Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
Nos. 04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
Devon Alexander KANE,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas
Trial Court No. A1319, A1320, A1321, & A1332
Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: February 11, 2015
AFFIRMED
This appeal stems from the trial court’s denial of Appellant Devon Alexander Kane’s
motions to suppress photographs obtained on an unmarked, unlocked flash drive left in a classroom
and discovered by employees of Schreiner University. Kane subsequently entered pleas of guilty;
the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed Kane on deferred adjudication probation for a
period of ten years in each case. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Kane’s motions to suppress
for the following reasons: (1) Kane failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
flash drive, and (2) Kane failed to establish that the evidence was obtained in violation of the law
and thereby inadmissible under article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 29, 2010, Kathleen Walker, the Director of Instructional Technology at
Schreiner University, found an unmarked, black-colored flash drive in one of the campus
classrooms. In an attempt to identify the owner of the flash drive, Walker inserted the flash drive
into a computer on the university’s computer network. Walker discovered documents belonging
to Kane and also to another student. Walker continued examining the flash drive for something
that would help identify the true owner. While looking through the flash drive’s contents, Walker
opened folders labeled “photos” and “music.” Contained within these folders were pictures that
Walker believed to be child pornography.
Walker immediately contacted Danny Flores, the university’s Director of Security, and
relayed her discovery and the identity of the student to whom she believed the flash drive might
belong. Flores subsequently viewed the same documents on the flash drive before contacting
Kerrville Police Officer Michael McDonald. The officers obtained a search warrant to search the
contents of the flash drive and Kane was charged with possession of child pornography.
Kane filed two motions to suppress in each case, one based on Walker and Flores’s search
and one based on the search warrant, contending the unwarranted search of his flash drive violated
his Fourth Amendment rights and constituted trespass. On December 18, 2013, following the trial
court’s denial of Kane’s motions to suppress, Kane entered pleas of guilty and was sentenced to
ten years deferred adjudication probation in each case. This appeal ensued. Because Kane’s
appellate briefs do not distinguish between the different motions, we address the motions
simultaneously, including the arguments contained therein.
-2-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
Because all of Kane’s issues on appeal stem from the trial court’s denial of his motions to
suppress, we limit our discussion to the motions to suppress.
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court’s
determination of historical facts will be given almost total deference, while the trial court’s
application of the law will be reviewed de novo. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 913
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A trial court has the distinct
advantage to make first-hand observations of a witness’s demeanor during testimony on a motion
to suppress; we, therefore, defer to the trial court’s determination of “credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony.” State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000); accord Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007).
B. Arguments of the Parties
Kane asserts that the acts of Kathleen Walker and Danny Flores violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, amounted to trespass, and violated section 33.02 of the Texas Penal Code;
Kane also contends he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the flash drive.
We address each assertion individually.
-3-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
C. Analysis
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
a. Arguments of the Parties
Kane contends that by storing information on a flash drive he manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The State argues that Kane failed to demonstrate that merely storing
information on a flash drive that is not password protected, not marked with personal identifiers,
and not locked in a locked case, manifests a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Both parties agree that Walker and Flores were individual citizens and not working under
the direction of law enforcement. Kane contends that the exclusionary rule applies to illegal
searches conducted by either law enforcement personnel or private citizens. The State counters
the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in this case because Kane’s flash drive was effectively
abandoned, or in the alternative, Walker and Flores took the flash drive with the intent to turn the
drive over to law enforcement.
b. Proof of Reasonableness of an Alleged Expectation of Privacy
“The purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 9 of the Texas
Constitution is to safeguard an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable
governmental intrusions.” Rogers v. State, 113 S.W.3d 452, 456–57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2003, no pet.) (citing Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). To prevail
on an alleged exclusionary rule violation, a defendant must first establish his standing to challenge
the admission of the evidence obtained by proof that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the place invaded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 38.23 (West 2005); Villarreal, 935
S.W.2d at 138; see also Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 819–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “The
Texas exclusionary rule applies to illegal searches or seizures conducted by law enforcement
officers or ‘other persons,’ even when those other persons are not acting in conjunction with, or at
-4-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
the request of, government officials.” Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(emphasis added). Importantly, “[o]nly those acts which violate a person’s privacy rights or
property interests are subject to the state . . . exclusionary rule.” Id. at 36 n.33 (citing Chavez v.
State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 822–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Price, J., concurring)).
The defendant bears “the burden of proving facts establishing a legitimate expectation of
privacy.” Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138 (citing Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988)). “To carry this burden, the accused must normally prove: (a) that by his
conduct, he exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy, i.e., a genuine intention to
preserve something as private; and (b) that circumstances existed under which society was
prepared to recognize his subjective expectation as objectively reasonable.” Villarreal, 935
S.W.2d at 138 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
c. Analysis
We first address Kane’s subjective expectation of privacy and whether any such
expectation was objectively reasonable.
