NUMBER 13-12-00640-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF J.M.F., A CHILD
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
By two issues, appellants Joe Angel Sanchez and Mary Louise Sanchez argue
the trial court erred in holding: (1) that the Sanchezes lacked standing to adopt J.M.F.
under section 102.005(4) of the Texas Family Code; and (2) that section 102.006(c)
was not applicable to their circumstances. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Ada S. and Shain F. were the biological parents of A.F., S.F., and K.F. In 2011,
a Victoria County trial court terminated Ada and Shain’s parental rights of the three
children and allowed Ada’s brother, Joe Angel Sanchez, and his wife, Mary Louise, to
adopt them.
Later that year, on November 29, 2011, the Department of Family and Protective
Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights to Ada and Shain’s youngest
child, two-year-old J.M.F. The trial court granted this petition on January 23, 2012. The
Sanchezes subsequently filed an original petition to adopt J.M.F. on April 11, 2012. In
their petition, the Sanchezes informed the court that they were the “maternal uncle and
aunt of the child” and “the adoptive parents of [J.M.F.’s] siblings and have had
substantial contact with [J.M.F.].” The attorney and guardian ad litem of J.M.F. filed
special exceptions to the Sanchezes’ petition, arguing that they had no standing to file
suit and requested that their petition be dismissed.1 The trial court agreed and, in a
letter dated April 10, 2012 to the attorneys, explained his reasoning for dismissing the
petition:
Joe Angel Sanchez and Mary Louise Sanchez have not alleged any
grounds for standing to file an “original suit” under Family Code § 102.002,
§ 102.003, or § 102.004, nor a suit for modification under Family Code §
156.002. Therefore, Joe Angel Sanchez and Mary Louise Sanchez do not
have standing to file a SAPCR requesting managing conservatorship or
possessory conservatorship.
§ 102.006(a) limits standing if one would otherwise have standing under
the previous sections cited, but the (b) and (c) subsections are exceptions
only to the limitation. One must have standing under § 102.002, §
102.003, or § 102.004, before addressing the limitation and the exception
to the limitation.
§ 102.006(a) also limits standing if one would otherwise have standing
under § 102.005. Joe Angel Sanchez and Mary Louise Sanchez . . . have
alleged that they are the aunt and uncle of the child and are the adoptive
parents of the child’s siblings.
1
Based on the record, it appears that J.M.F.’s foster parents also filed a petition to adopt him.
2
An adult who has adopted . . . a sibling of a child [§ 102.005(4)] may not
file an “original suit” requesting adoption only (termination not applicable
since parental rights already terminated by order signed 1/23/2012) unless
prohibited by § 102.006. § 102.006(a)(3) prohibits an “original suit” being
filed by a relative of a former parent whose parent-child relationship has
been terminated unless:
(b)(1) that person has a continuing right to possession or access to the
child under an existing court order (not alleged in pleadings);
(b)(2) that person has the consent of the managing conservator (not
alleged in pleadings that the “department” who is managing conservator
has consented); or
(c) if that person files an “original or modification” suit requesting
managing conservatorship [less than] 90 days from the termination date
(Court finds the 1/23/2012 date the order was signed is the termination
date) in a suit filed by the department.
Concerning the (c) exception to the limitation, since Joe Angel Sanchez
and Mary Louise Sanchez do not have standing to file a SAPCR
requesting managing conservatorship or possessory conservatorship as
set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 on page 1 of this letter, the (c) exception is
inapplicable. Therefore, Joe Angel Sanchez and Mary Louise Sanchez
also do not have standing to file an “original suit” requesting adoption
only.”*
* Note – if Joe Angel Sanchez and Mary Louise Sanchez had standing to
file an adoption only, it would have had to be filed in a new cause rather
than in this cause [§ 102.013(b)].
During various hearings held during the pendency of this case, Joe Angel
testified that he, his wife, and their adopted children had “frequent,” almost “daily,”
interaction with J.M.F. until December 2010. J.M.F. would spend the night at Joe
Angel’s home with his siblings A.F., S.F., and K.F. The parents and children would take
trips to their grandmother’s house, to McDonald’s, to grocery stores, and to the mall.
J.M.F. and his siblings also attended the same daycare. Joe Angel’s wife, Mary Louise,
provided similar testimony regarding her family’s frequent interaction with J.M.F.
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The Sanchezes filed a “First Amended Original Petition for Adoption of a Child”
on August 27, 2012. The trial court this time dismissed their petition with prejudice,
again stating that they did not have standing. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In an original suit affecting the parent-child relationship in which the petitioner
seeks adoption or managing conservatorship, the question of standing is a threshold
issue.” In re A.M., 312 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied).
Whether the Sanchezes have standing under the Texas Family Code must be
determined by the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Dep’t of Prot. & Regulatory Servs. v.
Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001). “When standing has been statutorily
conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis.” In
re H.G., 267 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (citing
Sherry, 46 S.W.3d at 861). “The party seeking relief must allege and establish standing
within the parameter of the language used in the statute.” Id. at 124. “The Texas
Legislature has provided a comprehensive statutory framework for standing in the
context of suits involving the parent-child relationship.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
102.003–.006 (West 2008 & West Supp. 2011)).
