IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10-00300-CR
KAREN MITCHELL MARTIN,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 249th District Court
Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court No. F44317
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After Appellant Karen Mitchell Martin made an open plea of guilty to the offense
of delivery of a controlled substance in an amount of one gram or more but less than
four grams, the trial court assessed her punishment at fifteen years’ confinement. In
one issue, Martin contends that her sentence was disproportionate to the offense for
which she was convicted.
Generally, a sentence within the statutory range of punishment for an offense is
not excessive, cruel, or unusual punishment. Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386, 389
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d); Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). A narrow exception to this rule is recognized where the
sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. See Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 542
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
1004-05, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy. J., concurring); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010-11, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); McGruder v.
Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992).
In conducting a proportionality analysis, we first make a threshold comparison
of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence. Moore, 54 S.W.3d at
542; see Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91, 103 S.Ct. at 3010; McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316. If we
determine that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense, we must then
compare the sentence received to sentences for similar crimes in this jurisdiction and
sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Alvarez, 63 S.W.3d at 581; see Solem,
463 U.S. at 291-92, 103 S.Ct. at 3010; McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316.
In this case, the charged offense of delivery of a controlled substance in an
amount of one gram or more but less than four grams is a second-degree felony
punishable by a term of imprisonment between two and twenty years and a fine up to
$10,000. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (c) (West 2010); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.33 (West 2011). Martin’s sentence of fifteen years’ confinement is
within this statutory range.
Martin argues that her sentence is disproportionate because “[m]itigating factors
existed within the evidence presented at trial.” Martin points out that she admitted her
Martin v. State Page 2
guilt and did not place responsibility for her actions on anyone else and that the
methamphetamine she pled guilty to delivering weighed only 1.67 grams, which is on
the low end of the range for a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 481.112(a), (c). Even considering these facts, however, the record does not reflect
that the punishment was grossly disproportionate to the offense. Investigator Mark
Goetz testified that methamphetamine is now the primary illicit drug in the area and
that it directly contributes to the criminal society in Johnson County. Goetz stated that,
before being indicted, Martin was given the opportunity to cooperate with him and the
Stop the Offender Program Special Crimes Unit but that she expressed no interest in
doing so. Goetz testified that Martin was a “meth addict” who had been involved in
the distribution of methamphetamine for about ten years. Martin had both a prior
misdemeanor and felony drug-related conviction.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Martin’s punishment was not
excessive or grossly disproportionate. We thus overrule Martin’s sole issue and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed March 28, 2012
Do not publish
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