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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13283
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00178-RS-EMT
AL JEFFERSON DAVIS,
BRITTANY DAVIS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
HABITAT FOR HUMANITY OF BAY COUNTY, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(February 28, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Al and Brittany Davis (the Davises) appeal the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee, Habitat for Humanity
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(Habitat), and the district court’s denial of their motion for a new trial or rehearing.
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, we affirm.
I. Facts
Habitat for Humanity is a non-profit organization that builds simple and
affordable housing for low-income families. Applicants are considered if their
present housing is inadequate and they are unable to obtain adequate housing
through conventional means. From the pool of applicants, Habitat selects “partner
families” to become homeowners. Completed homes are sold to partner families at
cost and financed with zero-interest loans.
Al and Brittany Davis are siblings. Al is an able-bodied 38-year-old and
Brittany Davis is a 35-year-old hemiplegic, who, as a result of a car accident, is
confined to a wheelchair and requires 24-hour care that is provided by either her
family or a caregiver.
In September 2004, the Davises filed a joint application for a Habitat home.
Prior to construction, a representative from Habitat met with the Davises and their
mother to discuss Brittany’s needs. The Davises also met with a rehabilitation
engineer to discuss how to make the home most accessible to Brittany.
Foundation for the home was poured in 2006. By August 2007, substantial
work had been done on the home but the Davises were not happy with the
construction. The Davises’ attorney sent a letter to Habitat, pointing out all the
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problems with the home. In October 2007 the home was substantially complete,
and the Davises conducted a walk-through to identify items that needed repairs.
Habitat provided the Davises with a “punch list” that would allow the Davises to
record any issues they had with the home. The Davises never completed or
returned the punch list to Habitat. In the following months, there appears to have
been a breakdown in communication between the parties and discussions became
adversarial and heated.
A Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the house in May 2008. The
Davises and Habitat, however, were never able to come to an agreement that the
Davises would purchase the home. Habitat offered to build another home for the
Davises but the offer was declined because the alternative locations were not
suitable for Brittany. The original home was eventually purchased by a different
partner family.
On June 17, 2011, the Davises filed their initial complaint in state court
alleging discrimination pursuant to the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§
3601–3604. Habitat removed the case to federal court and moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted its motion. The Davises filed a motion for a
new trial or rehearing. The district court denied their motion. This appeal follows.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment
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On appeal, the Davises first argue that the district court erred in granting
Habitat’s motion for summary judgment. We review de novo the district court’s
grant of summary judgment. Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir.
2002) (per curiam). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, [we] must view all evidence and
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.”
Loren, 309 F.3d at 1301–02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The FHA prohibits discriminatory housing practices based on an
individual’s disability or handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A). Discrimination
under the FHA includes “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(B). “[H]andicapped people must be afforded the same (or ‘equal’)
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling as non-handicapped people, which occurs
when accommodations address the needs created by the handicaps.” Schwarz v.
City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in
original). To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must establish
that (1) she is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the FHA, (2) she
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requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) such accommodation was necessary to
afford her an opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling, and (4) the defendants
refused to make the requested accommodation. See id. at 1218–20; United States
v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App’x 872, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). A
plaintiff is not entitled to the accommodation of his or her choice, but is entitled
only to a reasonable accommodation. Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire
Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997).
The Davises contend that Habitat violated the FHA by failing “to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,” which were
necessary to afford the Davises an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the home.
Specifically, the Davises claim Habitat did not allow them to communicate about
needed modifications and failed to make the modifications the Davises requested.
That is, Habitat’s policy of not offering customized homes prevented Habitat from
providing equal access to the Davises. Habitat responds that the Davises fail to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination as the record does not reveal that the
Davises made a request for an accommodation that was denied by Habitat.
Additionally, the FHA does not require Habitat to comply with every requested
modification or accommodation without regard to whether the request is
appropriate and reasonable.
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The Davises cannot prove discrimination under the FHA because there is
nothing in the record to demonstrate that Habitat refused to make the requested
accommodation of allowing the Davises to communicate with Habitat about
needed modifications. Habitat met with the Davises and with a vocational
rehabilitation engineer at the Davises’ request and agreed to modify the building
plan for the home. Habitat then built a home with the majority of the
modifications requested. As the district court correctly found, Brittany could have
used and enjoyed the home with those modifications. To the extent that Habitat
had a policy of not building custom homes, it certainly altered this policy when it
designed and built the Davises’ home. Accordingly, summary judgment was
proper.
B. Motion for a New Trial or Rehearing
The Davises claim that the district court erred in denying their motion for a
new trial or rehearing. “A district court has sound discretion whether to alter or
amend a judgment pursuant to a motion for reconsideration, and its decision will
only be reversed if it abused that discretion.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc.,
555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009). The Davises raised a new legal theory—that
Habitat failed to accommodate under § 3604(f)(3)(B)— in their motion for
reconsideration. We agree with the district court that this theory could have been
raised prior to the entry of summary judgment. “A motion for reconsideration
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cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment. This prohibition includes
new arguments that were previously available, but not pressed.” Id. (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the Davises’ motion. See id.
AFFIRMED.
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