Affirm and Opinion Filed August 7, 2013
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01015-CR
MICHAEL D. WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F94-03570-TK
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and Lang-Miers
Opinion by Justice Bridges
Appellant Michael D. Williams, appearing pro se, appeals from the denial of his motion
for post-conviction DNA testing. We affirm.
Background
In the underlying case, the trial court convicted appellant of aggravated assault and
assessed appellant’s punishment at 20 years’ imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. The collision at
issue took place in the early morning hours of July 2, 1994. Five vehicles were parked along a
well-lit street. Tommie Stillwell testified she was standing between a car and a truck, talking to
some friends. Stillwell remembered being struck by a car and thrown. As a result of the
collision, Stillwell’s back was broken at the eleventh vertebrae and her spinal cord was severed.
She testified the collision left her paralyzed from the waist down.
Steven Ashabranner testified he was one of the people present when Stillwell was hit. He
explained that a car hit the line of five parked cars, and he identified appellant as the driver of the
car responsible for the collision. Ashabranner testified that, after the collision, appellant was
sitting behind the steering wheel of his car “stunned.” He further explained appellant was dazed,
disoriented and bleeding.
Dallas Police Officer D.G. Marchetti testified he saw the wreckage from four or five
blocks away. He described the scene as a “chain reaction accident” with five wrecked vehicles
hitting each other. There were no skid marks, and the vehicle driven by appellant was traveling
at approximately 60 MPH when it hit the parked cars. Officer Marchetti went to the hospital
where Stillwell and appellant were taken. Appellant refused a blood sample, and Officer
Marchetti completed the paperwork for a mandatory blood sample, taken as a part of his DWI
investigation. Marchetti charged appellant with DWI, but appellant was later indicted for
aggravated assault. During the aggravated assault trial, appellant’s motion to suppress the results
of the involuntary blood sample was granted.
Prior to sentencing, the record reflects appellant made the following statement to the trial
court: “I just wanted to say that I wish Miss Stillwell had been here today. I wanted to tell her
how sorry I was and how bad I felt about what happened.” Appellant further testified: “I just
wanted to say that I am sorry about what happened and I do have remorse for what happened. I
am asking the Court to have mercy on me during the sentencing. I know what I did was a
mistake.”
Appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault to the Eastland Court of
Appeals, who affirmed appellant’s conviction. See Williams v. State, No. 11-95-175-CR, 1996
WL 33674375 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 11, 1996, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
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On July 11, 2011, appellant filed his motion for post-conviction forensic DNA testing in
the Criminal District Court No. 4. In his motion, appellant alleged “DNA testing of this blood
would show there is no connection between [himself] and the crime charged.” Appellant further
argued identity is an issue “because according to the trial record, the alleged offense occurred at
one location while the blood was allegedly obtained at a different location.”
On June 21, 2012, the trial court found appellant was not entitled to post-conviction DNA
testing under chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and denied the motion.
Specifically, the trial court found: (1) appellant’s identity is not an issue and was never an issue,
(2) appellant failed to establish that any evidence that may be tested for DNA still exists in
regard to the case to which the motion applies, (3) appellant failed to establish that any DNA
testing would have resulted in him not being convicted, and (4) appellant failed to satisfy the
requirements of articles 64.01 and 64.03 applicable to DNA testing.
Analysis
At the outset, we note that appellant filed a pro se brief on appeal. Although we construe
pro se pleadings and briefs liberally, a pro se litigant is still required to follow the same rules and
laws as litigants represented by a licensed attorney. See Digges v. State, No. 05-10-00239-CR,
2012 WL 2444543, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2012, pet. ref’d) (not designated for
publication) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex.1978); Drum v.
Calhoun, 299 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied)).
In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a request
for DNA testing of biological material not secured in relation to the offense that is the basis of
the challenged conviction under article 64.01(b). However, the code of criminal procedure
vested the convicting court, the Criminal District Court No. 4, with the authority to order post-
conviction DNA testing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 64.01(a-1), 64.03(a) (permitting a
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convicting person to submit to the convicting court a motion for forensic DNA testing of
evidence and permitting the convicting court to order forensic DNA testing). The record,
therefore, reflects appellant properly filed his motion for post-conviction DNA testing with the
Criminal District Court No. 4, and we conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the
motion.1 See id. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
In his remaining issues, appellant challenges the jurisdiction of the underlying court to
hear his motion for post-conviction DNA testing. However, none of these issues address the
statutory criteria required for DNA testing nor would DNA testing resolve any of his remaining
complaints. See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 64.03(a)(1), (2) (laying out the requirements for DNA
testing). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s remaining issues.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s six issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/David L. Bridges/
Do Not Publish DAVID L. BRIDGES
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 JUSTICE
121015F.U05
1
In the caption of appellant’s handwritten motion, he specifically lists “In the Criminal District Court Number 4” as the proper court. Thus,
appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the Criminal District Court No. 4, sought affirmative relief for himself at the hands of the court, and then
waited until the adverse result before suggesting a jurisdictional question.
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MICHAEL D. WILLIAMS, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-12-01015-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F94-03570-TK.
Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Moseley and Lang-Miers
participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered August 7, 2013
/David L. Bridges/
DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE
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