[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15923 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar OCTOBER 17, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
Agency No. A079-417-097
ALI HASSAN JASEM,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(October 17, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ali Hassan Jasem, a Shi’a Muslim and a native and citizen of Iraq, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) denial of his second
motion to reopen removal proceedings on the basis of changed country conditions
in Iraq. On appeal, Jasem argues that the BIA erred in concluding that there were
insufficient changed country conditions in Iraq by ignoring evidence of increased
violence along with a simultaneous decrease in security.
We review the denial of a motion to reopen an immigration petition for an
abuse of discretion. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.
2009). Our review “is limited to determining whether the BIA exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Id.
An alien may file one motion to reopen removal proceedings and generally
must file the motion within ninety days of the date of the BIA’s final
administrative removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(c)(2). However, these time and numerical limitations do not apply where
(1) the motion seeks asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief; (2) the
motion is based on changed country conditions; and (3) the evidence of changed
conditions is material and “was not available and would not have been discovered
or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) and 1003.23(b)(4)(i); Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256. Proving
that evidence is material is a “heavy burden” because an alien seeking to reopen
removal proceedings on the basis of changed country conditions must demonstrate
2
“that, if the proceedings were opened, the new evidence would likely change the
result in the case.” Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256-57.
To establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, “an applicant
must establish that [he] has a well-founded fear that [he] will be persecuted if
removed to [his] home country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Li v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 488 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 2007); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1),
and 1231(b)(3). To qualify for CAT relief, an applicant must demonstrate that it is
“more likely than not” that he will be tortured upon his return to the proposed
country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). We have stated that private acts of
violence, general criminal activity, and purely personal retribution do not qualify
as persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. See Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 392 F.3d
434, 438 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, we have held that noncriminal informants
do not constitute a particular social group under the INA. Castillo-Arias v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 2006). Nor does asylum eligibility
extend “to anyone who fears the general danger that inevitably accompanies
political ferment and factional strife.” Mazariegos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d
1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
3
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we find
that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jasem’s second motion to
reopen. First, because the BIA adequately reviewed Jasem’s motion and the
evidence of changed country conditions that he filed in support, the BIA did not
act arbitrarily or capriciously. See Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1258. Second, Jasem’s
second motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred, because it was filed
four years after the BIA’s final order of removal but did not demonstrate changed
country conditions in Iraq that were material and could not have been discovered
at the time of the removal proceedings. See id. at 1256. Rather, while Jasem’s
evidence showed ongoing general violence stemming from the government’s
transition, he did not demonstrate increased violence specifically directed at
individuals similar to him. See Mazariegos, 241 F.3d at 1328 (“the INA does not
extend eligibility for asylum to anyone who fears the general danger that
inevitably accompanies political ferment and factional strife.” (quotation marks
omitted)).1 As such, he failed to demonstrate that the “new evidence would likely
1
To be sure, Jasem testified that an alien smuggler asserted a personal vendetta that
constitutes a direct and targeted threat. However, purely personal retribution and private acts of
violence do not qualify as persecution based on a statutorily protected ground, and, even as a
noncriminal informant for the United States, Jasem would not fall within a particular social
group. See Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1258; Sanchez, 392 F.3d at 438.
4
change the result in his case,” Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1257, and consequently the
agency did not abuse its discretion in this denying relief.
PETITION DENIED.
5