In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00395-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF A.H.
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On Appeal from the 1st District Court
Newton County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 13368
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal, S.P. challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that statutory grounds for termination
exist and that termination is in the best interest of her daughter, A.H. See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2) (West 2014). We affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
Legal and Factual Sufficiency
“The decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.” In the Interest of J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Clear
and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the
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mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 2014). A
judgment will be affirmed if a parent committed one or more predicate acts or
omissions and termination is in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001 (West 2014); see also J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84.
In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, we consider all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the termination finding to determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that its finding was true. J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84–85. We assume the factfinder
resolved any disputed facts in favor of its finding, if a reasonable factfinder could
do so, and “disregard all evidence that a “reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved[.]” Id. at 85 (quoting In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex. 2002)).
When we review a termination of parental rights for factual sufficiency, we
give “due consideration” to any evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have
found to be clear and convincing. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; see also In the Interest
of C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). We consider the disputed evidence and
determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have resolved that evidence in
favor of the finding. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. The evidence is factually
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insufficient if the disputed evidence that does not reasonably support the finding is
so significant that a factfinder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or
conviction that the fact at issue was true. Id.
Factual Background
The trial court found that S.P. (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
A.H. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger her physical or
emotional well-being; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed A.H. with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the child’s physical or emotional
well-being; (3) constructively abandoned A.H., who had been in temporary
managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than six months, and (i)
the Department made reasonable efforts to return A.H. to S.P., (ii) S.P. has not
regularly visited A.H., and (iii) S.P. has demonstrated an inability to provide the
child with a safe environment; and (4) failed to comply with the provisions of a
court order that specifically established the actions necessary to obtain return of the
child in Department care for not less than nine months as a result of a removal for
abuse or neglect. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (N), (O).
S.P. testified that she started smoking marijuana at the age of nine and using
methamphetamines at age 13. At age 31, S.P had been addicted to
methamphetamine for over half of her life. S.P. described being high each morning
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as part of her daily routine before her incarceration. S.P. used drugs “off and on”
throughout her life, including during her pregnancies, and at least one of her
daughters was born with drugs in her system. 1 S.P. admitted she was around her
children while she was high on methamphetamine and that was a dangerous
situation for the children to be in. S.P. said she “spiraled down” after the
Department removed A.H., because addiction is “hard to overcome.”
The affidavit for removal that was filed with the Department’s original
petition states that the Department received two intakes for neglectful supervision
of three children, including six-month-old A.H. First, S.P. and A.H. were
reportedly living in a van with a leaking roof. A.H. was dirty and had a terrible
diaper rash. Second, the two older children reportedly found syringes and pills
while visiting with their mother, and observed S.P.’s boyfriend injecting himself
with a syringe in his neck. S.P. failed a drug test the following day, and the
children were voluntarily placed with relatives or family friends. S.P. went to a
rehabilitation facility called Franklin House for treatment, but she left the facility
and the Department filed for removal on May 8, 2012.
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Two older children were given other placements and were not the subject of
the case now on appeal. S.P. gave birth to a fourth child after CPS began its
investigation into the neglect of A.H. S.P. used methamphetamines during the
pregnancy. The same foster family was caring for both of S.P.’s younger children.
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The Department obtained temporary managing conservatorship of A.H. and
established a family service plan for S.P. The family service plan required that
S.P. visit A.H. She was allowed two visits each month, but she had to provide a
negative drug screen before the visit could occur. Over a nine-month period, S.P.
accomplished three scheduled visits and one unscheduled visit after a court hearing
on October 24, 2012. The family service plan required random drug screens, but
S.P. failed to comply with that requirement.
The Department required confirmation of scheduled visits twenty-four hours
before each visit, and the family service plan required that S.P. maintain safe,
clean, and appropriate housing. The foster care worker never performed the
necessary home visit because S.P. failed to provide an accurate residence address.
S.P. lived with at least two different men and in at least four different towns while
A.H. was in the Department’s care.
