Opinion issued March 5, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00792-CV
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EUGENIA WOODARD, Appellant
V.
FORTRESS INSURANCE COMPANY AND RONNIE ELMORE, D.D.S.,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 215th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2014-09985
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Eugenia Woodard, filed suit against appellees, Ronnie Elmore,
D.D.S. and Fortress Insurance Company, alleging injuries following some dental
work. Fortress Insurance obtained a summary judgment in its favor. Dr. Elmore
obtained a dismissal of the claims against him based on Woodard’s failure to file
an expert’s report. In her pro se brief on appeal, Woodard complains about the
injuries she alleges Dr. Elmore caused her and his refusal to submit to alternative
dispute resolution. We treat this as a challenge to the propriety of the order
dismissing the claims again Dr. Elmore. 1
We affirm.
Background
Dr. Elmore performed some dental work on Woodard. Some time later,
Woodard filed suit against Dr. Elmore and Fortress Insurance, alleging injuries
resulting from the dental work. Both defendants answered the suit. One hundred
twenty-three days after he answered the suit, Dr. Elmore filed a motion to dismiss
due to Woodard’s failure to file an expert report. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss.
Standard of Review
This appeal concerns dismissal of Woodard’s claims against Dr. Elmore due
to Woodard’s failure to file an expert report pursuant to Chapter 74 of the Texas
Civil Practices and Remedies Code, the Health Care Liability Act. We review the
1
Woodard does not make any direct complaints about Fortress Insurance in her pro
se brief. As a result, we do not construe her brief to raise an issue against Fortress
Insurance. Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs, we
nonetheless require pro se litigants to comply with applicable laws and rules of
procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring briefs to contain clear and
concise argument for contentions made); Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444
(Tex. 2005) (holding pro se litigants are not exempt from rules of procedure).
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trial court’s ruling in such cases for an abuse of discretion. Bowie Mem’l. Hosp. v.
Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (citing Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex.,
Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 2001)). A court abuses its discretion if
it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at
52 (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.
1985)). When reviewing matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, we may
not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s judgment. Walker v. Gutierrez,
111 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2003) (citing Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777
S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989)). Our analysis of an expert’s qualifications is limited to
the four corners of the expert’s report and the curriculum vitae. Palacios, 46
S.W.3d at 878.
Analysis
In a health-care-liability claim, a plaintiff must serve a defendant with an
expert report, along with the curriculum vitae of each expert listed in the report, no
later than 120 days after the defendant files its answer. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2014). If the plaintiff fails to serve an
expert report for the defendant, the court, on the defendant’s motion, must dismiss
with prejudice all claims brought against that defendant by that plaintiff. Id.
§ 74.351(b)(2).
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The record reflects that Woodard did not file any expert report. After 120
days passed, Dr. Elmore filed a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the trial court was
required to dismiss Woodard’s claims against Dr. Elmore. See id. We overrule
Woodard’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
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