In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-13-00046-CR
CLISTER RAY THOMAS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 188th District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 41776-A
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Carter
OPINION
Clister Ray Thomas was convicted by a jury for failure to comply with sex-offender
registration requirements 1 and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Thomas had
previously been convicted of aggravated sexual assault in Gregg County in 1987 and was
sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for that offense. As a result of that previous conviction,
Thomas was required to register as a sex offender and to annually verify his registration
information for life. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.101(a) (West Supp. 2012). On
appeal, Thomas contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We reverse and
enter a judgment of acquittal.
I. Background
In March 2012, Thomas moved from Upshur County to Gregg County. At that time,
Thomas registered his new address with the Longview Police Department in Gregg County. 2
Thomas provided the address where he expected to reside as “1900 South Green St. # 210
Longview, TX 75602.” This apartment was leased to Ashanti Jimerson. Jimerson’s mother,
Pamela Epsy, lived with her in the apartment. Epsy, who was Thomas’ girlfriend, stayed in the
apartment with Jimerson “off and on,” while working. The arrangement was temporary.
Thomas was present in Jimerson’s apartment only when Epsy was there.
On April 3, 2012, the apartment manager was notified by Officer Jeff Hall of the
Longview Police Department that Thomas was living in Jimerson’s apartment. Hall presented
1
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(b)(2) (West 2006). The judgment incorrectly cites to the Texas Penal
Code.
2
The Longview Police Department is the local law enforcement authority where Thomas was required to register his
change of address.
2
the apartment manager with paperwork documenting Thomas’ sex-offender status. On receipt of
this information, the manager asked that a criminal trespass warning be issued to Thomas. The
manager explained that she did not know Thomas was living in the apartment and that he did not
have permission to reside there with Jimerson and Epsy. Apartment policy requires that any
person who resides with a tenant must submit to a background check. The policy also prohibits
registered sex offenders from residing in the apartment complex. Thomas was issued a criminal
trespass warning, whereby he was prohibited from returning to the property. 3
That same day, Longview Police Officer Bennie Cooks arrested Thomas on five
outstanding city warrants. 4 The Gregg County Jail book-in report reflects that Thomas provided
his address as 1703 Houston Street in Longview. Epsy is listed on the book-in sheet as an
emergency contact. Thomas listed Epsy’s address as 1900 South Green Street, apartment 210.
Epsy testified that she resided at 1900 South Green Street in the Courtyard Apartments
through October 2012. She was present when Thomas was given the criminal trespass warning.
Even though he was given this warning, Thomas continued to stay in the apartment until he was
arrested on June 13, 2012. Jimerson acknowledged that Thomas lived in her apartment on South
Green Street. She testified that Thomas continued to live in the apartment on South Green Street
after he was given the criminal trespass warning. Thomas would arrive at the apartment at night,
spend the night, and leave early in the morning. According to the booking documents, Thomas
was arrested at the Courtyard Apartments at 1900 South Green Street in Longview.
3
Trespass warnings were issued for a period of two years, unless otherwise specified. The trespass warning was
issued by Officer Dennis Phillips of the Longview Police Department.
4
The city warrants were for traffic violations.
3
On June 13, 2012, Detective Kevin Brownlee with the Longview Police Department was
contacted by a deputy from the Upshur County Sheriff’s Department, who advised that Thomas
had been arrested in Gregg County. 5 The deputy indicated the address on Thomas’ book-in sheet
was different than that listed on his sex-offender registration record. Brownlee checked the jail
records on the Gregg County Sheriff’s Department website and found Thomas listed his address
as 1703 Houston Street in Longview. Thomas’ registered address was 1900 South Green Street,
Apartment 210. Brownlee attempted to locate Thomas at the Green Street address; he did not,
however, check at apartment 210. Instead, Brownlee spoke with the apartment manager, who
indicated Thomas was not permitted on the apartment property. Brownlee then proceeded to the
book-in address Thomas provided, 1703 Houston Street. He located Thomas at this address at
approximately 8:30 a.m. Brownlee spoke with Thomas, who told Brownlee that he lived at 1703
Houston Street. 6 The Longview Police Department had no record of any change of address for
Thomas indicating a move from the apartment on South Green Street to 1703 Houston Street.
Thomas was arrested for failing to update his address with the Longview Police Department
upon moving from South Green Street to Houston Street.
