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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-15465
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20352-CMA-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllCross Appellant,
versus
DAILIN PICO RODRIGUEZ,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllCross Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 30, 2012)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Dailin Pico Rodriguez appeals her convictions and concurrent 50-month
sentences for two counts of making false statements in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the district court: (1)
erred by failing to sustain her objections to the government’s comments made
during closing argument; (2) improperly applied a three-level sentencing
enhancement when it found her to have substantially interfered with the
administration of justice; and (3) improperly applied a two-level sentencing
enhancement when it found her offense was extensive in scope, planning, or
preparation.
The government cross-appeals, arguing that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to change Rodriguez’s 50-month sentences from running
consecutively to running concurrently with her undischarged term of
imprisonment.
I. Background
On July 21, 2011, a federal grand jury indicted Rodriguez for three counts
of knowingly making false statements to federal officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2). According to the indictment, on or about February 4, 2010,
Rodriguez, an inmate in the Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Miami, knowingly
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and falsely represented to a special agent within the Department of Justice, that her
prison-issued clothing contained semen of a correctional officer who had sexually
assaulted her. On or about February 12, 2010, Rodriguez told the same story to a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent. On or about February 25,
2010, Rodriguez knowingly and falsely told an FBI special agent that she had
saved hair cuttings containing the semen of an FDC correctional officer who had
sexually assaulted her. When tested, the DNA matched that of Rodriguez’s
boyfriend. The DNA did not match the DNA of the FDC correctional officer
Rodriguez alleged had sexually assaulted her.
A jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Count Two, however, was
dropped; Rodriguez was only sentenced on Counts One and Three, each count
carrying a 50-month sentence.
On November 15, 2011, the district court held that the current sentences
would be consecutive to the undischarged term of imprisonment. The minute
entry for sentencing, however, reflected that the current sentence was to run
concurrently with the undischarged term. Rodriguez immediately filed notice of
appeal. On November 16, 2011, the district court entered an amended judgment,
ordering that the 50-month sentences instead run concurrently with Rodriguez’s
undischarged term of imprisonment. The district court did not issue an
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accompanying order or opinion explaining its reasoning for entering the amended
judgment. Rodriguez again filed notice of appeal on November 18, 2011. The
government filed notice of cross-appeal on December 16, 2011.
II. Analysis
A. Rodriguez’s Claims on Appeal
1. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Rodriguez argues that the following comments made by the prosecutor in
closing argument were not based on evidence and amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct: (1) Rodriguez’s allegations of sexual assault could have ruined the
life of the accused correctional officer, and (2) because investigators spent time
investigating Rodriguez’s allegations, real cases were neglected.
We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct de novo. United States v.
Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006). To establish prosecutorial
misconduct, the defendant must show both that the prosecutor’s remarks were
improper, and that those remarks prejudicially affected her substantial rights. Id.
While a prosecutor may not exceed the evidence presented at trial during her
closing argument, she may state conclusions drawn from the evidence presented at
trial. United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997). “Although a
prosecutor may not make an argument directed to passions or prejudices of the
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jurors instead of an understanding of the facts and law, there is no prohibition on
colorful and perhaps flamboyant remarks if they relate to the evidence adduced at
trial.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A prosecutor may
argue the conclusions that the jury should draw from the evidence. United States
v. Johns, 734 F.2d 657, 663 (11th Cir. 1984).
In addition to showing that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, a
defendant must also show that those remarks prejudiced her substantial rights.
Eckhard, 466 F.3d at 947. Improper remarks prejudice the defendant’s substantial
rights if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different but for the remarks. Id. If “the record contains sufficient
independent evidence of guilt, any error is harmless.” Id.
Here, the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper and did not prejudice
Rodriguez’s substantial rights. When the prosecutor told the jury that the agents
had to spend time investigating Rodriguez’s allegations and thus could not
investigate real cases, the prosecutor likely intended to remind the jury of the fact
that Rodriguez’s lies were material and had real consequences. Similarly, the
prosecutor’s comment that Rodriguez’s lies could have ruined the correctional
officer’s life was a common-sense inference as to the likely consequences of
Rodriguez’s lies. See e.g. Bailey, 123 F.3d at 1400; Johns, 734 F.2d at 663.
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The prosecutor’s comments during closing argument were not improper and
did not prejudice Rodriguez’s substantial rights.
2. Three-Level Enhancement
Next, Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in determining that
she substantially interfered with the administration of justice. Specifically,
Rodriguez argues that the three-level enhancement cannot apply because the
government resources expended were part of the investigation into and the
prosecution of her false claims. See United States v. Johnson, 485 F.3d 1264,
1271 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that “the government correctly recognized at
sentencing that it could not rely on any investigative costs incurred prior to
Johnson’s false testimony or the expenses associated with prosecuting Johnson's
underlying perjury offense.”).
“We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
application of the Guidelines de novo.” United States v. Newman, 614 F.3d 1232,
1235 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 2J1.2(b)(2) of
the Guidelines provides a three-level enhancement if the offense resulted in a
“substantial interference with the administration of justice.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2J1.2(b)(2). The commentary explains that substantial interference with the
administration of justice includes, among other things, “the unnecessary
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expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.” § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1.
In United States v. Johnson, we interpreted this commentary with regard to
a perjury offense. 485 F.3d at 1271. We upheld the district court’s application of
a three-level enhancement under § 2J1.3(b)(2) for unnecessary expenditure of
substantial government or court resources. As a result of the defendant’s false
grand jury testimony, the government was forced to identify and interview several
other witnesses, review the defendant’s records, and reconvene the grand jury,
which required the government to pay travel expenses for grand jury members,
prosecutors, and witnesses. Id. at 1272. We also held that the government need
not specify the number of hours expended by government employees to sustain the
enhancement. Id. at 1271.
