Micah Cain Prater v. State

                                                                                                                            

 

 

 

 

NUMBER 13-11-046-CR

 

COURT OF APPEALS

 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

                                                                                                                     

 

MICAH C. PRATER,                                                                Appellant,

 

v.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                       Appellee.

                                                                                                                        

 

On appeal from the Criminal District Court

of Jefferson County, Texas.

                                                                                                                     

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

Before Justices Benavides, Vela, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela

                                                                                                                                   

On July 14, 2009, appellant, Micah C. Prater, pleaded guilty to possessing less than one gram of methamphetamine, a state-jail felony.  See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115 (West 2010).  The trial court placed Prater on deferred adjudication community supervision for two years.  On November 30, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to revoke Prater’s community supervision, alleging that Prater had violated its terms by nine separate counts.  Prater pleaded “true” to counts one and nine, namely that while on community supervision, he had committed the offense of evading arrest or detention twice:  once on or about the 5th day of February, 2010 in Harris County and once on or about the 13th day of October, 2010 in Fort Bend County.  Based on the pleas of true, the trial court found Prater guilty, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced Prater to two years' confinement in a state-jail facility.  We affirm.

I.  Anders Brief

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court stating that, based upon his review of the record, “there are no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated” and “the appeal is wholly without merit.”  Although counsel’s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal.  See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

            In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no errors in the trial court’s judgment.  Counsel has informed this Court that he has:  (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response.[1]  See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.  More than an adequate period of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se brief in this matter.  See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

II. Independent Review

 

            Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous.  Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988).  We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal.  See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. Motion to Withdraw

 

            In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant.  See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant.  To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)).  We grant the motion to withdraw.  Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.[2]  See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

 

 

 

                                                                                         ROSE VELA

                                                                                         Justice

 

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 

Delivered and filed the 

11th day of August, 2011.

 



[1] The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered.  Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.”  In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23 (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

 

[2] No substitute counsel will be appointed.  Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review.  Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this court.  See Tex. R. App. P. 68.2.  Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this court, after which it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  See id. R. 68.3; 68.7.  Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.  See id. R. 68.4.