Thomas testified that on June 13, 2012, he was still living in the apartment on South
Green Street (where he was properly registered). Thomas conceded that he told Brownlee he
5
There is no explanation as to why a Longview police officer was contacted by an Upshur County sheriff’s deputy
regarding an arrest in Gregg County. The date of this arrest is not reflected in the record.
6
The June 13 conversation between Brownlee and Thomas was recorded and played for the jury. Brownlee testified
that the recording indicated that he asked Thomas where he was staying, and Thomas responded that he was staying
at 1703 Houston Street. This portion of the recording is inaudible. The recording did indicate, however, that
Thomas stated that he was “registered right here,” while speaking with Brownlee at the Houston Street location. An
unidentified female, who ostensibly resided at the Houston Street address, told Brownlee that Thomas “doesn’t stay
here” and that “he got dropped off this morning.”
4
lived at the Houston Street address, explaining that he did not want his family (referring to Epsy
and Jimerson) to be evicted from their apartment for letting him stay there while he was subject
to a criminal trespass warning. Thomas testified that he lied (on two occasions) when he was
arrested (on April 3 and June 13) by indicating that he lived on Houston Street. He felt it was
necessary to provide this address to protect his family. When Thomas listed Houston Street as
his address, he had already been given the warning to stay away from the apartment on South
Green Street. Thomas was arrested in Upshur County after June 2012. He provided the Houston
Street address to the Upshur County arresting officer as well. Thomas explained, “I give every
police officer the Houston address.”
Thomas personally spoke with a clerk in the Longview office for sex-offender
registration after his June 13 arrest in an attempt to change his registration to the Houston Street
address. He was unable to change his registration because the owner of the Houston Street
property refused to provide a written statement indicating he resided there. Thomas concedes
that he never changed his registration from South Green Street. He claims, however, that he
never moved from the South Green Street address, even though he was trespassing. Thomas is
not currently registered anywhere that shows he has any other address other than South Green
Street.
II. The Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Judgment
In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
elements of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements beyond a reasonable
5
doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2010, pet. ref’d). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while
giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to
weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19);
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A person commits the offense of failure to comply with registration requirements if the
person “is required to register and fails to comply with any requirement” of Chapter 62 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102 (West 2006).
Under Article 62.055(a),
If a person required to register under this chapter intends to change address, . . .
the person shall, not later than the seventh day before the intended change, report
in person to the local law enforcement authority designated as the person’s
primary registration authority by the department and to the . . . officer supervising
the person and provide the authority and the officer with the person’s anticipated
move date and new address.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.055(a) (West Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). Under the
indictment, Thomas was only charged with failing to comply with this specific requirement. The
indictment does not allege that Thomas failed to provide proof of his new address within seven
days after changing the address. 7 See id. 8
7
The indictment reads,
[O]n or about the 13th day of June, 2012, and anterior to the presentment of this Indictment, in the
County and State aforesaid, CLISTER RAY THOMAS, hereinafter called Defendant, did then and
there while being a person required to register with the local law enforcement authority in the
6
The application paragraph of the jury charge, unlike the indictment, did not include
language concerning the failure to comply with registration requirements by failing to advise the
Longview Police Department of the anticipated move date and new address at least seven days
before the move. Rather, the jury charge read,
You must decide whether the state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt,
four elements. The elements are that—
1. the defendant was previously convicted of aggravated sexual
assault; and
2. the defendant was required to comply with the sex offender
registration program under chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
and
municipality where the Defendant resided or intended to reside for more than seven days to wit:
Longview, Texas, and being a person required to comply with the registration requirements of
Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and having a duty to verify registration
annually for life because of a reportable conviction or adjudication for Aggravated Sexual Assault,
did intentionally or knowingly fail to report in person to the Longview Police Department, the
local law enforcement authority in the municipality where the Defendant resided and had last
registered and provide the Defendant’s anticipated move date and the new address anticipated not
later than the seventh day before the anticipated move date as required by the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. . . .
8
This Article provides,
If a person required to register under this chapter intends to change address, regardless of whether
the person intends to move to another state, the person shall, not later than the seventh day before
the intended change, report in person to the local law enforcement authority designated as the
person’s primary registration authority by the department and to the juvenile probation officer,
community supervision and corrections department officer, or parole officer supervising the
person and provide the authority and the officer with the person’s anticipated move date and new
address. If a person required to register changes address, the person shall, not later than the later
of the seventh day after changing the address or the first date the applicable local law enforcement
authority by policy allows the person to report, report in person to the local law enforcement
authority in the municipality or county in which the person’s new residence is located and provide
the authority with proof of identity and proof of residence.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.055(a).
