NUMBER 13-13-00344-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN RE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relator, the Office of the Attorney General of
Texas, seeks relief from an order requiring it to disclose the address of a custodial
parent to a non-custodial parent. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.108 (West 2008).
We conditionally grant relief as stated herein.
1
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is
not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”);
Id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
I. STANDARD FOR MANDAMUS RELIEF
Mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion for which the
relator has no adequate remedy at law. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40
(Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the
law is or in applying the law to the facts, and a clear failure to analyze or apply the law
correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
Mandamus is appropriate only when the relator has no adequate remedy on
appeal. Id. The adequacy of an appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the
benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d at 136. In evaluating the benefits and detriments, we consider whether
mandamus will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or
loss. Id.; see In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
proceeding). The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an appeal is
inadequate when a court erroneously orders the disclosure of privileged information.
See In re Bexar County Crim. Dist. Attorney's Office, 224 S.W.3d 182, 185 (Tex. 2007)
(orig. proceeding); In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 298 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding); In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 745 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
II. BACKGROUND
Juan Antonio Aguiniga and Graciela Aguiniga were divorced in August 2006.
Graciela was appointed the sole managing conservator of the couple’s two minor
children, and Juan was ordered to pay her child support. Shortly thereafter, Juan filed a
petition to modify the conservatorship based on Graciela’s alleged incarceration and
2
incipient deportation to Mexico. After a hearing at which Graciela did not appear, the
trial court signed a temporary order appointing Juan as the temporary sole managing
conservator of the children and ordering that no party would be obligated to pay child
support for the minor children. Juan’s modification suit was ultimately dismissed for
want of prosecution.
In April 2013, Juan filed a “Motion to Void Alleged Child Support Arrearages and
Illegal Child Support Lien and Application for Temporary Restraining Order.” In the
motion, Juan alleged that he was the primary conservator of the children under both
Texas and Mexico’s law. He further alleged that Graciela had been deported to Mexico,
where she then resided, and her family members had also taken the minor children to
Mexico and refused to give Juan custody. Juan alleged that Graciela’s family had
“assaulted” him and “threatened to kill him.” Juan thus contended that he did not owe
Graciela any child support arrearages.
Juan attempted to serve this motion on Graciela through the Attorney General.
The Attorney General filed a “Notice of Defective Service” asserting that it did not
represent Graciela and that it only represented the State of Texas. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 231.109(d) (West 2008).
At a trial court hearing held on Juan’s motion on June 6, 2013, the Attorney
General contended that it was unable to provide Juan with Graciela’s address because
the provisions of the Texas Family Code rendered such information confidential. The
trial court disagreed and orally ordered the Attorney General to provide Juan with
Graciela’s address within seven days. The Attorney General filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order contending that Graciela’s address was
3
confidential under the Texas Family Code because an allegation of family violence had
been made against Juan. The trial court denied the Attorney General’s motion for
reconsideration by written order rendered on or about June 19, 2013.
On July 10, 2013, the Attorney General filed this original proceeding. By order
issued that same day, the Court requested that Juan, or any other person whose
interest would be directly affected by the relief sought, file a response to the petition for
writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8. The Court further ordered the
disclosure of Graciela’s address to be stayed pending further order of this Court, or until
the case is finally decided. See id. R. 52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order
granting temporary relief is effective until the case is finally decided.”). More than an
adequate period of time has passed, and no party has filed a response to the petition for
writ of mandamus. We thus proceed to address the merits.
III. ANALYSIS
By two issues, the Attorney General contends that (1) the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering the disclosure of Graciela’s address, and (2) there is no adequate
remedy by appeal. Our analysis of this issue is governed by section 231.108 of the
Texas Family Code concerning “Confidentiality of Records and Privileged
Communications.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.108. This section provides:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (c), all files and records of
services provided under this chapter, including information
concerning a custodial parent, noncustodial parent, child, and an
alleged or presumed father, are confidential.
(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), all communications made by
a recipient of financial assistance under Chapter 31, Human
Resources Code, or an applicant for or recipient of services under
this chapter are privileged.
4
(c) The Title IV-D agency may use or release information from the files
and records, including information that results from a
communication made by a recipient of financial assistance under
Chapter 31, Human Resources Code, or by an applicant for or
recipient of services under this chapter, for purposes directly
connected with the administration of the child support, paternity
determination, parent locator, or aid to families with dependent
children programs. The Title IV-D agency may release information
from the files and records to a consumer reporting agency in
accordance with Section 231.114.
(d) The Title IV-D agency by rule may provide for the release of
information to public officials.
(e) The Title IV-D agency may not release information on the physical
location of a person if:
(1) a protective order has been entered with respect to
the person; or
(2) there is reason to believe that the release of
information may result in physical or emotional harm
to the person.
(f) The Title IV-D agency, by rule, may provide for the release of
information to persons for purposes not prohibited by federal law.
(g) The final order in a suit adjudicating parentage is available for
public inspection as provided by Section 160.633.
See id.
The Attorney General contends, and we agree, that the information sought
regarding Graciela’s current address is rendered confidential by the general provisions
of subsection (a). See id.; Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290,
295 (Tex. 2011) (stating that “information obtained during [the] provision of services
under Chapter 231 is confidential”). While the statute allows the discretionary release of
information for purposes associated with the administration of certain expressly
5
identified programs, assisting a private party in obtaining service on a custodial parent is
not one of those discretionary purposes. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.108(c).
The Attorney General further contends, and we again agree, that the information
sought is also protected by the specific prohibition in subsection (e) against releasing
information on the physical location of a person where there is a reason to believe that
the release of the information may result in physical or emotional harm to that person.
See id. § 231.108(e). In the instant case, the Attorney General expressly contended
that the case was “marked with family violence” and the disclosure of Graciela’s
address “may raise safety concerns” for Graciela.
Based on the particular factual and procedural context of this case as presented
in this original proceeding, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
requiring the Attorney General to provide Juan with Graciela’s location or address. See
id. § 231.108(a),(e). We further conclude that the Attorney General lacks an adequate
remedy by appeal for the forced disclosure of confidential information, and thus, relief
by mandamus is appropriate. See In re Bexar County Crim. Dist. Attorney's Office, 224
S.W.3d at 185; In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d at 298.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of
mandamus, is of the opinion that the Attorney General has shown itself entitled to the
relief sought. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.108(a),(c); Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 295.
Accordingly, the stay previously imposed by this Court is lifted. See TEX. R. APP. P.
52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective
until the case is finally decided.”). We conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct
6
the trial court to withdraw its order requiring the Attorney General to disclose Graciela’s
address to Juan. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.
JUSTICE NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Delivered and filed the
6th day of August, 2013.
7