Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-11-00877-CR
Antonio AVILES,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2011CR7244
Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 6, 2014
REVERSED AND REMANDED
On original submission, this court held the trial court did not err in denying appellant
Antonio Aviles’s motion to suppress the blood specimen drawn pursuant to section
724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code. Aviles v. State, 385 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2012), vacated, 134 S.Ct. 902 (2014). Relying upon Beeman v. State, 86
S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), we held section 724.012(b)(3)(B) permits a police
officer to take a blood specimen from DWI suspect without a warrant if the officer has credible
04-11-00877-CR
information that the suspect has been previously convicted on at least two prior occasions of DWI.
Id.
Aviles sought review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, but that court refused his
petition. Thereafter, Aviles filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated our judgment, and remanded the matter
to us for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct.
1552 (2013). Aviles v. Texas, 134 S.Ct. 902, 902 (2014). After reviewing the denial of the motion
to suppress in light of McNeely, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter to the
trial court for a new trial.
BACKGROUND
Aviles was arrested for DWI. Prior to trial, Aviles filed a motion to suppress the blood
specimen taken without a warrant. At the hearing on the motion, the State presented one witness,
the arresting officer, Joe Rios.
At the hearing, Officer Rios testified that on the night of the arrest, he saw a pickup truck
veer across several lane markers. As he neared the truck, it again crossed the lane markers, veering
into his lane. Because of the driver’s erratic handling of the truck, Officer Rios suspected the
driver was intoxicated. Accordingly, the officer stopped the vehicle.
After he pulled the vehicle over and made contact with the driver, later identified as Aviles,
Officer Rios noticed Aviles had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and was unsteady on his feet when
he exited the truck. The officer asked Aviles to perform three standardized field sobriety tests —
the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”), the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg-stand. Aviles
complied and Officer Rios testified Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication on each test. Based on
his erratic driving, appearance, and performance on the three field sobriety tests, Officer Rios
arrested Aviles for DWI.
-2-
04-11-00877-CR
After the arrest, the officer used his mobile laptop to determine if Aviles had prior offenses.
He discovered Aviles had two prior DWI convictions. Officer Rios asked Aviles if he would
voluntarily give a breath or blood sample. When Aviles declined, Officer Rios, relying on section
724.012 of the Texas Transportation Code, took Aviles to a nurse assigned to the City of San
Antonio magistrate’s office and required him to give a blood sample. Section 724.012(b)(3)(B)
states: “[a] peace officer shall require the taking of a specimen of the person’s breath or blood
under any of the following circumstances . . . [for example, if] at the time of the arrest, the officer
possesses or receives reliable information from a credible source that the person[,] on two or more
occasions, has been previously convicted of or placed on community supervision for an offense
under Section 49.04 [DWI] . . . Penal Code.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (West
2011). The blood specimen showed Aviles was legally intoxicated.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied Aviles’s motion to suppress. Thereafter,
Aviles pled nolo contendere to the charge of DWI and was sentenced to two years’ confinement.
Aviles appealed, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
As noted above, in the original appeal to this court, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment,
holding the mandatory blood draw, taken without a warrant, was proper under section
724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Transportation Code. Aviles, 385 S.W.3d at 116. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals refused Aviles’s petition, but the Supreme Court granted the petition and vacated
our judgment, remanding the matter back to us for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision
in McNeely. Aviles, 134 S.Ct. at 902.
ANALYSIS
We permitted the parties to file amended briefs on remand. In his amended brief, Aviles
contends that based on the Court’s decision in McNeely, the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because per se exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement are
-3-
04-11-00877-CR
impermissible. The State counters, arguing McNeely does not require a reversal in this case
because it was a very narrow decision that merely held the natural dissipation of alcohol does not
create a per se exigency in all DWI cases. Based on our prior decision in Weems v. State, No. 04-
13-00366-CR, 2014 WL 2532299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 14, 2014, pet. filed), we agree
with Aviles.
Standard of Review
Appellate courts review trial court rulings on motions to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). With regard
to a determination of historical facts, we afford great deference to a trial court’s determination. Id.