7
3. the defendant was registered with the Longview Police Department
as sex offender as residing at a residence in Longview, Gregg County,
Texas;[9] and
4. the defendant changed his address for more than seven days and
intentionally or knowingly failed to report in person to the Longview
Police Department to register the defendant’s new address.
You must all agree on elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 listed above. If you all agree
the state has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of elements
1, 2, 3, and 4 listed above, you must find the defendant “not guilty.”
If you all agree the state has proved each of the four elements above, you
must find the defendant “guilty.”
The jury found Thomas guilty “as charged in the indictment.”
Thomas contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction due to a material
variance between the indictment and the proof at trial. He contends that the State was required to
prove that the failure to register was committed by failing “to report in person to the Longview
Police Department, . . . and provide [his] anticipated move date and the new address anticipated
not later than the seventh day before the anticipated move . . . .” Thomas claims he was virtually
evicted from his apartment and could not have notified the authorities of a move he did not
intend to make. The case was tried on the theory that Thomas moved from his apartment and
subsequently failed to notify the registration authority of the move within seven days. Thomas
thus complains the indictment sets out one offense and the evidence at trial attempts to prove
9
Thomas conceded, in closing argument, that the State proved the first three elements at trial. “He did have a
previous conviction, he was required to register, and he was registered with the Longview Police Department.”
8
another offense. 10 In reliance on Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001),
Thomas contends his conviction cannot withstand appellate scrutiny. In sum, Thomas seeks an
acquittal because the indictment alleged that the failure to register was committed by failing to
advise authorities seven days beforehand, but no evidence of such failure was proved.
In addressing a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we are to determine whether any
rational jury could have found the essential elements of failure to comply with sex-offender
registration requirements beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912. The essential
elements of this offense are to be determined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is
“one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily
increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. The law as
“authorized by the indictment” includes “the statutory elements of the offense . . . as modified by
the charging instrument.” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The
hypothetically correct jury charge need not, however, incorporate allegations that give rise to
10
A person commits an offense if the person is required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure and fails to comply with any requirement of that chapter. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 62.102(a); Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“Article 62.102 is a generalized
‘umbrella’ statute that criminalizes the failure to comply with any of the registration requirements set out in Chapter
62.”). Chapter 62 contains numerous distinct requirements in its various statutes. Id. The language of Article
62.055, though, states that a sex offender has a duty to report a change of address to the proper authorities both
before and after a move. The failure to do so is an offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(a). However,
“the Legislature intended for the unit of prosecution to be one offense for each change of address.” Young, 341
S.W.3d at 426. Thus, Thomas incorrectly contends that he was charged with one offense and tried for another.
9
immaterial variances. 11 Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 256. Conversely, a material variance must be
included within the hypothetically correct charge. Id. at 257. As explained by the high criminal
court in Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012):
A variance in pleading and proof can occur in two different ways. First, a
variance can involve the statutory language that defines the offense. This can
happen when a statute specifies alternate methods by which an offense could be
committed, the charging instrument pleads one of those alternate methods, but the
State proves, instead, an unpled method. For example, the retaliation statute
makes it a crime to threaten a “witness” or “informant.” The first type of variance
occurs if the State pleads only “witness” in the charging instrument and proves
only the unpled element of “informant” at trial. Second, a variance can involve a
non-statutory allegation that is descriptive of the offense in some way. For
example, the charging instrument pleads “Mary” as the victim, but the State
proves “John” at trial. Or the charging instrument pleads the offense was
committed with a knife, but the State proves at trial that a baseball bat was
used.[12]
Id. at 294 (citation omitted).
Here, the variance between the pleading and the proof is of the first type described in
Johnson, and is, therefore, material. 13 The language of Article 62.055(a) defines an offense as
11
In Gollihar, the indictment for theft of a go-cart stated that the go-cart was “Model 136202,” but the State’s
evidence showed that its model was 136203. Because the model number was not an element of the offense and the
defendant’s guilt or innocence did not depend on the specific model of the go-cart, the variance was immaterial.
Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 258.