As a result of a positive drug screen, S.P. re-entered rehabilitation at
Franklin House on January 4, 2013. A subsequent indictment accused S.P. of
delivering a controlled substance to a minor on November 23, 2012. S.P. resolved
the criminal case through a plea bargain agreement for deferred adjudication with a
ten-year period of community supervision. S.P. left Franklin House because she
was transported to court for a hearing on the criminal case and subsequently
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confined in a substance abuse felony punishment facility as a condition of
community supervision. On the date of the termination hearing, S.P. would have to
remain in the SAFP facility another few months, then go to a halfway house. She
completed a parenting class while in the SAFP facility. The foster care worker
testified that the child could not be returned to her mother in the SAFP facility and
making the Department A.H.’s permanent managing conservator would not obtain
permanency for the child.
S.P. had been in the SAFP facility approximately four months at time of the
hearing. She completed a six-week, eight-session parenting course. S.P. stated that
she would be released from SAFP in one and one half months, and she hoped that
she would be placed in a Beaumont halfway house. Once established in a halfway
house, a friend would help her get a job working at the Vidor restaurant where her
friend’s mother is the manager. S.P. would possibly be released from the halfway
house after three months.
S.P. testified that she performs community service in the community under
supervision by a squad boss and that she attends church regularly. She realizes that
when she is doing drugs she is not being a good mother. After her release to the
halfway house S.P. intends to live with a family friend she considers to be her
“mamaw.” Then she will move away from the area, perhaps to Nacogdoches where
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she hoped a friend could get her a job at the chicken plant. S.P. admitted that she
did nothing to obtain a home for her family prior to her incarceration and that
“[t]here’s nothing I can do until I’m released.”
The CASA representative, Cecelia Dixon, visited A.H. at her foster parents’
home at least once each month beginning in August 2012. Dixon stated that A.H. is
“really doing well” with her foster family and that termination of the existing
parent-child relationship and adoption by the foster family would be in the child’s
best interest. She admitted that she has not visited S.P. during the time S.P. has
been in jail and in a SAFP facility.
Ground for Termination
In her first issue, S.P. contends the trial court’s findings, including the
finding regarding subsection (O), are not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. S.P. acknowledges that A.H. was removed as a result of S.P.’s drug
addiction, but she contends the initial allegations of neglect were unsubstantiated.
Establishing grounds for termination under subsection (O) requires removal under
chapter 262 of the Texas Family Code for abuse or neglect, but “those words are
used broadly.” In the Interest of E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 2013).
Consistent with chapter 262’s removal standards, “abuse or neglect of
the child” necessarily includes the risks or threats of the environment
in which the child is placed. Part of that calculus includes the harm
suffered or the danger faced by other children under the parent’s care.
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If a parent has neglected, sexually abused, or otherwise endangered
her child’s physical health or safety, such that initial and continued
removal are appropriate, the child has been “remov[ed] from the
parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Department removed A.H. because she was reported to
be living in a van with a leaking roof and her siblings were exposed to drug use by
S.P. and her boyfriend. The Department determined that it was necessary to obtain
temporary managing conservatorship over A.H. after S.P., an admitted long-time
drug addict, left the rehabilitation facility and then refused to return. S.P. claimed
she was not using drugs, but she failed a drug test on the day of the removal.
During the termination hearing, S.P. admitted she was using drugs before and after
the Department took temporary custody of A.H. The trial court could reasonably
find that the Department removed A.H. from S.P. for the abuse or neglect of A.H.
See id.
The trial court also considered evidence that supports a finding that S.P.
failed to comply with the court order. S.P. continued to abuse methamphetamines
after the Department established a family service plan and while S.P. was pregnant
with another child. She failed to pass drug screens and did not attend scheduled
visits with her child. S.P. failed to obtain appropriate housing and admitted she
could not assume custody of A.H. on the date of the termination hearing.
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S.P. admits that she did not begin work on her parenting plan right away, but
argues that the evidence that she failed to complete the court-ordered actions
necessary to obtain the return of A.H. is factually insufficient because by the date
of the termination hearing, she had completed the parenting course and had been
“drug free” for almost seven months. Evidence that S.P. was not abusing drugs
while she was confined in a SAFP facility and that she expected to temporarily
reside with a family friend after her eventual release from the facility is not so
significant that the trial court could not form a firm conviction or belief that S.P.
failed to visit A.H., failed to obtain and maintain appropriate housing, and failed to
complete drug treatment before the date of the termination hearing. We conclude
the evidence supporting a termination finding under subsection (O) is both legally
and factually sufficient.
