NUMBER 13-14-00204-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN RE REBEKAH SHROPSHIRE
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam1
Relator, Rebekah Shropshire, proceeding pro se, filed a “Motion under Article
11[.]07 Procedures After Conviction Without Death Penalty” on April 1, 2013. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). By three
issues, relator contends generally that she did not receive a fair trial and requests this
Court to order that she receive a new trial. Relator’s criminal conviction has already been
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
addressed by direct appeal, see Shropshire v. State, No. 13-08-00205-CR, 2009 WL
3385243, at **1–8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 22, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op. not
designated for publication) (affirming relator’s conviction for murder where relator
contended by three issues that: (1) she was denied a fair and impartial trial due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the evidence was factually insufficient to support the
jury's verdict; and (3) the sentence imposed constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
Because relator’s pleading does not otherwise reference an order or judgment subject to
appeal and relator asks us to command a public officer to perform an act, we construe
this pleading as a petition for writ of mandamus. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(a),
(d); In re Castle Texas Prod. Ltd. P'ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006,
orig. proceeding) (“The function of the writ of mandamus is to compel action by those who
by virtue of their official or quasi-official positions are charged with a positive duty to act.”);
see also Boston v. Garrison, 152 Tex. 253, 256 S.W.2d 67, 70 (1953).
Relator's complaint is in the nature of a petition for writ of habeas corpus because
the substance of her argument attacks the validity of her conviction. The procedure
established in Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is the exclusive
post-conviction judicial remedy available when a conviction is final and the applicant is
confined by virtue of his felony conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07;
see Ex Parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Tex. Crim. App.1989); McBride v. State, 114
S.W.3d 556, 557 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). Article 11.07 vests jurisdiction over
post-conviction relief from otherwise final felony convictions in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07; Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel.
Keene v. Ct. of Appeals for Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); In
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re Watson, 253 S.W.3d 319, 320 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, orig. proceeding). The
courts of appeals have no role in criminal law matters pertaining to proceedings under
article 11.07 and have no authority to issue writs of mandamus in connection with such
proceedings. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, §§ 3; 5; Ater v. Eighth Court of
Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding); In re Briscoe,
230 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding); In re McAfee,
53 S.W.3d 715, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding).
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus
and the applicable law, is of the opinion that we lack jurisdiction over this matter.
Accordingly, relator's petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
2nd day of April, 2014.
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