[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 03, 2010
No. 10-13438 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cv-60289-JIC
JACQUELINE RIGAUD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BROWARD GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER,
NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 3, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The controversy underlying this appeal stems from a workers’ compensation
proceeding in Florida. Appellant was the claimant. She settled her claim and
thereafter attempted to set aside the settlement. She was unsuccessful at the
administrative level, appealed to the Florida First District Court of Appeal, which
dismissed her appeal, and then petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus. The supreme court denied her petition and her motion for
reconsideration. She thereafter removed the case from the supreme court to the
district court. Her notice of removal alleged that the judges of the district court of
appeal denied her due process of law.
The district court dismissed appellant’s case sua sponte on two grounds. (1)
She was seeking review of the Florida Supreme Court’s disposition of her case,
and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precluded the district court from conducting
such review. Final Order of Dismissal at 2-3. (2) The District Court of Appeal
judges were entitled to judicial immunity. Id. at 3-4. Appellant appealed to this
court, and we affirmed. Rigaud v. Broward General Medical Center et. al., No.
09-12271 (September 24, 2009) (not published).
Appellant then moved the district court to vacate its judgement pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) for fraud on the court. She alleged that
the district court, Judge James I. Cohn, perpetrated the fraud. Judge Cohn denied
her motion, and she now appeals his ruling. In her brief to this court, appellant
contends that Judge Cohn should have not have ruled on her Rule 60(d)(3) motion
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but, instead, should have recused—as the party who perpetuated the fraud, he was
biased against her.
Appellant did not move Judge Cohn to recuse; rather, she raises the recusal
issue for the first time on appeal. We therefore consider her recusal argument for
plain error. We find no error here, much less plain error.
Bias can either be extrajudicial, or come from remarks in a judicial context
that demonstrate a pervasive bias. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2000); Phillips v. Joint Legis. Comm. on Performance and Expenditure Review of
the State of Miss., 637 F.2d 1014, 1020 (5th Cir. 1981); Hamm v. Members of Bd.
of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). Adverse rulings do
not constitute pervasive bias. Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651. Judge Cohn made no
remarks in a judicial context that demonstrated a pervasive bias, and his adverse
ruling is immaterial. Appellant made no argument and presented no evidence,
below or on appeal, that Judge Cohn was influenced by any extrajudicial bias.
Instead, her arguments regarding bias stem from his prior rulings in this case.
Judge Cohn’s prior involvement in ordering the dismissal of appellant’s notice of
removal did not require his disqualification from appellant’s motion to vacate.
Phillips, 637 F.2d at 1020.
AFFIRMED.
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