NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0403-12T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. October 14, 2015
VANCLEVE ASHLEY, a/k/a APPELLATE DIVISION
QAWEE ALI,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
Submitted March 9, 2015 – Decided October 14, 2015
Before Judges Espinosa, St. John, and
Rothstadt.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment
No. 03-06-1233.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant, (Lauren S. Michaels,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel
and on the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth
County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent
(Monica do Outeiro, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.
Defendant Vancleve Ashley, also known as Qawee Ali, appeals
from the Law Division's denial of his motion to vacate his
guilty plea and from his sentence, which he argues was
excessive. We conclude defendant's guilty plea, the judgment of
conviction, and the sentence must be vacated, the dismissed
charges reinstated, and defendant allowed to re-plead or to
proceed to trial.
When there has been a plea agreement and a defendant seeks
to withdraw his guilty plea to multiple counts after providing
an inadequate factual basis to support a guilty plea, the remedy
is to vacate the plea in its entirety, reinstate the dismissed
charges and restore both the State and the defendant to their
positions prior to the guilty plea. State v. Campfield, 213
N.J. 218, 232 (2013) (citing State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 420
(1989)). In this case, we consider whether the same remedy
applies when the guilty plea, lacking an adequate factual basis,
is entered without a plea offer from the prosecutor, but after
the defendant has been advised by the trial court regarding the
maximum sentence the judge was "inclined" to impose. Because it
was intended that the maximum ten-year sentence the judge was
inclined to impose would globally address all charges and
defendant provided an inadequate factual basis for the most
2 A-0403-12T2
serious offense, it was error to deny his motion to vacate his
plea and sentence him to the ten year term.
Defendant was arrested in 2002 and charged in an indictment
with attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and
aggravated assault, exposing him to a possible sixty-year prison
sentence. In 2009, defendant pled guilty to each charge in the
indictment without a plea offer from the prosecutor. The judge,
however, advised defendant that he might be inclined to sentence
defendant to ten years with an eighty-five percent period of
parole ineligibility, concurrent to sentences defendant was then
serving, but the court made clear it was not making any promises
to defendant. The court's "inclination" was incorporated into a
written plea agreement, which the prosecutor, defendant, and his
attorney signed. Defendant purportedly gave a factual basis for
each of the crimes, but the prosecutor expressed concern that
defendant provided inadequate factual bases for the attempted
murder and conspiracy counts. The trial judge disagreed, and
accepted defendant's plea to all three charges.
Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to vacate his plea.
At his motion hearing before a different judge, defendant argued
that he did not provide an adequate factual basis for his guilty
plea to the attempted murder and conspiracy charges. He also
argued that he was not advised of the parole supervision aspect
3 A-0403-12T2
of his sentence. The judge found no merit to the parole
supervision argument, but agreed as to the lack of a factual
basis for defendant's guilty pleas to the attempted murder and
conspiracy counts. He granted defendant's motion as to those
two counts. However, the judge concluded defendant's testimony
sufficiently supported his plea to aggravated assault and,
therefore, did not vacate defendant's plea to that charge. The
State moved to dismiss counts one and two of the indictment and
have the court sentence defendant on the aggravated assault
charge. The court granted the motion and, after finding three
aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, sentenced
defendant to ten years imprisonment, with an eighty-five percent
parole ineligibility period, which he stated was "pursuant to
the plea agreement" between defendant and the former trial
judge.1 This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I.
[DEFENDANT'S] ENTIRE PLEA MUST BE VACATED,
BOTH BECAUSE THE JUDGE VACATED THE PLEAS TO
THE TWO MOST SERIOUS OFFENSES WHILE REFUSING
1
The court also imposed a three-year period of parole
supervision, waived all financial penalties, and awarded 570
days of jail credit and 2,390 days of gap time credit.
Defendant filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its
calculations, which the court denied. Defendant amended his
Notice of Appeal to include the denial.
4 A-0403-12T2
TO VACATE THE PLEA TO THE REMAINING CHARGE,
AND BECAUSE THE PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY.
A. It Was Improper For The Judge
To Vacate The Plea As To The Two
Most Serious Charges, But Deny The
Plea-Withdrawal Motion As To The
Least Serious Charge, And Then
Continue To Bind [Defendant] To
The Remainder Of The Plea
Agreement.
