[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-13194 DECEMBER 19, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:04-cr-60039-WPD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
versus
THEODIS JONES,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(December 19, 2011)
Before WILSON, PRYOR, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Theodis Jones appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his motion to
compel specific performance of a provision of his plea agreement concerning the
government’s filing of a substantial-assistance motion. Upon review, we affirm
the judgment of the district court.
In 2009, Jones filed a similar motion to compel specific performance of the
plea agreement. Aside from an equal protection claim, the instant appeal advances
substantially the same arguments as that earlier motion. A panel of this court
previously affirmed the denial of the 2009 motion, concluding that Jones “failed to
demonstrate that he had a clear right to the relief requested, or that the
Government had a clear duty to file a substantial-assistance motion.” United
States v. Jones, 368 F. App’x 959, 961 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
The law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits “relitigation of issues that were
decided, either explicitly or by necessary implication, in an earlier appeal of the
same case.” United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2005). We
are bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a prior appeal in the
same case unless “(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence,
(2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to
that issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest
injustice.” United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
2
curiam).
We do not find that any of the exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine
apply here. There has been no new evidence submitted, and we find no
controlling authority necessitating a different result than we reached in Jones’s
2009 appeal. Furthermore, Jones has not advanced an argument to convince us
that the 2009 decision was clearly erroneous.
Jones’s one new claim, that the government violated his equal protection
rights, was already decided by necessary implication in our 2009 decision.
Analysis of the equal protection claim would necessarily involve evaluating the
quality and significance of Jones’s assistance and reviewing the government’s
decision not to file a substantial-assistance motion on his behalf. This point is
foreclosed by our prior opinion, see Jones, 368 F. App’x at 961, and there is no
exception that would compel us to reevaluate that conclusion.1
AFFIRMED.
1
Because these claims are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, we find that counsel is
unnecessary to assist in Jones’s appeal. Accordingly, his request for appointment of appellate
counsel is DENIED.
3