(1) Kane’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy
The Austin Court of Appeals’ analysis in Miller v. State, 335 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2011, no pet.), is instructive. Miller, an officer with the Elgin Police Department, left his
personal thumb drive in the department’s patrol room computer after printing a copy of his daily
activity report. Id. at 851, 856. The thumb drive was left attached to the computer located at the
front desk of the patrol room and discovered by another officer attempting to use the computer.
Id. at 851. The thumb drive did not have Miller’s name or marks identifying the drive as Miller’s.
Id. One of the Elgin Police Department officers logged onto the computer and opened the drive
in an attempt to return the thumb drive to its rightful owner. Id. In doing so, the officer found a
photograph he considered pornographic and the thumb drive was turned over to his supervisor. Id.
-5-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
The court found that Miller did not exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy. Id. at 854–
55.
The court identified several factors in determining whether Miller possessed a subjective
expectation of privacy. Miller had previously left the thumb drive in the patrol room which was
accessible to other officers, city personnel, and citizens accompanied by officers. Id. at 855.
Additionally, the thumb drive did not contain any identifying markers that would “necessarily
identify the drive as [Miller’s], id. at 853; and finally, Miller did not take any precautions to prevent
others from accessing the information contained on the thumb drive, such as use of a password or
encrypted data, id. at 855.
This case is factually similar to that of Miller. Walker found the flash drive in a public
computer, in a classroom at Schreiner University. At a minimum, the classroom was available to
other students, faculty, and staff of the University. The flash drive did not have any identifying
marks suggesting the identity of its owner and was not password protected, encrypted, or locked.
Moreover, unlike Miller, Kane did not testify during the hearing on the motions to suppress and
did not provide testimony as to his subjective expectation of privacy.
We, therefore, conclude that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Kane’s
conduct did not exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the flash drive. Id. at 855;
see also Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138.
Even assuming Kane possessed a subjective expectation of privacy, to establish a
legitimate expectation of privacy, Kane also had to prove that his expectation was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. See Miller, 335 S.W.3d at 855; see also Villarreal, 935
S.W.2d at 138.
-6-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
(2) Objective Reasonableness of Kane’s Expectations
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals identified several factors that courts may consider in
determining whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable:
(1) whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the place invaded;
(2) whether he was legitimately in the place invaded;
(3) whether he had complete dominion or control and the right to exclude others;
(4) whether, prior to the intrusion, he took normal precautions customarily taken by
those seeking privacy;
(5) whether he put the place to some private use; and
(6) whether his claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy.
See Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d
at 138). “This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and none is dispositive of a particular
assertion of privacy; rather, we examine the circumstances surrounding the search in their totality.”
Id.
This court previously noted that these factors “are more applicable when discussing the
expectation of privacy in a place than in discussing the expectation of privacy in a computer hard
drive or even a closed container.” Rogers v. State, 113 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2003, no pet.). Although Kane did not testify at the hearing on the motions to suppress, there is
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the flash drive belonged to Kane.
See Miller, 335 S.W.3d at 855. Once again, Miller is instructive in analyzing the remaining factors.
See id. at 855–56 (applying Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 223). Here, the trial court “could have
reasonably inferred that in order to return the drive to [Kane], others must have taken temporary
possession of the drive and possibly accessed it to ascertain whether it belonged to [Kane].” Miller,
335 S.W.3d at 856. Kane left the flash drive in a classroom and did not mark it with his name or
other identifying information and did not password protect or take other precautions to prevent
others from viewing the information. See Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 223; Miller, 335 S.W.3d at 856.
-7-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
Thus, “[Kane] did not exercise complete dominion or control over the drive, at least during the
times he had misplaced it.” Miller, 335 S.W.3d at 856.
We conclude, like in Miller, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
circumstances did not rise to a level that any subjective expectation by Kane was objectively
reasonable. Id.; see also Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138.
(3) Walker’s and Flores’s Intent in Taking Possession of the Flash
Drive
Although the State argues the flash drive was abandoned, the trial court did not make such
a finding. We, therefore, turn to Walker’s and Flores’s intent in taking possession of the flash
drive. The court’s analysis in Jenschke v. State, 147 S.W.3d 398, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004),
provides guidance. In Jenschke, after their teenage daughter reported being sexually assaulted by
a relative, the parents broke into Jenschke’s vehicle and retrieved a box that contained a used
condom. Id. The parents took the box and an adult video out of the vehicle. Id. Over two years
later, the parents turned the evidence over to law enforcement. Id.
The court explained that when an individual, acting in their individual capacity and not as
“an officer or an agent of an officer[,] takes property that is evidence of crime, without the effective
consent of the owner and with the intent to turn over the property to an officer, the conduct may
be non-criminal even though the person has intent to deprive the owner.” Id. at 402. However,
when the victim’s parents broke into the vehicle, they intended to deprive Jenschke of the property;
they did not take the property with the intent to turn it over to law enforcement. Id. Therefore,
the parents violated the law against burglary of the vehicle. Id. at 403. Because the parents took
possession of the property with the intent to hold on to the property, and had not yet decided to
turn the property over to law enforcement, the evidence was properly excluded. Id.
