COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
ROSA SERRANO D/B/A THE LENS §
FACTORY, No. 08-12-00101-CV
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Appellant, Appeal from the
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v. 327th District Court
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PELLICANO PARK, L.L.C., of El Paso County, Texas
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Appellee. (TC#2012-DCV-02335)
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OPINION
Appellant, Rosa Serrano, appeals the order of the 327th District Court dissolving a temporary
restraining order and denying temporary injunctive relief. We dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
The subject matter of this appeal stems from a sworn complaint for forcible detainer and
eviction filed in Cause No. 411-520F by Pellicano Park, L.L.C., a Texas Limited Liability
Company (Appellee) which sought to evict TLP-ELP Enterprises Inc., a Texas Corporation d/b/a
The Lens Factory1 from two commercial properties in El Paso, Texas. The eviction was filed in
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Appellant, Rosa Serrano was not a party to the eviction.
Justice of the Peace Court, Precinct Four, in El Paso County, Texas (Justice Court Four).
Appellant appeared pro se on behalf of TLP-ELP at the eviction proceedings. At the
conclusion of a jury trial, a judgment was entered on November 22, 2011, awarding possession of
the premises to Appellee and ordering TLP-ELP to pay Appellee’s costs of court including
attorney’s fees in the amount of $731. TLP-ELP filed notice of appeal and a Pauper’s Affidavit of
Rosa Serrano, who was not a party to the eviction, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 749a.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 749a. At a hearing on December 13, 2011, Justice Court Four denied the Pauper’s
Affidavit, set bond at $3,200, and directed that the bond be paid within five days. TEX. R. CIV. P.
749 (either party may appeal from a final judgment in a forcible entry and detainer case to the
county court of the county in which the judgment is rendered by filing with the justice within five
days after the judgment is signed, a bond to be approved by said justice); TEX. R. CIV. P. 752; TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0051 (West 2000).
Appellant then filed in this Court a petition for writ of mandamus in Cause Number
08-11-00294-CV against Judge Barbara Perez of Justice Court Four, which was denied on January
18, 2012. Appellant also filed Cause No. 2011-CCV10315 in County Court at Law Number
Three of El Paso County, Texas (County Court Three), an appeal of Justice Court Four’s denial of
the Pauper’s Affidavit. At a hearing held on January 20, 2012, County Court Three affirmed
Justice Court Four’s denial of the Pauper’s Affidavit and the order setting bond.
Appellant responded by filing in this Court Cause Number 08-12-00020-CV, an
“Emergency Stay to Writ of Possession Injunctive Relief” and a petition for writ of mandamus by
which Appellant sought to set aside the County Court Three’s ruling on appeal. We denied the
motion for emergency stay on February 3, 2012, and the writ of mandamus on March 7, 2012.
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Meanwhile, Appellant failed to pay the appeal bond required by Justice Court Four. Justice Court
Four ordered that the bond be disallowed and that the writ of possession issue. The writ of
possession issued on February 1, 2012, and was executed on February 6, 2012.
On February 7, 2012, in Cause No. 2012-DCV-02335, Appellant filed the instant cause of
action in the 327th District Court seeking a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief
against Appellee, Pellicano Park, which the court granted. Appellant filed the action as Rosa
Serrano doing business as The Lens Factory. On February 23, 2012, after finding the matters
presented to the court were subject to another lawsuit, the 327th District Court dissolved the
temporary restraining order, denied Appellant’s request for temporary injunction, and granted
Appellee’s motion to dismiss with prejudice to the rights of Appellant to refile.
Appellant presents seven issues on appeal challenging the order of the 327th District Court.
During the pendency of this appeal, we referred this case for mediation. In response, Appellee
filed its response to notice of the interlocutory appeal and to the order for mediation referral. In
its response, Appellee presents its motion to dismiss this appeal based on Appellant’s lack of
standing and our lack of jurisdiction, argues that Appellant’s pleadings are frivolous and constitute
an abuse of the legal system, and objects to the order for mediation because there are no grounds
for our consideration of the appeal and, absent a duly-licensed attorney representing a proper
Appellant as required, the goals of mediation cannot be accomplished.
DISCUSSION
Appellant filed this cause of action pro se and as such we must construe her brief liberally.
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989). Pro se litigants are held to the
same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable laws and rules of
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procedure. Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-- El Paso 2007, no pet.); Sweed v.
