defense objected, Judge
Green sent the jury out of the courtroom and explained to Trueman that Judge Wright’s
decision was not admissible. Specifically, Judge Green stated as follows:
What I’m saying is that you’re trying this case here and asking the jury to
determine whether there was an unconstitutional conduct on behalf of
Officer Fanelli based upon the record presented here. Judge Wright
determined his suppression motion based upon what was before Judge
Wright. I don’t know and can’t tell whether the identical evidence before
Judge Wright is that which is being submitted to this jury. Therefore, this is
neither to be offered to the jury informationally or is binding on them. This
jury is going to make a determination in this case based upon the record
submitted here and not the suppression record before Judge Wright.
(N.T. 11/27/2006, pp. 127-28.)
We see no error in the District Court’s decision. In order to prevail on his Fourth
Amendment claim, Trueman was required to show that Officer Fanelli’s decision to
conduct the traffic stop was not based on probable cause. See Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Given that the criminal court’s order does not state the basis
on which it found that the traffic stop was illegal, that court’s legal conclusion was not
relevant to determining whether Officer Fanelli lacked probable cause.6 Therefore, we
6
We note that, under principles of collateral estoppel, the state court’s ruling was not
binding on the District Court as a matter of law. See Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 199
16
conclude that the District Court did not err in excluding this order.7
K. Attorney Gallagher’s Alleged Attacks on Trueman’s Character
Next, Trueman claims that, “attorney Gallagher’s rants to discredit the honor,
integrity and character of the Appellant in front of the jury calls for a new trial, in of [sic]
itself.” (Appellant’s Br. 27.) Trueman, however, fails to direct this Court to the specific
questions or comments that might be prejudicial. Therefore, we are unable to review this
claim.8 See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (providing that the appellant’s brief must contain
“appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and
parts of the record on which the appellant relies”).
L. Alleged Jury Misconduct
Trueman’s next complaint concerns alleged jury misconduct at the end of the first
day of the trial. Specifically, Trueman claims that at that time, Wise witnessed Police
Chief Thomas T. Bush—who had taken the stand earlier that day—speaking to several
members of the jury outside the courtroom. The following morning, Trueman brought the
alleged incident to Judge Green’s attention. Trueman was unable, however, to identify
n.18 (3d Cir. 2000).
7
In his brief, Trueman lists as a separate point of error, “whether all Post-trial Filings
were arbitrarily dismissed by the Judge Green.” (Appellant’s Br. 29.) In support of this
claim, however, Trueman simply reiterates his objection to the District Court’s decision to
exclude Judge Wright’s order from the underlying criminal case.
8
In fact, most of Trueman’s argument in support of this claim concerns comments
made by Judge Green, not Mr. Gallagher. (Appellant’s Br. 27-28.) We considered these
and other allegations that Judge Green made improper comments in Section B. above.
17
which jurors had been involved. As a result, Judge Green told Trueman to ask Ms. Wise
to identify the jurors to him, and to then relate their identities to the court at the next
recess. Judge Green assured Trueman that he would then question the jury about Wise’s
allegations. In the meantime, Judge Green reminded the jury that they were not permitted
to have any substantive conversations with parties or witnesses.
Based on our review of the trial transcript, Trueman never raised the issue on the
record again. In light of the limited information that Trueman gave the court, and in light
of the fact that the court promptly cautioned the jury against any further communication
with witnesses, we cannot say that the District Court erred in failing to take any additional
action in response to Trueman’s allegations.
M. Judgment as a Matter of Law for the Township
Next, Trueman claims that the District Court erred in granting the Township’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). At the close of the
Township Defendants’ case, defense counsel argued that Trueman had failed to establish
that the Township had in place any policy or practice to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights; that the Township had reason to believe that Officer Fanelli would violate a
citizen’s constitutional rights; or that the Township had failed to adequately train the
police department. The District Court granted the Township’s motion, issuing an oral
ruling as follows:
. . . I will grant the motion as it relates to the Township of Upper
Chichester because there is absolutely no evidence of any policy
18
regulation procedure law that authorizes unlawful conduct by a
police officer, nor is there any evidence from which a jury could find
that they completely ignored conduct of officers or that there was a
failure to train or anything else.
They’re just not in this case. You attempted to make that assertion
and prove it, but the witnesses you called all testified to the fact of
the training and so forth of their officers. So, I will grant the motion
as to all of your claims as it relates to Chichester because as I
understand it, you would not have claims under their statutes against
Chichester anyway. They would be barred.
(N.T., 11/30/2006, at p. 120.)
Based on our review of the transcripts, it appears that the only claim against the
Township at trial was one for negligent supervision under section 1983. In order to
succeed on this cause of action, Trueman had to prove the existence of a policy or custom
that resulted in a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 694-
95 (1978). A municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory. Id. at 691. Thus, liability for failure to train subordinate officers will lie
only where a constitutional violation results from deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of the municipality’s inhabitants. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47
F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted).
Based on our careful review of the record, we agree with the District Court that the
jury could not reasonably have found in Trueman’s favor on his claim against the
Township. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (“A motion
for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule 50(a) ‘should be granted only if,
19
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no
question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other than the one directed would be
erroneous under the governing law.’”) (quoting Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083
(3d Cir.1987)). Neither the testimony that Trueman introduced nor any other evidence
admitted at trial gave the jury reason to believe that the Township had an inadequate
training program or a municipal policy of negligent supervision which rises to the level of
deliberate indifference required for section 1983 liability. Therefore, we affirm the
District Court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Township.
N. Whether the Jury Should have Ruled in His Favor
Finally, Trueman argues that, based on the evidence he presented through the
testimony of Officers Fanelli and Smoak, the jury should have found in his favor. First,
Trueman claims that, if the jurors had been “paying attention,” they “would have
concluded via the preponderance of the evidence standard that Fanelli was liable to the
Appellant for his ‘illegal’ police conduct.” (Appellant’s Br. 24-25.) Trueman further
alleges that Officer Fanelli’s testimony lacked credibility, and that, as a result, “the jury’s
verdict on behalf of Fanelli was grossly wrong [and] must be overturned in the interest of
justice.” (Id. 26.) Trueman also believes that the testimony of Officer Smoak, an Upper
Chichester Township police officer who was present at the scene of Trueman’s arrest,
“should be discounted by this Court” because he lacked credibility on the stand.9 (Id. 26.)
9
To the extent that Trueman argues that he should have been permitted to amend the
complaint in order to add Officer Smoak as a defendant, we have considered this
20
In making these arguments, Trueman misunderstands the role of this Court; we
may not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our own
version of the facts for the jury’s version. See Lighting Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d
1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d
171, 190 (3d Cir.1992)). Therefore, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict on the grounds
that Trueman suggests.
IV.
We have reviewed Trueman’s remaining allegations of error and find them
meritless. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.
argument in section A. above.
21