[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 15, 2010
No. 09-16037 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-01675-CV-RGV-1
STEVEN D. STANLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 15, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Stanley appeals a decision that affirmed the denial of his application
for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Stanley challenges the ruling
on two grounds. First, Stanley challenges the decision not to give controlling
weight to the opinion of his treating physician, Michael Wofford, that Stanley was
totally disabled. Second, Stanley argues that the administrative law judge failed to
consider all his impairments in assessing his residual functional capacity. We
affirm the decision to discount Wofford’s opinion, but we reverse the decision
about Stanley’s residual functional capacity and remand for further proceedings.
We review the decision by the Commissioner “to determine if it is supported
by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). “‘Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)). That review “precludes deciding
the facts anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the evidence.”
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
Substantial evidence supports the decision to discount Wofford’s opinion
that in December 1997 Stanley was “totally and permanently disabled for all
work.” Wofford’s opinion is inconsistent with his medical notes about Stanley’s
2
condition, the opinions of other doctors who examined Stanley, and Stanley’s
testimony. See Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532–33
(11th Cir. 1991); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583 (11th Cir. 1991).
Wofford recorded essentially the same complaints about Stanley’s severe back pain
and headaches between 1995 and 1997, and Wofford stated in 1995 and 1996 that
Stanley was capable of performing light work. Although in 1997 Stanley suffered
two bouts of bursitis and an increase in kidney stones, Wofford’s notes do not
suggest that those conditions were disabling. Physicians Dean Talley and Alfred
Hauser examined Stanley in July 1996 and September 1997, and neither physician
concluded that Stanley was disabled. Furthermore, Stanley’s testimony about
walking up to a mile, shopping for groceries, attending his sons’ baseball games,
and hunting a couple of times a year suggests that he was not permanently
disabled. The only evidence in the record that supports Wofford’s opinion is a
report detailing the findings of an exercise physician and a physical trainer during a
vocational assessment, but those individuals do not qualify as acceptable medical
sources who can provide evidence to establish that Stanley was impaired. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). We affirm the decision not to give controlling weight to
Wofford’s opinion.
Although the decision of the administrative law judge reflects a reasoned
3
consideration of Wofford’s opinion, the decision does not reflect a reasoned
consideration of all the medical evidence in determining Stanley’s residual
functional capacity. “[T]he regulations define [residual functional capacity] as that
which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his . . .
impairments.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)). Residual functional capacity is determined by
considering cumulatively “all the relevant medical and other evidence,” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(e), in the case. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987).
Stanley presented evidence that he suffered from kidney disease, cervical
disease, lumbar disc disease, headaches, and adjustment disorder, but the
administrative law judge failed to consider the combined effect of these
impairments. The administrative law judge mentioned but did not consider
evidence about Stanley’s kidney disease, and the administrative law judge
evaluated separately Stanley’s cervical and lumbar diseases and his adjustment
disorder. After the administrative law judge found that the adjustment disorder
was not a severe impairment, he assessed Stanley’s residual functional capacity
based solely on Stanley’s cervical and lumbar diseases and his headaches.
Ultimately, the administrative law judge found that Stanley could “perform a
significant range of sedentary work.” Substantial evidence does not support that
4
finding because the administrative law judge failed to account for the combined
effect of all of Stanley’s impairments. We reverse the order of the district court
that affirmed this portion of the decision of the Commissioner and we remand “for
review of all of the evidence under the proper legal standards.” Id. at 1002.
We AFFIRM the decision to discount the opinion of Stanley’s treating
physician, but we REVERSE the decision of the district court affirming the
decision about Stanley’s residual functional capacity, and we REMAND for
further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, and REVERSED and REMANDED IN PART.
5