[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 27, 2009
No. 08-15887 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00005-CR-3-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FREDERICK GLEN GRAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 27, 2009)
Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Frederick Glen Gray appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
reduce his 96-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment
706 to the Sentencing Guidelines.1
Gary was convicted of a crack cocaine offense. Although his guidelines
range was initially 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment, he faced a statutorily
enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) due to his prior felony
convictions, and his guidelines range became life imprisonment. After the court
granted the government’s U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion, it sentenced Gary to 96
months’ imprisonment. Gary subsequently filed a motion for reduction of sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) based on Amendment 706. In denying the motion, the
district court stated, “[t]he defendant has already received an unusually large
reduction in sentence: from Mandatory Life to 96 months. No further reduction is
required or appropriate.” This appeal followed.
Gray argues that the district court’s order denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion is
too ambiguous to allow for meaningful appellate review because it is unclear
whether the court found that (1) it lacked discretion to reduce his sentence because
Gray was unqualified, or alternatively, (2) it did have discretion to reduce his
sentence, but chose not to do so.
In the § 3582(c)(2) context, we review “de novo the district court’s legal
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Amendment 706 reduced by two levels the § 2D1.1(c) offense levels in crack cocaine
cases and became effective November 1, 2007. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706.
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conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.”
United States v. White, 305 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002). Once eligibility
under § 3582(c)(2) has been established, however, we review “a district court’s
decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on
a subsequent change in the sentencing guidelines, for abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). We may affirm the district
court on any basis supported by the record. Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344,
1353 n.17 (11th Cir. 1997).
In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to reduce a sentence under
§ 3582(c)(2), the preferred practice is for a district court to state the reasons for its
rulings. See United States v. Carter, 110 F.3d 759, 761 (11th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997). When a district court
fails to provide sufficient reasons for its denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce
sentence, and as a result, we cannot engage in meaningful appellate review, we will
vacate the sentence and remand for the district court to state sufficient reasons for
its ruling. On the other hand, if meaningful appellate review is possible, remand is
unnecessary.
Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court has discretion to reduce the term of
imprisonment of an already incarcerated defendant if that defendant “has been
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sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(o).” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Amendment 706 was made retroactive
effective March 3, 2008, by incorporation into § 1B1.10(c). See U.S.S.G. App. C,
Amend. 713.
In evaluating a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the court must first determine the new
base offense level under the guideline amendment, leaving intact all other original
guideline application decisions, and then must decide whether it will exercise its
discretion to impose the newly calculated sentence or retain the original sentence.
See United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780-81 (11th Cir. 2000). When,
however, a defendant is not eligible for a sentencing reduction as a matter of law, a
district court does not have to recalculate a defendant’s amended guideline range or
consider the § 3553(a) factors.
This court recently addressed and rejected Gray’s argument, holding that
because “the statutorily required minimum sentence effectively displaces the
shorter sentence and becomes the guideline sentence for the individual,”
Amendment 706 does not apply, as “the court’s point of departure [for purposes of
applying the § 5K1.1 downward departure] [does] not shift as a result of the
amendment’s lowering of the crack offense levels.” United States v. Williams, 549
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F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2008).
Upon review, we conclude Gray is ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence
reduction because Amendment 706 does not effectively reduce his applicable
guideline range, as his statutory minimum sentence remains life imprisonment.
Although the district court’s order is ambiguous as to why the court denied the
reduction, the order does not preclude us from conducting meaningful review
because, regardless of how the order is interpreted, Gray was ineligible for a
sentence reduction as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Gray’s § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction.
AFFIRMED.
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