B. The Unanticipated Three-Year
Delay Between Plea And Sentencing
Resulted In (1) A Day-For-Day
Increase In Defendant's
Incarceration; (2) Partially-
Consecutive Sentencing, In
Violation Of The Plea Agreement;
And (3) The Loss Of Potential
Discretionary Credits, Which Were
Abolished Between His Plea And His
Sentencing.
C. The Plea Was Not Knowing And
Voluntary Because Even Though
[Defendant] Repeatedly Informed
The Court That He Was Reserving
His Rights, Rather Than Waiving
Them, The Judge Accepted His Plea.
POINT II.
BECAUSE [DEFENDANT] DID NOT RECEIVE THE
BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT TO CONCURRENT
SENTENCES AND TO A MINIMUM SENTENCE, AND
BECAUSE OF THE THREE-YEAR DELAY IN
SENTENCING RESULTING IN MEANINGLESS GAP
TIME, THE SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.
In his supplemental pro se brief, defendant presents the
following additional issues:
5 A-0403-12T2
POINT I.
IT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE COURT THE
STATE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL TO STIPULATE TO
THE FACTUAL BASIS OF SERIOUS BODILY INJURIES
IN REGARDS TO THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IN
VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. AMENDS. VI AND XIV
AND N.J. CONST. (1947) ART I. PARS. 9 AND
10.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT DID NOT PROVIDE THE COURT WITH AN
ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS ON COUNT THREE OF THE
PLEA IN REGARDS TO THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
THEREFORE THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO VACATE THE
ENTIRE PLEA AS BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
VIOLATION . . . OF U.S. CONST. AMENDS. VI
AND XIV AND N.J. CONST. (1947) ART I. PARS.
9 AND 10.
POINT III.
DEFENDANT'S PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED BECAUSE HE REPEATEDLY STATED OVER
AND OVER THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THE SAME
CRIMINAL INTENT TO ASSAULT VICTIM WITH [A]
CAR AS HIS CO-DEFENDANT YORK U.S. CONST.
AMENDS. VI AND XIV AND N.J. CONST. (1947)
ART I. PARS. 9 AND 10.
We have considered defendant's arguments in light of our
review of the record and applicable legal principles. We
reverse.
Defendant was arrested in connection with an assault during
which the victim was struck by a motor vehicle and sustained
significant injuries. On June 23, 2003, a Monmouth County Grand
Jury issued Indictment No. 03-06-01233, charging defendant with
6 A-0403-12T2
first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3
(count one); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2a(1) and/or (2), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (count two); and second-
degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (count three).
On June 1, 2009,2 defendant appeared before the court to
enter a guilty plea to the indictment. At the beginning of the
hearing, the prosecutor advised the court defendant was entering
"an open-ended plea," explaining that the "State [was] not a
party to any plea agreement here." The prosecutor acknowledged
that, despite the fact that "there [was] no plea agreement," he
was asked to sign the plea form and did so. Defense counsel
stated he had reviewed the plea form and discovery with
defendant. He represented that defendant was entering the plea
voluntarily and understood both the charges and the nature of
the proceedings.
When asked if he understood all the questions on the plea
form, defendant requested the court explain the notation on page
four, which read "ct. inclined to sentence [defendant] to 10 &
2
From 2003 through 2008, defendant was convicted and sentenced
in both state and federal courts for various crimes. He
remained in federal custody from 2006 through 2008. By the time
he pled guilty in this matter, he was serving a thirty-four-year
federal sentence and fifteen-year and nine-year sentences on
state charges.
7 A-0403-12T2
85% concurrent to sent. being served." The following exchange
took place between defendant and the judge:
THE COURT: . . . It says that the [c]ourt
is inclined to impose a sentence of ten with
no parole for 85 percent concurrent to your
presen[ t] sentence. That's what it says.
. . . Inclined doesn't mean promise.
DEFENDANT: Oh, okay.
THE COURT: I have to see whatever happens.
I have to read the presentence
investigations. I have to see what happens.
If you have to testify in another case,
whatever it is, there's an inclination but
no promise. Understand?
DEFENDANT: So what does "inclination" mean?
THE COURT: That I am leaning that way but
haven’t tipped over yet. All right. I
haven't made that my final decision. It's a
thought. I told counsel, both counsel that
but it's no promise.
DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: Tipping over is promise, I can't
promise that that's what the sentence will
be.
DEFENDANT: Is it permissible to promise the
sentence to be that? Is that permissible?
THE COURT: Yes.
