FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HECTOR L. RESSY, No. 12-35584
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00760-MJP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KING COUNTY; D. BENEVENTE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Hector L. Ressy appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he was treated roughly and handcuffed too
tightly during his pre-hearing detention for a probation violation. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Arpin v. Santa Clara
Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ressy’s excessive
force claim because Ressy failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Benevente’s use of force was unreasonable. See Gibson v. County of
Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
sets the ‘applicable constitutional limitations’ for considering claims of excessive
force during pretrial detention.” (citation omitted)); LaLonde v. County of
Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (the extent of the injury inflicted on
the plaintiff is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ressy’s cruel and
unusual punishment claim because Ressy failed to raise a triable dispute as to
whether Benevente maliciously and sadistically used force to cause him harm. See
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per curiam) (extent of injury is
relevant to Eighth Amendment inquiry); Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609
F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and
unusual punishment, applies to pretrial detainees, we apply the same standards in
both cases[.]” (internal citation omitted)).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ressy’s
negligence claim because Ressy failed to raise a triable dispute as to causation. See
Folsom v. Burger King, 958 P.2d 301, 308 (Wash. 1998) (“In order to establish
actionable negligence, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a duty owed to
the complaining party; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) resulting injury; and (4) that the
breach was the proximate cause of the injury.”); Fabrique v. Choice Hotels Int’l,
Inc., 183 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (expert medical testimony is
necessary to establish causation where the nature of the injury involves medical
factors beyond a lay person’s ordinary understanding).
AFFIRMED.
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