This is because trial judges are uniquely situated to observe the demeanor and appearance of any
witnesses. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As the sole fact finder at
a suppression hearing, a trial court may believe or disbelieve any portion of a witness’s testimony
and make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872,
878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). However, whether a specific search or seizure is reasonable or
supported by probable cause is a question of law subject to de novo review. Dixon v. State, 206
S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Application
After the Supreme Court vacated our prior decision and remanded the matter back to this
court, this court decided Weems. In Weems, we specifically considered the effect the Supreme
Court’s decision to remand Aviles in light of McNeely had on our holding in Aviles that a
warrantless blood draw of a DWI suspect, which was conducted pursuant to the provisions of
section 724.012(b)(3)(B), did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
2014 WL 2532299, at *7. After reviewing numerous Texas cases considering McNeely’s effect
on section 724.012(b)(3)(B) — the mandatory blood draw statute — and the similar implied
-4-
04-11-00877-CR
consent statute found in section 724.011 of the Transportation Code, 1 we held that neither the
mandatory blood draw statute nor the implied consent statute were exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement. 2 Id. at *8. We considered the State’s suggestion that we
should balance the public and private interests implicated in serious DWI cases and hold the
mandatory blood draw statute is a reasonable substitution for the warrant requirement. Id. We
declined the State’s suggestion, holding that McNeely “clearly proscribed what it labeled
categorical or per se rules for warrantless blood testing, emphasizing over and over again that the
reasonableness of a search must be judged based on the totality of the circumstances presented in
each case.” Id. (citing McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1560–63).
Looking at the mandatory blood draw statute and the implied consent statute, we held in
Weems these statutes clearly create categorical or per se rules the McNeely court held were not
permissible exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Weems, 2014 WL
2532299, at *8; see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 724.011(a), 724.012(b)(3)(B). We concluded
that because the statutes “do not take into account the totality of the circumstances present in each
case, but only consider certain facts,” an approach rejected in McNeely, the statutes were not
substitutes for a warrant or legal exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Id.
In this case, as in Weems, the State urges us to adopt a balancing test — balancing the
public interests (public safety on roads and DWI enforcement) and the defendant’s “minimal”
privacy interests — in DWI cases wherein the defendant has been convicted of two or more prior
DWIs. This is the same approach we specifically rejected in Weems. See 2014 WL 2532299, at
1
Section 724.011(a) states that if a person is arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed
while the person was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, the person is deemed to have
impliedly consented to the taking of a breath or blood specimen. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.011(a) (West 2011).
2
This court did not hold in Weems, and does not now hold, that sections 724.011(a) and 724.012(b)(3)(B) are
unconstitutional. Rather, we merely held that under McNeely, these provisions did not create per se exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The statutes may, in fact, be used for other purposes.
-5-
04-11-00877-CR
*8. The State also suggests that statutes such as the implied consent and mandatory blood draw
statutes are permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement because they are searches pursuant
to reasonable statutes or regulations. We hold this flies in the face of McNeely’s repeated mandate
that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case. 133 S.Ct. 1560–63. Thus,
we reject the State’s suggested balancing and regulatory approach.
It is undisputed that Officer Rios did not obtain a warrant prior to requiring Aviles to submit
to a blood draw. Once Aviles established the absence of a warrant, it was incumbent upon the
State to prove the warrantless blood draw was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
See Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 666, 672–73. The State may satisfy this burden by proving the
existence of an exception to the warrant requirement. See Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Here the only exception to the warrant requirement proposed by the State
was section 724.012(b)(3)(B), the mandatory blood draw statute. Because this is not a permissible
exception to the warrant requirement, and the State has not argued or established a proper
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, we hold the blood draw violated
Aviles’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, i.e., the blood draw was an unconstitutional search
and seizure.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold the warrantless blood draw violated Aviles’s rights under
the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We
sustain Aviles’s complaint and reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for a new
trial in accordance with this court’s opinion.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Publish
-6-