DEFENDANT: Could I talk to my counselor for
a second[?]
(Off-the-record discussion.)
THE COURT: Understand?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
8 A-0403-12T2
THE COURT: You understand there's no
promise. There's an inclination. I'm
leaning in that direction but I haven’t
promised it until everything is all over.
And I can't tell you exactly what I'm going
to do.
Do you understand that? So you really are
pleading guilty open-ended which there's no
promise from the prosecutor, there's no
recommendation from the prosecutor, and just
my inclination, not a promise. Do you
understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that agreeable with you?
DEFENDANT: That's the situation at hand.
THE COURT: Well, this is part of your plea.
DEFENDANT: All right.
THE COURT: Now, you and [your counsel] went
over the, all the questions together?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you understand the
questions?
DEFENDANT: Basically I got a different
understanding from it, from the way you
explaining it, but it sounds from the way he
explained it to me, that's what it sounds.
THE COURT: All right.
DEFENDANT: Appropriate.
[(Emphasis added).]
9 A-0403-12T2
The court proceeded to question defendant to establish whether
he read and understood the plea agreement form he signed and was
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his guilty
plea.3 During the court's questioning, defendant confirmed that
he understood the prosecutor was not making any recommendations
about the sentence to be imposed:
THE COURT: You know that the prosecutor has
made no promises to you as to any
recommendation at the time of your
sentencing[?]
DEFENDANT: From I was concerned the
prosecutor had nothing to do with me at all
at this point.
THE COURT: He is the prosecutor in the
case. You understand that there's no
promises from the prosecutor?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
When the court asked defendant for a factual basis for the
crimes to which he was pleading guilty, defendant explained he
was approached by a man ("Roger") on behalf of another ("Nick")
to make arrangements to have Nick's attorney ("Peter")
3
Defendant complicated the plea hearing when he confirmed he
signed the plea agreement "without prejudice" and he "reserved"
his rights. Also, he claimed he was not a citizen of the United
States but, rather, a "sovereign" and a "Moorish American." See
United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2003)
(explaining a defendant who states he is a "Moorish American” is
a person claiming "that his ancestors came from Africa, that he
is therefore a Moorish national, and that as a result he need
obey only those laws mentioned in an ancient treaty between the
United States and Morocco").
10 A-0403-12T2
"straightened out" because Nick was not happy with the way Peter
represented him in a domestic matter. At a meeting with Nick
and Roger, Nick offered to pay defendant five thousand dollars
to have Peter's "ass beat." Defendant subsequently contacted
another man ("Raimaine") to tell him that he had a job for him,
stating "[t]he job was to beat the lawyer['s] ass because he was
a crook, too." Defendant had a second meeting with Roger and
Nick, during which he received half of the agreed-upon payment.
Defendant went with Raimaine to Peter's office in
defendant's wife's vehicle, where they met up with "another
assailant." Ultimately, despite defendant's instructions to
"wait for [Peter] to come outside to run up on him and beat the
shit out of him," Raimaine struck Peter with defendant's wife's
vehicle while traveling at approximately fifteen to twenty miles
per hour. Defendant emphasized that Peter was not supposed to
be hit with the vehicle because "[n]obody paid [him] to commit
murder," and "nobody paid nobody to do no murdering with a
vehicle registered to my wife."
When asked if he realized Peter's injuries were serious,
defendant replied:
Did I know that? No, I didn't know. I knew
later on when the charges came about and,
well, Roger did some investigation. Let me
be honest. He found out that the man was
hit and he was seriously hurt. He was hurt
bad.
11 A-0403-12T2
Defendant expressed his remorse for what occurred and further
stated,
[I am] willing to do my time for what the
hell I did and what is involved with this
idiot, the man was struck. Thank God he
didn't die because we would be here talking
about something else. I was paid to make
sure this man get his ass whooped[4] and he
got ran over.
Toward the conclusion of the hearing, the prosecutor noted
that "[t]he second degree aggravated assault charge . . .
need[s] . . . proof of serious bodily injury." Defense counsel
stipulated to the seriousness of Peter's injuries, which
satisfied the prosecutor that "there's an adequate factual basis
for the second degree charge." The court stated:
THE COURT: I find in regard to that, that
the injuries that I learned about earlier in
this case and now today, that that's an
indication of an, under our statute, second
degree serious bodily injury. So do you
have any questions you want to ask of [the
prosecutor], [your counsel] or of me?