“Statutory construction is a legal question and is reviewed de novo.” In re A.M.,
312 S.W.3d at 81 (citing F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680,
683 (Tex. 2007)). “In construing a statute, our primary objective is to determine the
legislature’s intent, which, when possible, we discern from the plain meaning of the
words chosen.” Id. (citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006)).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Standing Under Section 102.005(4)
By their first issue, the Sanchezes argue that the trial court erred when it
concluded that they did not have standing to file an original suit for adoption under
section 102.005(4) of the Texas Family Code. We agree.
1. Applicable Law
Section 102.005 of the Texas Family Code addresses standing in termination
and adoption cases. The pertinent statute at issue, section 102.005(4), follows:
An original suit requesting only an adoption or for termination of the
parent-child relationship joined with a petition for adoption may be filed by:
(4) an adult who has adopted, or is the foster parent of and has petitioned
to adopt, a sibling of the child; . . . .
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.005(4) (West Supp. 2011).
2. Analysis
Here, the Sanchezes filed an original suit requesting an adoption on April 11,
2012. See id. It is uncontested that the Sanchezes previously adopted J.M.F.’s older
three siblings, A.F., S.F., and K.F. See id. The Sanchezes, as the parties seeking
relief, meet the “parameter[s] of the language used in” section 102.005(4). In re H.G.,
267 S.W.3d at 124. We sustain their first issue.
B. The Section 102.006(c) Exception to Standing
Even if standing is established, section 102.006 can limit standing in cases
where the parent-child relationship has been terminated, such as in J.M.F.’s case. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.006; see also In re M.G., No. 13-09-00305-CV, 2010 WL
2776566, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). By their
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second issue, the Sanchezes aver that the trial court erred in concluding that section
102.006 limited their standing to adopt J.M.F. Specifically, the Sanchezes contend that
the trial court erred when it concluded that the exception enumerated in section
102.006(c) did not apply to them.
1. Applicable Law
Section 102.006 generally provides that relatives of terminated parents do not
have standing to file an original suit concerning the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
102.006(a)(3) (providing that “a family member . . . by blood . . . of either a former
parent whose parent-child relationship has been terminated” does not have standing to
file an original adoption petition). However, section (c) provides an exception to this
limitation:
The limitations on filing suit imposed by this section do not apply to an
adult sibling of the child, a grandparent of the child, an aunt who is a sister
of a parent of the child, or an uncle who is a brother of a parent of the child
if the adult sibling, grandparent, aunt, or uncle files an original suit or a suit
for modification requesting managing conservatorship of the child not later
than the 90th day after the date the parent-child relationship between the
child and the parent is terminated in a suit filed by the Department of
Family and Protective Services requesting the termination of the parent-
child relationship.
Id. § 102.006(c).
2. Analysis
Joe Angel Sanchez was Ada S.’s brother and J.M.F.’s natural uncle. Therefore,
he would be ineligible to bring suit under 102.006(a)(3) because he was a “family
member . . . by blood . . . of either a former parent whose parent-child relationship has
been terminated.” Id. § 102.006(a)(3). However, Joe Angel asserted that he timely
brought his original suit under the subsection (c) and, thus, did have standing. The
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court terminated trial court terminated Ada S. and Shain F.’s parental rights to J.M.F. on
January 23, 2012 and the Sanchezes filed their original petition for adoption on April 11,
2012. Joe Angel filed his suit 79 days after the termination was granted and, therefore,
well within the 90-day deadline set forth by subsection (c).
The trial held, however, that the subsection (c) exception was inapplicable to the
Sanchezes because they did “not have standing to file a SAPCR requesting managing
conservatorship or possessory conservatorship,” presumably under section 102.003.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (listing persons who generally have standing to file
suit in SAPCRs). The Sanchezes, though, did not file a SAPCR requesting managing
conservatorship or possessory conservatorship under section 102.003. See id.
Instead, they filed an original petition for adoption under section 102.005. See id. §
102.005. Section 102.006(c) is drafted disjunctively—persons can either file “an original
suit” or “a suit for modification requesting managing conservatorship.” See In re A.M.,
312 S.W.3d at 81–82 (holding that although aunt met the standing criteria of section
102.005 to file an original suit to adopt, she did not meet the section 102.006(c)
exception because she filed her lawsuit six months after termination). Here, Joe Angel
and Mary Louise timely filed “an original suit” for adoption on April 11, 2012 after the
trial court terminated J.M.F.’s parents’ parental rights.2
Accordingly, we hold that the Sanchezes fit “within the parameters” of the
exception established by section 102.006(c) because Joe Angel was a natural uncle of
J.M.F. who filed an original petition within 90 days of the date J.M.F.’s parents’ parental
2
As noted earlier in the opinion, the Sanchezes also filed a “First Amended Original Petition for
Adoption of a Child” on August 27, 2012.
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rights were terminated. See in re H.G., 267 S.W.3d at 124. We sustain the Sanchezes’
second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having sustained Joe Angel and Mary Louise Sanchez’s issues on appeal, we
reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
__________________________
GINA BENAVIDES,
Justice
Delivered and filed the
26th day of September, 2013.
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