Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-9-2008
USA v. Gaddy
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-1852
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"USA v. Gaddy" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1038.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1852
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALLEN GADDY,
a/k/a Douglas Gaddy,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 03-cr-00710)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 6, 2008
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 9, 2008)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
convicted Allen Gaddy of four counts of drug and gun possession in May 2005. The
District Court imposed an aggregate term of 168 months’ imprisonment, a special
assessment of $300, a fine of $500, and an eight-year term of supervised relief. On
appeal, we remanded under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The District
Court imposed the same sentence on remand, with the exception that it added the special
condition of supervised release that Gaddy “seek gainful employment in the clothes
apparel field.” He now appeals the imposition of that special condition. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The District Court did not give reasons for its imposition of the challenged
condition of supervised release. This leaves us guessing as to its rationale. Though an
educated guess follows, we are not sure our surmise is right.
While the district court has broad discretion in fashioning conditions of
supervised release, the sentencing judge is required by statute to state the
reasons in open court for imposing a particular sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c). By explaining the reasons behind the sentence, the court ensures
that appellate review does not “flounder in the zone of speculation.”
United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 370–71 (1999) (quoting United States v. Edgin, 92
F.3d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir. 1996)). To avoid that speculation, and because of the
restriction of liberty represented by the condition of supervised release, we have no
choice but to vacate and remand.
We note that an officer supervising Gaddy’s release could construe the challenged
condition as prohibiting Gaddy from pursuing employment outside the clothes apparel
field. We doubt that the District Court intended to limit Gaddy’s employment options in
this fashion. The Court likely meant to encourage Gaddy to seek any gainful employment
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and only emphasized the garment industry because of Gaddy’s experience as a tailor.
However, the condition’s ambiguous language highlights the challenge facing us when
we lack a sufficient statement of the reasons for sentence. The statement of reasons on
remand will allow us to understand and review Gaddy’s sentence on any future appeal.
We thus vacate the challenged condition of supervised release and remand to the
District Court.
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