-8-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
Walker’s testimony was to the contrary. As university employees, both Walker and Flores
were permitted to be in the classroom where the flash drive was left. Walker initially viewed the
flash drive to identify the owner’s identity. When she discovered the pornographic images, she
immediately took the flash drive to Flores, the head of security. Walker’s intent clearly changed
from simply identifying the owner of the flash drive to turning over the flash drive to law
enforcement based on its content that she believed were potentially illegal. After Flores reviewed
the images, the flash drive was immediately turned over to law enforcement.
The evidence supports a reasonable inference that Walker, and subsequently Flores, took
the flash drive with the intent to turn the evidence over to law enforcement. See Jenschke, 147
S.W.3d at 402; Carlson v. State, 355 S.W.3d 78, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011,
pet. ref’d); Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95, 104–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
ref’d).
d. Conclusion
The record supports that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Kane’s
conduct did not exhibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the flash drive. See Miller,
335 S.W.3d at 855; see also Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138. Additionally, we conclude Kane
similarly failed to sustain his burden that any expectation he may have possessed was objectively
reasonable. See Miller, 335 S.W.3d at 855; see also Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138. Finally, even
without the trial court’s finding that the flash drive was abandoned, we cannot say the trial court
erred in concluding that both Walker and Flores took the flash drive with the intent to turn the
evidence over to law enforcement. See Jenschke, 147 S.W.3d at 402. We, therefore, overrule
Kane’s first two issues on appeal.
We next turn to Kane’s issues associated with trespass and consent to search.
-9-
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
2. Trespass and Consent to Search
a. Arguments of the Parties
Kane asserts the searches conducted by Walker and Flores constituted trespass when they
obtained information from his personal property without his permission and without a warrant.
Kane contends that his failure to password protect the information on his flash drive, mark the
flash drive with personal identification information, or store the flash drive in a locked container,
as well as his leaving the flash drive unattended, did not amount to consent to search the flash
drive.
The State counters that because Kane’s abandonment of his flash drive was voluntary, no
trespass was committed by either Walker or Flores.
b. Exclusion of Evidence Obtained in violation of Texas Penal Code section
33.02 - Breach of Computer Security
Kane’s argument relies on Texas Penal Code section 33.02’s prohibition against a “person
knowingly accesses[ing] a computer, computer network, or computer system without the effective
consent of the owner.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02(a) (West Supp. 2014). In this case, Kane
contends the record does not support either actual consent or implied consent. See Baird v. State,
398 S.W.3d 220, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Because Walker and Flores allegedly accessed
Kane’s flash drive without his effective consent, Kane asserts any evidence obtained through their
actions was illegally obtained and should be suppressed pursuant to article 38.23 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (“No evidence obtained by an
officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of
Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence
against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.”).
- 10 -
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
“If a defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence under this article on the ground it
was wrongfully obtained by a private person in a private capacity, the defendant must establish
that the private person obtained that evidence in violation of law.” Mayfield v. State, 124 S.W.3d
377, 378 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d) (citing Carroll v. State, 911 S.W.2d 210, 220 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1995, no pet.)); see also Baird v. State, 379 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. App.—Waco
2012), aff’d, 398 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Dipple v. State, No. 05-12-00114-CR, 2013
WL 222277, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). We must, therefore, determine whether Walker and Flores violated the law in
obtaining the evidence in question.
c. Analysis
We find the Dallas Court of Appeals’ analysis in Knepp v. State, No. 05-08-00002-CR,
2009 WL 638249, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 13, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication), instructive. Knepp used his personal laptop for work purposes. Id. at *1. When he
left his laptop unsecured, another employee attempted to set a new background image on Knepp’s
computer and accessed his “‘my documents’ folder to find a funny picture.” Id. The pictures
contained child pornography and Knepp’s supervisor contacted the police. Id.
Knepp’s co-worker testified that he followed office protocol by accessing a co-worker’s
unsecured computer and changing a setting to alert the owner that the computer had been left
unsecured. Id. at *3. The court concluded that “[b]y leaving his computer open and unsecured,
[Knepp] knew he was leaving it for his coworkers to access” and “the trial court could reasonably
conclude that [the co-worker] had [Knepp’s] effective consent to access the computer.” Id. at *4.
This case is comparable. Walker testified that she routinely checked the computer lab and
classroom for articles left by students or faculty and regularly discovered flash drives. She further
- 11 -
04-14-00004-CR, 04-14-00005-CR, 04-14-00006-CR, & 04-14-00007-CR
testified that doing so was part of her “standard operating procedure” and that the only reason she
viewed the information on the flash drive was to facilitate returning the flash drive to its owner.
We conclude the trial court could have reasonably determined that by examining an
unmarked and unlocked flash drive left in a common-use computer facility, Walker did not violate
Texas Penal Code section 33.02 and that she had Kane’s effective consent to access the flash drive.
Id. Because Walker did not violate section 33.02, Kane failed to prove the evidence should have
been excluded under article 38.23. Mayfield, 124 S.W.3d at 378.
We, therefore, overrule Kane’s third and fourth issues on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Kane’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Kane’s
motions to suppress.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
PUBLISH
- 12 -