12
In Johnson, the variance was of the second type, a non-statutory allegation. There, Johnson was charged with
having committed aggravated assault by intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury by hitting the
victim with his hand or by twisting her arm with his hand. The victim testified that Johnson threw her against a
wall, which caused her serious bodily injury. The court held that the variance involved a non-statutory type of
allegation. Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 298.
13
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated that a variance analysis is unnecessary, in certain instances
such as this one, where the pleading alleges one alternative method of committing an offense, but the proof is of an
unpled method. This is simply a failure to prove the statutory requirements as alleged, which necessarily results in
the evidence being legally insufficient. Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 257–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“‘[T]he
word ‘variance’ ought to be used to describe instances in which there is a minor discrepancy between the facts
alleged and those proved . . . .’”) (quoting Bailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 122, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Keasler, J.,
dissenting)).
10
failing to provide the local law enforcement authority with the anticipated move date and new
address not later than seven days before the intended change. Article 62.055(a) also defines the
offense as failing to provide proof of a new address to the applicable local law enforcement
authority within seven days after changing the address. The statute simply describes alternate
methods by which an offense can be committed. 14 See Young, 341 S.W.3d at 427 (“Article
62.055(a) creates a duty to notify law enforcement when a relevant circumstance is present—a
sex offender changes addresses—but can be violated in either of two ways.”). Here, the State
alleged a specific duty to report a change of address. The State alleged only one specific failure
to fulfill that duty—the duty to report an intended change of address before the intended move.
In sum, Thomas was indicted for a single offense of failing to report a change of address, and the
State alleged he committed this offense in one specific way.
In Geick v. State, 349 S.W.3d 542, 547–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals determined that when pled in an indictment, a statutory definition becomes an
element of the offense that the State must prove. In that case, Geick was indicted for theft of a
bulldozer by deception. The jury charge allowed for a conviction without limiting the manner in
which the theft was committed, and Geick was found guilty “‘as charged in the indictment.’” Id.
at 544. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals acquitted Geick because there was no
evidence of deception. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that “[w]hen a
statute lays out several alternative methods of committing the offense, and the indictment alleges
only one of those methods, ‘the law as authorized by the indictment’ is limited to the method
14
The failure to report a change of address is one crime per move. Young, 341 S.W.3d at 426.
11
specified in the indictment.” Id. at 545 (quoting Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 254–55). In so holding,
the high criminal court rejected the State’s argument that the term “deception” as a means of
committing theft was merely a definition, rather than an element of the offense, and therefore
should not be a part of the hypothetically correct jury charge. See also Cada v. State, 334
S.W.3d 766, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“Under Jackson, the State must prove the statutory
elements that it has chosen to allege, not some other alternative statutory elements that it did not
allege.”).
Here, the State was not required at the indictment stage to plead a narrowed method in
which the duty to report a change of address could be violated. Having done so, however, “‘the
law as authorized by the indictment’” is limited to the method specified in the indictment. Geick,
349 S.W.3d at 545 (quoting Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 254–55). Accordingly, the State was
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Thomas violated his reporting requirements
by failing to notify the authorities of his anticipated move date and new address seven days in
advance of his intended change. A failure to prove such allegation renders the evidence legally
insufficient to support the conviction.
The State acknowledges that it was required to prove Thomas failed to give seven days’
advance notice of an intended move. It maintains, however, that the evidence indeed proved
such failure, analogizing this case to that of Walmer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
Walmer was found guilty of the offense of failure to comply with sex-offender
registration requirements. Id. at 115. On appeal, Walmer claimed the evidence was insufficient
12
to support his conviction because the State did not prove that he “failed to notify the Harris
County Sheriff’s Department at least seven days before he moved.” Id. at 117. Walmer claimed
it was impossible to comply with this requirement because his mother unexpectedly threw him
out of the house. Id. The evidence showed that Walmer registered, using his mother’s address.
Walmer testified that he lived at that address until he was “thrown out.” Id. at 118. Walmer later
testified that after his release from prison, he had been “bounc[ing] in between” his brother’s
apartment and his mother’s house. Id. Walmer’s mother testified that Walmer never lived with
her after his release from prison. Id. In affirming the conviction, the court found this evidence
supported a finding that Walmer failed to provide his primary registration authority of his
anticipated move date and new address seven days before the intended change. “Even if his
move was unexpected[,] . . . appellant still failed to provide his move date and new address to
[the authorities].” Id.