DEFENDANT: I just want to say I just want
to leave the situation, clean my hands with
it and just, you know, get this stuff
resolved.
4
Defendant later clarified that an "ass whooping" consists of
"[j]ust beat[ing] his ass, little bumps and bruises, something
simple."
12 A-0403-12T2
The prosecutor then expressed his doubt as to whether
defendant's admissions constituted an adequate factual basis for
the attempted murder charge and the conspiracy charge, stating
he would leave the matter up to the discretion of the court.
The judge accepted defendant's plea, finding an adequate factual
basis as to all three charges.
Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
plea. On July 11, 2012, a different judge heard oral argument
on defendant's motion. From the outset, defendant's new
attorney acknowledged that there was no plea agreement with the
prosecutor and that despite defendant explicitly asking for a
formal deal from the court, he was given "not a promise promise,
but a maybe." Defendant then proffered two bases for vacating
the plea: the court failed to advise him of "the penal
consequences of the plea in terms of the parole supervision
aspect of it, which our Court [has] held is – is mandatory;" and
the factual basis he proffered was inadequate as to the
attempted murder and conspiracy counts, reminding the court that
the prosecutor had acknowledged the deficiency at the hearing.
Defense counsel reiterated "[t]he agreement was for a beating,
never for a killing." Defendant did not attack the sufficiency
of the factual basis for his guilty plea to the aggravated
assault charge.
13 A-0403-12T2
The court found there was "no doubt" that defendant
voluntarily entered his plea. The judge also found no merit to
the argument that defendant was not properly informed of the
parole supervision aspect of his sentence, stating that, in
light of defendant's upcoming federal sentence, "it is not a
material factor." However, the judge agreed that there was an
insufficient factual basis to support the attempted murder and
conspiracy charges; therefore, he granted the motion as to
counts one and two. As to the third count, the judge found "all
the necessary components to support a plea of guilty," and
denied the motion to vacate as to that count. He commented,
"[d]efendant through his own words clearly indicate[d] he knew
what they were doing. . . . There's no question they were down
there to injure [Peter] and they did."
Immediately following the plea withdrawal hearing, the
State moved to dismiss counts one and two and sentence defendant
on the aggravated assault charge. The State declined to be
heard as to sentencing. Defense counsel acknowledged that
defendant could be sentenced to a maximum of ten years with an
eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility. However, he
requested that the court consider a lesser sentence, claiming
that Raimaine, the "primary assaulter," received a sentence of
14 A-0403-12T2
eight years in exchange for his cooperation with the State.
Defendant argued that he never admitted to assaulting Peter.
Noting that defendant had fifty adult arrests, the judge
found that aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3)
(risk of defendant committing another offense), six, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(6) (extent of defendant's prior criminal record and
seriousness of offense), and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (need
to deter defendant and others) applied. The judge found no
mitigating factors applicable. The judge stated he had
"completely eliminated all the first degree counts," was
sentencing defendant pursuant "to the plea agreement that was
between him and" the plea judge, and imposed the ten-year
sentence with the eighty-five percent parole ineligibility
period, concurrent to the sentence he was currently serving.5
This appeal followed.
We address defendant's argument that, once the court
dismissed two of the three counts to which he pled guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court was required to
vacate his guilty plea to all three charges. We agree.
5
Defendant's judgment of conviction stated: "The court
followed the plea agreement . . . . This was a plea agreement
between the prosecutor and the defendant. It appears fair and
in the interest of justice. The court will impose the
recommended sentence." (emphasis added). This was obviously an
error.
15 A-0403-12T2
"A plea agreement is an all-or-nothing arrangement."
Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 422. "The cornerstone of the plea-
bargaining system is the 'mutuality of advantage' it affords to
both the defendant and the State." Id. at 420.
Negotiations for plea agreements take place between the
defendant and the State, ibid., as judges are prohibited from
taking part in plea discussions. R. 3:9-3(a). However, in the
absence of a plea agreement, the court may
indicate . . . the maximum sentence it would
impose in the event the defendant enters a
plea of guilty, assuming, however, . . .
that the information in the presentence
report at the time of sentence is as has
been represented to the court at the time of
the disclosure and supports its
determination that the interests of justice
would be served thereby. . . . [I]f the plea
is to be based on the court's conditional
indication about the sentence, all the terms
of the plea, including the court's
concurrence or its indication concerning
sentence, shall be placed on the record in
open court at the time the plea is entered.
Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize the court to dismiss or downgrade
any charge without the consent of the
prosecutor.
[R. 3:9-3(c).]
See also State v. Salentre, 275 N.J. Super. 410, 417 (App. Div.)
(stating that the court rules permit the parties to "obtain the
judge's view as to 'maximum sentence' he might impose if
defendant entered a plea"), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 269 (1994).
16 A-0403-12T2
This does not mean that a judge is bound to impose the
sentence he previously indicated, even if the presentence report
is as expected. Rule 3:9-3(e) provides,
If at the time of sentencing the court
determines that the interests of justice
would not be served by effectuating the
agreement reached by the prosecutor and
defense counsel or by imposing sentence in
accordance with the court's previous
indications of sentence, the court may
vacate the plea or the defendant shall be
permitted to withdraw the plea.
When a court gives an inclination of a sentence in a plea
agreement, it is not an open plea to the indictment. "An 'open
plea' [is] one that d[oes] not include a recommendation from the
State, nor a prior indication from the court, regarding
sentence." State v. Kates, 426 N.J. Super. 32, 42 n.4 (App.
Div. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing State v. McDonald, 209 N.J.
549, 552 (2012)), aff'd, 216 N.J. 393 (2014).
When a court has given an inclination of a maximum
sentence, but subsequently determines that there was an
inadequate factual basis to support the plea, absent an
agreement between the State and defendant,
[t]he remedy . . . is an order vacating the
guilty plea and restoring both parties to
their positions prior to the trial court's
acceptance of the plea. Barboza, supra, 115
N.J. at 420. If an appellate court
determines that "a plea has been accepted
without an adequate factual basis, the plea,
the judgment of conviction, and the sentence
17 A-0403-12T2
must be vacated, the dismissed charges
reinstated, and defendant allowed to re-
plead or to proceed to trial." Ibid.
[Campfield, supra, 213 N.J. at 232.]
The plea must be vacated regardless of whether a defendant
gave a factual basis for all of the charges to which he pled
guilty, or less than all of the charges, if there is a material
change to the reasons why he pled in the first instance. See R.
3:9-2; see also Campfield, supra, 213 N.J. at 243 n.5 (Albin,
J., dissenting) ("[W]hen a guilty plea to one charge is vacated,
the plea agreement as a whole is a nullity, and the State
retains the right to proceed to trial on all charges in the
indictment (citing Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 420)). As the
Court explained, "[this] procedure . . . best reflects the
concerns of fundamental fairness to defendants and of procedural
simplicity, which benefits all parties involved and the criminal
justice system." Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 427.
Contrary to the State's argument here, the fact that the
State did not participate in the plea is of no consequence. The
requirement that the entire plea be vacated is equally
applicable whenever the defendant's exposure to prison time is
dramatically reduced from what it was when a defendant entered
the plea. "Knowledge of the comparative sentence exposure
between standing trial and accepting a plea offer will often be
18 A-0403-12T2
crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty." United States
v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). Sentencing a defendant
in accordance with the original plea after his exposure is
reduced violates the defendant's "right to make a reasonably
informed decision whether to accept a plea offer," because
knowledge of potential sentence exposure is crucial to the
decision of whether to plead guilty. Ibid.; see also State v.
Nichols, 71 N.J. 358, 361 (1976).
Defendant pled guilty after the court indicated that it
would consider limiting his exposure to ten years, rather than
the sixty years he was facing. His plea to the greater offenses
was vacated and dismissed, thereby dramatically reducing his
exposure to ten years, the maximum sentence for a second-degree
aggravated assault and the sentence to which the court was
inclined to limit his exposure when he was facing sixty years.
Under these circumstances, we are constrained to reverse
the court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate the entirety
of his plea and remand the matter for reinstatement of the
dismissed charges, allowing defendant to re-plead or proceed to
trial. In doing so, we stress to our courts the importance of
trial judges scrutinizing the factual basis offered by
defendants in support of guilty pleas and the need for the
rejection of those pleas that lack an adequate factual basis so
19 A-0403-12T2
as to avoid similar outcomes in the future. See State v.
Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 527 (2015) ("'[e]ven if a defendant wished
to plead guilty to a crime he or she did not commit, he or she
may not do so. No court may accept such a plea.'" (quoting
State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 415 (1990))).
Because we reverse the court's denial of the motion to
vacate his plea and judgment of conviction, we need not reach
defendant's other arguments.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
20 A-0403-12T2