In this case, the record shows the expenditure of substantial government
resources that were required to investigate Rodriguez’s initial claims of sexual
assault. First, Rodriguez was interviewed on multiple occasions by different
agents. She was moved to a different jail during the investigation. An Assistant
United States Attorney had to prepare a search warrant in order to obtain DNA
from the alleged perpetrator. DNA had to be collected from Rodriguez’s
boyfriend and her alleged attacker. Lastly, the DNA collected (pants, hair, saliva)
had to be tested and analyzed. DNA testing and analysis is a time consuming and
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expensive process.
The record reflects that these resources were spent investigating
Rodriguez’s allegations and identifying her alleged assailant, and thus are
attributable to her criminal conduct for purposes of the Guidelines. Rodriguez has
not shown that the district court clearly erred in determining that she substantially
interfered with the administration of justice by causing the unnecessary
expenditure of substantial governmental resources.
3. Two-Level Enhancement
Rodriguez contends that her offense was not extensive in scope, planning,
or preparation because it involved her claiming that she had been the victim of
sexual assault and because DNA analyses quickly proved that her allegations were
not supported in fact.
Section § 2J1.2(b)(3)(C) provides for a two-level enhancement where the
offense “was otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or preparation.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2J1.2(b)(3)(C). Rodriguez’s offense was “extensive in scope, planning, [and]
preparation” and the district court did not err in so finding. See id.
Here, the district court found Rodriguez’s offense extensive in scope and
planning “because [it] involve[d] a gathering together of lies and
misrepresentations.” This court agrees. It could not have been an easy task for
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Rodriguez to obtain a semen sample from her boyfriend while he visited her in a
guarded visiting room and to then use that semen in such a way that would allow
her to have semen-stained pants in her cell. To further corroborate her story,
Rodriguez provided her boyfriend with a sample of her hair so he could later
produce her hair with a semen sample on it. Rodriguez directed agents to her
boyfriend so he could give them the hair sample.
Given the constraints of incarceration, Rodriguez’s offense clearly involved
extensive planning and preparation and the district court did not err in awarding
the two-level enhancement.
B. Government’s Cross-Appeal
In its cross-appeal, the government maintains that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to amend Rodriguez’s sentences. The original sentences were to run
consecutively to Rodriguez’s current undischarged prison term, but the district
court amended the judgment so that the sentences would run concurrently.
Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of
jurisdiction over aspects of the case involved in the appeal. United States v.
Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the district court
retains jurisdiction to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a). Fed. R. App.
P. 4(b)(5).
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A district court may not modify a term of imprisonment except under
limited circumstances, including to the extent expressly permitted by statute or by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). Rule 35(a)
permits district courts to correct arithmetical, technical, or other clear errors in a
sentence within 14 days of sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). The advisory
committee note explains that the authority to correct a sentence under Rule 35(a)
is intended to be very narrow and is not intended to give the court an opportunity
to change its mind about the appropriateness of a sentence. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 35 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190,
1196–97, 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the limitations of Rule 35(a)
are jurisdictional in nature).
In United States v. Lett, we vacated a re-sentencing order where the district
court’s original sentence was permissible under the Guidelines and the applicable
statutes. 483 F.3d 782, 791 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court initially imposed a
60-month sentence of imprisonment; 60 months was the mandatory minimum
sentence. Id. at 785. After further reflection, however, the court determined that,
under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), it could sentence the defendant
below the statutory mandatory minimum. Id. at 786–87. Acting within the time
limit, and purportedly under the authority provided by Rule 35(a), the district court
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modified the defendant’s sentence to below the mandatory minimum. Id. The
government appealed the district court’s amended sentence. Id. at 787. On
appeal, this court explained that Rule 35(a) provides district courts with only “a
narrow corrective power” that is limited to obvious errors. Id. at 788. Because the
sentence originally imposed was “plainly permissible” under the Guidelines and
applicable statutes, we vacated the district court’s re-sentencing order and
remanded with instructions to impose the original sentence. Id. at 788, 791.
Section 3742(b) of Title 18 authorizes the government to appeal an
otherwise final sentence if that sentence was imposed “in violation of law.”
18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1). We have explained that the legislative history and
symmetrical structure of § 3742 indicate Congress’s intent that the government
and defendants be able to appeal sentences on the same terms. United States
v. Chavarria-Herrara, 15 F.3d 1033, 1036 (11th Cir. 1994). We have further held
that under § 3742(b), this court has jurisdiction over government appeals of a
sentence reduced pursuant to Rule 35(b). Id.
Here, the district orally sentenced Rodriguez to two terms of 50-months
imprisonment to run consecutively to her undischarged term of imprisonment.
The initial sentencing order also reflects that the sentences run consecutively. On
the docket sheet, the minute entry for the sentencing proceedings reads that the 50-
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month sentences should run concurrently. After Rodriguez initially appealed, the
district court amended its sentencing order so that the two 50-month sentences
would run concurrently to the undischarged prison term. However, the district
court offered no explanation as to why it amended its judgment; there appears to
be no technical, arithmetical or other clear error in its original sentencing order.
See 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a); United States v. James, 597
F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that “under Rule 35(a), a court can
correct a sentence only for arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”).
Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend Rodriguez’s
sentences, and in the absence of an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error, her
50-month sentences should run consecutively to her current undischarged prison
sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district
court with instructions to reinstate its original judgment.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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