J-S60017-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.R.S.C., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER
No. 1091 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered March 24, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Orphans' Court at No(s): AD-2014-0051
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015
S.C. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order involuntarily
terminating her parental rights1 to her minor son, D.R.S.C (born 11/2003).
Mother’s counsel has also filed an application to withdraw pursuant to In Re:
Adoption of V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992). After careful review,
we affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Chester County Department of Children, Youth and Families (CYF)
removed D.R.S.C. from Mother and Father’s2 care for two relevant periods,
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1
We review a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate parental rights
for an abuse of discretion or error of law. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 563
(Pa. Super. 2003). Our scope of review is limited to determining whether
the trial court’s order is supported by competent evidence. Id. Therefore,
even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess
the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment.
In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
2
Father’s parental rights to D.R.S.C. have also been involuntarily
terminated. However, he is not a party to this appeal.
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November 2010-August 2011 and April 20133-present.4 D.R.S.C.’s removal
was a result of unsafe housing conditions and poor parental judgment.
Specifically, Mother has a history of mental health problems, including
emotional instability, and had been the victim of domestic violence at the
hands of Father. CYF provided Mother numerous services to address the
concerns that led to D.R.S.C.’s placement, including in-home services, family
preservation and intervention services, housing assistance, life skill services,
counseling, and family group decision making courses.
While Mother did attend all supervised visits with D.R.S.C., she made
minimal to no progress toward her initial goal of reunification and, as a
result, CYF filed its petition to terminate her parental rights on July 10,
2014. After two days of termination hearings held on February 12, 2015
and March 17, 2015, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s
parental rights to D.R.S.C. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8), and (b). Specifically, the court determined that: (1) Mother had made
minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led to D.R.S.C.’s
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3
Removal from the home was precipitated by Mother being evicted and
having to live in her truck, as well as D.R.S.C. not being properly cared for.
N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/12/15, at 22-23, 51.
4
CYF has been involved with Mother and Father and their other children,
T.F.C., III (age 17), and C.C (age 15), continuously since November 2009 –
years before D.R.S.C. was even born. Father’s history of substance abuse,
domestic violence and poor judgment combined with Mother’s history of
mental instability and inadequate parenting caused CYF to place T.F.C., III,
and C.C. in foster care.
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placement; and (2) termination would best serve the needs and welfare of
D.R.S.C. Although the court recognized that Mother and D.R.S.C. have a
bond, testimony revealed that the bond was unhealthy and that the damage
of leaving the bond intact would cause more harm to D.R.S.C. than if the
bond were severed. N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/12/15, at 66. Finally, and
most impactful on the court, was Mother’s “continuing lack of insight after all
this time . . . as to why her parental rights should be terminated.” Trial
Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 8.
This timely appeal follows, in which counsel seeks to withdraw from
representation. In V.E., supra, our Court held:
Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first
appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her
parental rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review
of the record, petition the court for leave to withdraw
representation if he or she can find no issues of arguable merit
on which to base the appeal. Given the less stringent standard
of proof required and the quasi-adversarial nature of a
termination proceeding in which a parent is not guaranteed the
same procedural and evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant,
appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must
submit an advocate's brief.
611 A.2d at 1275. In In re Adoption of V.G., 751 A.2d 1174 (Pa. Super.
2000), our court reiterated the requirements counsel must satisfy before
being permitted to withdraw in termination appeals: (1) petition the court
for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination
of the record and interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the
appeal would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the record
of arguable merit; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and
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advise him of his right to retain new counsel or raise any additional points he
deems worthy of this Court’s review. Id. at 1176.
Instantly, counsel has complied with the three prongs outlined in V.G.
While counsel’s brief is somewhat sparse in argument and case law,5 it does
reference issues6 of arguable merit. Therefore, we find it substantially
complies with the withdrawal requirements. Commonwealth v. Wrecks,
934 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Super. 2007) (substantial compliance is sufficient to
satisfy withdrawal on appeal).
Moreover, based on our own independent review of the record,
including the notes of testimony from the termination hearings, relevant
case law and the trial court opinion, we agree with counsel’s assessment
that any appeal would be frivolous. We rely upon the decision authored by
the Honorable Mark L. Tunnell to affirm the order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to D.R.S.C. under sections 2511(a) and (b) and advise the
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5
We recognize that counsel’s brief is an advocate’s brief, as opposed to
counsel’s brief in V.G., which our court deemed “wholly inadequate” as it
resembled a “no-merit” letter. 751 A.2d at 1177. Notably, however, our
Court in V.G. did not remand for counsel to file a proper advocate’s brief
where “our independent review of the record indicate[d] that, in fact,
appellant ha[d] no issues of arguable merit on which she c[ould] base an
appeal.” Id.
6
Specifically, those arguably meritorious issues include the demonstrated
bond between Mother and D.R.S.C. and the lack of a formal bonding
assessment as it relates to a section 2511(b) analysis and Mother having
obtained appropriate housing and maintained stable employment, in addition
to several other completed services, in compliance with CYF’s service plan.
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parties to attach a copy of Judge Tunnell’s decision in the event of further
proceedings in the matter.
Order affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2015
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( Circulated 10/05/2015 01:30 PM
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CHESTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
IN RE: D.R.S.C.
FILE NO. AD-I 4-005 I
FINAL DECREE
AND NOW, to wit, th.is 23rd day of March, 2015, upon consideration of the Petition
and hearing had thereon,
The court finds that Stephanie Corum, by conduct continuing for a period of at least \
six (6) months, has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the child, or
has refused or failed to perform parental duties pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l); and
The court further finds that the repeated and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal of
the said Stephanie Corum has caused the said minor child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for the child's physical and mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
said parent pursuantto 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2); and
The court further finds that the child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six (6) months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, and the
parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time. The
services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and
Circulated 10/05/2015 01:30 PM
termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant
to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §251 l(a)(S); and
The court further finds that the child has been removed from the care of the parent by a
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, twelve months or more have lapsed from
/
the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §25 l l(a)(8).
IT IS .ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Petition of Chester County
Department of Children, Youth and Families for the termination of parental rights of Stephanie
Corum, the natural mother of D.R.S.C., is granted, and that all parental rights and duties of
Stephanie Corum in respect to D.R.S.C. is hereby awarded to Chester County Department of
Children, Youth and Families which is hereby authorized to give consent to the adoption of
said child and adoption of said child may be decreed without further consent of or notice to the
aforesaid parent. Further, pending finalization of adoption, the Chester County Department of
Children, Youth and Families shall stand in loco parent is to the child and in such capacity shall
have the authority, inter alia, to consent to major medical, psychiatric and surgical treatment,
make educational decisions· and to exercise such other authority concerning the child as a
natural parent could exercise.
BY THE COURT:
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