Walmer is distinguishable from the present case, as there was no claim in that case of a
material variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. Walmer was
charged with “Failure to Comply with Registration Requirements of a Sex Offender.” Id. at 115
(citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 62.055(a), 62.102(a)). In discussing the elements of
proof, in Walmer, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed both methods of failing to
report (failing to notify of intended change of address seven days beforehand and failing to
report the new residence within seven days after changing residence). The State apparently had
not limited itself to only one manner or means of violating the registration requirement as
occurred here. Consequently, Walmer is inapposite to the issue presented here. Further, the case
13
is factually different from the case at hand. Although Walmer testified that he was unexpectedly
thrown out of his mother’s house, that evidence was disputed. Walmer’s mother testified that he
never lived with her; Walmer testified that he lived with his mother and his brother at various
times.
Here, the evidence is undisputed that Thomas was served with a criminal trespass
warning to stay away from the apartment where he had been living—the address registered with
the appropriate authorities. In fact, notification of Thomas’ residence at the subject address was
provided to the apartment manager by law enforcement authorities, resulting in the criminal
trespass warning. In light of these circumstances, there is no evidence that Thomas ever
intended to move from the apartment where he was appropriately registered.
Thomas relies on Green v. State, 350 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2011, pet. ref’d), for the proposition that the seven-day advance notice requirement is triggered
only if the person intends to change his address. In that case, Hunt (Green’s wife) moved from
the couple’s Highland Avenue residence (the address appropriately registered with the
authorities) taking all of Green’s belongings with her while Green was out of town working. Id.
at 620. Hunt was unaware of when Green found out she had moved their belongings from the
Highland Avenue address. Green was found guilty of failing to report his intended move not
later than the seventh day before the anticipated move date. Id. Green challenged his
conviction, claiming the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to move.
Under the indictment, Green was charged with failing to notify local law enforcement of
a change in address seven days before the intended change. As in this case, Green was not
14
charged with the failure to notify law enforcement of his new address within seven days after
changing the address. The only issue was whether “the State proved appellant intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly failed to register his intended address change.” 15 Id. at 621. The
testimony at trial showed that law enforcement and the prosecuting attorney both believed that a
registered sex offender must give at least seven days advance notice before any change in
address. Id. at 623. The court correctly recognized that this requirement is triggered only “‘[i]f a
person required to register under this chapter intends to change address.’” Id. (quoting TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.055(a)). “In addition, the deadline for reporting this intended
address change is not seven days before the date on which the move actually occurs; rather, the
deadline is seven days ‘before the intended change.’” Id. The court recognized that
There are various situations in which a registered sex offender’s address may
change without the offender having any intent to change address prior to the
actual change of address. The offender may be barred from his current residence
without warning or someone else may move the offender’s property out of the
residence and to another address without the offender’s knowledge.
Green, 350 S.W.3d at 623. The court determined that there was no evidence that Green
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failed to comply with his reporting requirements. Id.
15
In this case, the indictment charged that Thomas “intentionally or knowingly” failed to report his intended address
change seven days in advance of the move. In doing so, the State increased its burden in the indictment. Generally,
“‘[s]ince no state of mind is specified for article 62 offenses, proof that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly is sufficient.’” Harris v. State, 364 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)
(quoting Ford v. State, 313 S.W.3d 434, 438 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 334 S.W.3d 230
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). “When the indictment alleges that a defendant ‘intentionally or knowingly’ failed to
register as a sex offender, we review the record to determine if the State presented sufficient evidence of the
defendant’s intentional or knowing failure.” Id.; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(c) (West 2011) (providing
if statute does not prescribe culpable mental state and one is required, “intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to
establish criminal responsibility”).
15
Here, Thomas was immediately banned from his registered address. 16 The State
presented no evidence that Thomas intended to change his address at least seven days before he
was required to leave the apartment. If anything, the evidence proves that he had no expectation
or intention to change his address—certainly not at a time that would allow him to notify the
authorities seven days in advance. The evidence here does not prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Thomas intentionally or knowingly failed to register an intended change of address
seven days before the intended change.
III. Conclusion
Because the evidence is legally insufficient to support the judgment, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and render a judgment of acquittal.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: August 21, 2013
Date Decided: August 28, 2013
Publish
16
The trespass warning began immediately on April 3, 2012, and is in effect until April 3, 2014.
16