City of El Paso, 195 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2006, no pet.). A pro se litigant is
required to properly present her case on appeal, just as she is required to properly present her case
to the trial court. Martinez v. El Paso County, 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2007,
pet. struck). Without this rule, pro se litigants would be given an unfair advantage over parties
represented by counsel. Id. Likewise, we cannot make allowances because a litigant is not an
attorney. Id. Although Appellant is not an attorney, she has acted as one by representing herself
pro se. 2 Attorneys have a professional responsibility of candor to the court. See TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.03 reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit.
G, app. A (West 2013) (lawyers shall not knowingly make false statements of material fact or law
to a tribunal).
A plaintiff must have standing to file suit. Willis v. Marshall, 401 S.W.3d 689, 695
(Tex.App.--El Paso 2013, no pet.). Only the entity whose primary legal right has been breached
has standing to bring the cause of action. Id. at 696. When there is no breach of a legal right
belonging to the plaintiff, the plaintiff lacks standing. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927
(Tex. 1976). When a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim, a court has no jurisdiction and must
2
Appellant has a long history of filing pro se briefs, including: Serrano v. Union Planter’s Bank, N.A., 155 S.W.3d
381 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2004, no pet.); Serrano v. Union Planter's Bank, N.A., 162 S.W.3d 576, 577 (Tex.App.--El
Paso 2004, pet. denied); In re Serrano, 224 S.W.3d 225 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding); Serrano v.
Ryan’s Crossing Apartments, 241 S.W.3d 560, 562 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2007, pet. denied); Serrano v. Francis
Properties I, Ltd., 411 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2013, no pet.); TLP–EPL Enterprises, Inc. v. El Paso
Times, No. 08–07–00114–CV, 2007 WL 2269733, at *1 (Tex.App.--El Paso Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Serrano v. First Prestons Mgmt. Corp., 346 S.W.3d 648 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2009, no
pet.); In re Serrano, No. 08–11–00145–CV, 2011 WL 2112753, at *1 (Tex.App.--El Paso May 27, 2011, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Serrano v. Francis Properties I, Ltd., No. 08–11–00190–CV,
2011 WL 5189595, at *1 (Tex.App.--El Paso Nov. 2, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); In re
Serrano, No. 08–11–00366–CV, 2012 WL 248044, at *1 (Tex.App.--El Paso Jan. 25, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Serrano v. Pellicano Business Park, LLC, No. 08–12–00186–CV, 2012 WL
3100846, at *1 (Tex.App.--El Paso July 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Serrano v.
Pellicano Bus. Park, L.L.C., No. 08-13-00201-CV, 2013 WL 5873328 (Tex.App.--El Paso Oct. 30, 2013, pet. denied)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
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dismiss the claim. Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). A cause
of action for injury to the property of a corporation is vested in the corporation and not its
shareholders individually. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 406, 168
S.W.2d 216, 221 (1942); Redmon v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225, 233 (Tex.App.--Tyler 2006, pet.
denied).
As a general rule, corporations must be represented by a licensed attorney. Nevada Gold
& Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Indep. Sch. Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68, 70 n.1 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2005, no
pet.); see also, Dell Dev. Corp. v. Best Indus. Unif. Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303
(Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) (a corporation cannot be represented pro se by
an officer who is not an attorney). A non-attorney is permitted to file documents on behalf of
corporations for limited purposes, but is still prohibited from representing the corporation in court
proceedings. See Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456
(Tex. 1996) (a non-attorney officer of a corporation may file the documents to perfect an appeal);
Rabb Intern., Inc. v. SHL Thai Food Serv., LLC, 346 S.W.3d 208, 210 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (documents filed by non-attorney on behalf of corporation are defective but
not void for limited purposes); Home Sav. of Am. FSB v. Harris County Water Control & Imp.
Dist. No. 70, 928 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (response letter
filed by non-attorney on behalf of corporation may be used to preclude default judgment).
However, dissolution of a corporation does not abate any pending suit in which the corporation
may be involved. TEX. R. CIV. P. 160. See also TEX. R. CIV. P. 29 (when no receiver has been
appointed for a corporation which has been dissolved, a suit may still be brought and judgment
rendered as though the corporation had not been dissolved).
