[DO NO PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-11740 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 29, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
Agency Nos. A99-544-414,
A99-544-415
LUIS GUILLERMO TORRES,
BEATRIZ EUGENIA LLANOS TORRES,
MATEO TORRES LLANOS,
SAMUEL TORRES LLANOS,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(April 29, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Guillermo-Torres, his wife Beatriz Eugenia Llanos-Torres, and their
minor children Mateo and Samuel Torres, natives and citizens of Colombia,1
petition for review of the affirmance by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
of the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The decision denied asylum and
withholding of removal.2 No reversible error has been shown; we deny the petition.
We review the BIA’s decision in this case because the BIA did not expressly
adopt the IJ’s decision. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.
2001) (noting that we review the BIA’s decision; but “[i]nsofar as the [BIA] adopts
the IJ’s reasoning, we will review the IJ’s decision as well”). We review de novo
legal determinations of the BIA. Id. We review factual determinations under the
“highly deferential” substantial evidence test; and we must affirm a “decision if it
is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Forgue v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Therefore, a fact determination will be reversed only
1
Guillermo-Torres included his wife and children as derivatives in his asylum
application; so our decision about Guillermo-Torres also applies to them.
2
The decision also denied relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. But on appeal, Guillermo-
Torres does not offer argument on this claim; and thus, it is abandoned. See Sepulveda v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that petitioner abandons an
issue by failing to offer argument on that issue).
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when the record compels, instead of merely supports, a reversal. Alim v.
Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2006).
An alien may obtain asylum if he is a “refugee,” that is, a person unable or
unwilling to return to his country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of” a protected ground, including political
opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 1158(a)(1), (b)(1). The asylum applicant
bears the burden of proving statutory “refugee” status with specific and credible
evidence. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287.
Guillermo-Torres sought asylum based on his political opinion, claiming
that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) targeted him because
of his activities with the Radical Change Party, an arm of the Liberal Party. About
his political activities, Guillermo-Torres testified that (1) he worked on the mayoral
campaign of his cousin, the campaign received threats from the FARC, and his
uncle, the leader of the campaign, was assassinated by the FARC; (2) he also
worked on the re-election campaign of President Alvaro Uribe and, after a meeting
about the campaign, a village leader told him not to return to the village because
FARC guerillas would kill him if he continued to work on the campaign; and (3) a
few days after the Uribe meeting, he received a threatening phone call from a
FARC member.
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Guillermo-Torres also testified that the FARC stopped one of his company
trucks and told the driver to warn Guillermo-Torres that he was not safe. The
FARC captured another of Guillermo-Torres’s company trucks, killed the driver
and his assistant, and burned the truck. Shortly after the truck driver’s death,
Guillermo-Torres and his wife were driving and noticed that they were being
followed by a truck. When the truck passed them, Guillermo-Torres accelerated
and hit the side of the truck. Gun shots were fired from the truck, hitting
Guillermo-Torres’s vehicle in several places. This incident prompted Guillermo-
Torres and his wife to seek government protection, but they were told by the
mayor’s office that there was insufficient personnel to offer protection. Guillermo-
Torres and his family fled to a town 650 kilometers away to stay with his wife’s
family. There, someone called him and threatened to assassinate him. Guillermo-
Torres and his family then fled to the United States.
The IJ determined that Guillermo-Torres had not demonstrated past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA agreed, noting
that (1) Guillermo-Torres presented no evidence indicating that the destruction of
his company trucks was connected to his political activities; (2) it was unclear
whether the FARC was involved in the driving incident or why people shot at
Guillermo-Torres’s vehicle; (3) the threats Guillermo-Torres received did not
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constitute past persecution; and (4) he had family members living unharmed in
Colombia while nothing indicated that the FARC was actively looking for him
there. On appeal, Guillermo-Torres argues that he suffered past persecution at the
hands of the FARC because of his political activities and that he demonstrated a
well-founded fear of future persecution.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision; and we are not compelled
to reverse it. About his uncle’s assassination, the incidents with the company
trucks, and being followed while driving, Guillermo-Torres did not show a
connection between the acts and his political activities. Rodriguez Morales v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., 488 F.3d 884, 890 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the persecution
must occur because of the victim’s protected characteristic). For instance, since his
uncle was killed, no other member of his family has been harmed by the FARC.
Guillermo-Torres admitted to running into the truck with his own vehicle, making
it unclear why shots were fired. Also, nothing evidences that the FARC instigated
this incident or took responsibility for it. And the threats Guillermo-Torres
received from the FARC -- the only acts that clearly were directed at him because
of his political activity -- do not rise to the level of past persecution. Sepulveda,
401 F.3d at 1231 (explaining that persecution is an “extreme concept, requiring
more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation”; and
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“mere harassment does not amount to persecution”) (citation and internal quotation
omitted).
About a well-founded fear of future persecution, Guillermo-Torres needed to
establish that his fear both was “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.”
Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. “[T]he objective prong can be fulfilled . . . by
establishing . . . that he. . . has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id.
(internal quotation omitted). Guillermo-Torres has shown no such objective good
reason. Nothing evidences that the FARC is actively looking for Guillermo-Torres
or his family in Colombia. And he has family remaining there -- including his
politically active cousin -- unharmed. See Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 440 F.3d
1247, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006) (indicating that a claim of well-founded fear is
undercut when the alien has family living in the country without incident).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision that Guillermo-Torres was
unentitled to asylum; and we are not compelled to reverse the BIA’s decision.
Because we conclude that Guillermo-Torres did not meet his burden of
establishing his eligibility for asylum, he also has failed to meet the more difficult
standards for withholding of removal. See Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1288 n.4. We deny
the petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
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