The judgment will be affirmed if clear and convincing evidence supports a
single termination finding and the trial court’s finding that termination is in the
best interest of the child. See J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84. We note that S.P. admitted (1)
she used drugs while she was pregnant, (2) she was around her children while she
was high on methamphetamine, and (3) it was dangerous for her children to be
with her while she was high. The evidence that weighs against a finding of
endangerment consists of S.P.’s testimony that, although she used drugs while her
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children were in her care, they never saw her use drugs. The factfinder could
consider the children’s exposure to their mother’s drug use to be endangering, and
S.P. admitted her children saw her when she was high, even if they did not watch
her injecting methamphetamine. The evidence that weighs against the finding is
not so significant that the trial court could not have reasonably formed a firm belief
or conviction that S.P.’s drug use endangered A.H. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
161.001(1)(E). We overrule issue one.
Best Interest
Regarding the child’s best interest, we consider a non-exhaustive list of
factors: (1) desires of the child; (2) emotional and physical needs of the child now
and in the future; (3) emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future; (4) parental abilities of the individual seeking custody; (5) programs
available to assist this individual to promote the best interest of the child; (6) plans
for the child by this individual or by the agency seeking custody; (7) stability of the
home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent which may
indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse
for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72
(Tex. 1976); see also Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 263.307(b) (West 2014).
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S.P. argues that the Department provided little information about A.H.’s
living conditions before her removal to foster care, and other than testimony
concerning S.P.’s drug addiction provided little information about S.P.’s behavior
at that time. Because her drug addiction provides the Department’s evidence
concerning her parenting abilities, she contends the evidence that termination
would be in A.H.’s best interest is insufficient in light of the evidence of her
recovery from addiction.
S.P. failed in her first attempt to attain and maintain sobriety through a
rehabilitation facility’s program. A factfinder may infer from past relapses that
similar conduct will recur if the child is returned to the parent. See In the Interest of
I.C.W., No. 02-12-00226-CV, 2013 WL 173746, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Jan. 17, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). S.P. had achieved sobriety only while
incarcerated, and none of the evidence in the record required the factfinder to
conclude that S.P. has the skills to permanently maintain her recovery after her
release from confinement. “[E]vidence of improved conduct, especially of short-
duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of drug
use and irresponsible choices.” In the Interest of J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346
(Tex. 2009) (analyzing evidence of endangerment under subsection
161.001(1)(E)).
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S.P.’s current incarceration prevented her from assuming the care of A.H.
S.P. expected to obtain employment in a restaurant during her residence in a
halfway house, but had no assurance that she would be housed in a local halfway
house; she did not have a firm offer of employment; and she provided no evidence
to corroborate her claim that her friend could get her a job. S.P. hoped to obtain
long-term employment through a friend, but she admitted her plan “has not been
set into motion yet.” “[A] parent without stability, income, or a home is unable to
provide for a child’s physical and emotional needs.” In the Interest of M.C.H., No.
14-12-00103-CV, 2012 WL 1795123, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May
17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The Department’s plan for A.H. was for her adoption by the foster family
that has cared for A.H. since she was sixth months old. At the time of trial, A.H.
was almost two years old and knew no parents other than her foster parents. The
CASA representative had met with the foster family monthly, and she testified that
the foster family was meeting A.H.’s emotional and physical needs. The foster
family was also caring for A.H.’s younger sister, who was eight months old at the
time of the termination hearing.
As the sole finder of fact, the trial court could reasonably form a firm
conviction or belief that (1) S.P. lacked the ability to provide stability for A.H., (2)
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the Department had found a permanent home for A.H. where her emotional and
physical needs would be met, and (3) termination would be in the child’s best
interest. The evidence of S.P.’s successful recovery while confined in the SAFP
facility and her testimony concerning her plans for the future weigh against
termination, but in light of the entire record, including the evidence of S.P.’s past
conduct and the lack of certainty in her future plans, that evidence is not so
significant that a reasonable factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm
belief that termination of S.P.’s parental rights is in A.H.’s best interest. We
overrule issue two and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on March 18, 2014
Opinion Delivered April 10, 2014
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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