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In the suit pertaining to the eviction, although TLP-ELP Enterprises Inc., a Texas
Corporation d/b/a The Lens Factory is the party defendant, Rosa Serrano is not a named party. At
the hearing in the 327th District Court, Appellant contended that TLP-ELP Enterprises Inc., a
Texas corporation, had been dissolved, and that she is now the sole proprietor of the entity doing
business as The Lens Factory. However, Appellant provided no documentation of the
corporation’s purported dissolution, and offered no legal basis to demonstrate that she is a proper
party to the litigation or any proceedings arising therefrom. Appellant failed to explain in her
temporary restraining order petition before the 327th District Court that she was not a named or
proper party to the forcible entry and detainer proceedings, and made statements to the court
indicating that she was a party in those proceedings. Even if TLP-ELP Enterprises Inc. had been
dissolved at the time Appellant filed the petition for a temporary restraining order, it remained a
party to the pending eviction litigation and could not have been replaced in the matter by Appellant
at her will. TEX. R. CIV. P. 160; see also Davis, 168 S.W.2d at 221, Redmon, 202 S.W.3d at 233.
There is evidence in the record that County Court Three admonished Appellant that she
could not provide pro se representation to a corporation. There is no evidence supporting
Appellant’s claim that the corporate status of TLP-ELP Enterprises Inc., a Texas Corporation d/b/a
The Lens Factory has changed, and no legal basis for concluding that Appellant has standing in
this case. We conclude Appellant lacks standing to bring suit when the proper party for the
subject matter of the claims is the entity TLP-ELP Enterprises Inc., a Texas Corporation. See
Willis, 401 S.W.3d at 696, Redmon, 202 S.W.3d at 233. Because Appellant lacks standing, we
have no jurisdiction over this appeal and it must be dismissed. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150.
We note that in the course of determining that it lacked jurisdiction, the 327th District
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Court warned Appellant to be cautious “because you’re going to find yourself in a position where
if you keep filing these lawsuits on the same issue as this eviction, you’re going to find yourself
being [declared] as a vexatious litigant[,]” and warning Appellant that “if everybody got to just
say, ‘Oh, I don’t like that decision[,] [n]ow I’m going to go somewhere else,’ we’d have chaos.
So we have to be orderly about this.” The 327th District Court dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit
with prejudice to Appellant’s rights to refile any part of it, found that the matters presented therein
were subject to another lawsuit, and precluded Appellant from filing another cause of action in any
court based on the matters arising under the facts of the cause of action. Despite the 327th District
Court’s written order and oral warnings, Appellant proceeded to file this appeal, placed a lien on
the property, and subsequently appealed the removal of the lien in another cause of action. See
Serrano v. Pellicano Bus. Park, L.L.C., No. 08-13-00201-CV, 2013 WL 5873328, at *1
(Tex.App.--El Paso Oct. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(Appellant’s appeal of an order vacating a lien was statutorily barred and was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction).
We observe that a party who knowingly brings a fictitious suit, or makes false or
groundless statements in a pleading, including for purposes of delaying litigation proceedings,
risks the imposition of sanctions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.03 (West 2013) (lawyers shall not knowingly make false statements of
material fact or law to a tribunal). A court may also find a pro se litigant who repeatedly
commences, prosecutes, or maintains litigations to be vexatious when the criteria of Section
11.054 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code are shown.3 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
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A court may find a plaintiff a vexatious litigant if the defendant shows that there is not a reasonable probability that
the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant and that:
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ANN. §§ 11.051–11.057 (addressing vexatious litigants).
We grant Appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice
March 28, 2014
Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
(1) the plaintiff, in the seven-year period immediately preceding the date the defendant makes the motion
under Section 11.051, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five litigations as a pro se litigant
other than in a small claims court that have been:
(A) finally determined adversely to the plaintiff;
(B) permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing;
or
(C) determined by a trial or appellate court to be frivolous or groundless under state or federal laws
or rules of procedure;
(2) after a litigation has been finally determined against the plaintiff, the plaintiff repeatedly relitigates or
attempts to relitigate, pro se , either:
(A) the validity of the determination against the same defendant as to whom the litigation was
finally determined; or
(B) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law determined or
concluded by the final determination against the same defendant as to whom the litigation was
finally determined; or
(3) the plaintiff has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by a state or federal court in an action
or proceeding based on the same or substantially similar facts, transition, or occurrence.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054 (West Supp. 2013).
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