[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 31, 2010
No. 09-15287 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-01966-CV-2-IPJ
CHAD GAMBRILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CULLMAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
a local education agency,
L. HANK ALLEN,
in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 31, 2010)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Chad Gambrill, a member of the Alabama National Guard, appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Cullman County Board
of Education (“CCBE”) and Hank Allen, the Superintendent of Education of
Cullman County (collectively “Defendants”), as to Gambrill’s discrimination
action under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4311.
“Congress enacted USERRA to prohibit employment discrimination on the
basis of military service as well as to provide prompt reemployment to those
individuals who engage in non-career service in the military.” Coffman v.
Chugach Support Serv., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005). The USERRA
provides, in pertinent part, that “a member . . . in a uniformed service shall not be
denied initial employment . . . , promotion, or any benefit of employment by an
employer on the basis of that membership.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). An employer
violates the USERRA if the applicant’s membership in a uniformed service is a
“motivating factor” in the employer’s adverse employment action, “unless the
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such
[membership].” Id. § 4311(c).
According to the statutory context above, we have held that the plaintiff
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must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing, by a
preponderance of evidence, that his protected status was a “motivating factor” in
the employer’s adverse employment decision. Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1238. “A
motivating factor does not mean that it had to be the sole cause of the employment
action,” but it has to be one of the factors that the employer “relied on, took into
account, considered, or conditioned its decision on that consideration.” Id.
(quotation and citation omitted). After the plaintiff meets the initial burden, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, the
affirmative defense that “legitimate reasons, standing alone, would have induced
the employer to take the same adverse action.” Id. at 1238-39 (citation omitted).
In this case, the district court did not err in concluding that legitimate
reasons standing alone would have induced Defendants to hire Jimmy Collins as
the most qualified candidate to be assistant principal at Hanceville Middle School
regardless of Gambrill’s military involvement.
Upon review of the entire record on appeal, and after consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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