NO. 07-09-0249-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
JANUARY 11, 2011
______________________________
WILLIAM COALE AND JULIE COALE,
Appellants
v.
RONALD SCOTT, HAZEL SCOTT, JACQUELINE SCOTT, JUDY SAUR,
SHEA SAUR AND HEATHER SAUR,
Appellees
_______________________________
FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY;
NO. C2004-0600C; HON. CHARLES R. RAMSAY, PRESIDING
_______________________________
Opinion
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
William Coale and Julie Coale (the Coales) appeal from an order approving a
Rule 11 agreement purportedly entered into by the Coales and Ronald Scott, Hazel
Scott, Jacqueline Scott, Judy Saur, Shea Saur and Heather Saur (the Scotts). Through
two issues, it is contended that the trial court abused its discretion by enforcing a Rule
11 agreement after its plenary power had expired and which agreement improperly
expanded the Scotts’ rights accorded in the original judgment. We affirm.
Background
The underlying suit involved the resolution of a dispute regarding an easement.
A final judgment was entered favoring the Scotts and recognizing the easement.
Several years passed after which the Scotts moved the trial court to enforce its
judgment. That motion was granted, though the trial court denied what appeared to be
a “Motion to Enter Order.” Shortly thereafter, the Scotts filed a “Motion to Enter Order
and Enforce Rule 11 Agreement.” The agreement arose after the trial court’s original
judgment became final and allegedly clarified various matters for the parties viz the
easement. The trial court granted that motion and “approve[d] that one certain Rule 11
Agreement filed with the Court on March 20, 2009.” It is from that order the Coales
appealed.
Issue One – Plenary Jurisdiction Expired
In their first issue, the Coales contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
approve and enforce the March 20, 2009 Rule 11 agreement. We overrule the issue.
Irrespective of whether a trial court lost its plenary jurisdiction over its judgment,
the trial court’s authority to approve a Rule 11 agreement does not depend upon
whether it has such jurisdiction. Karp v. Karp, No.14-01-902-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS
8014, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] November 7, 2002, no pet.) (not designated
for publication). It may enforce a Rule 11 agreement touching upon the suit executed
after the cause was tried and finally resolved via judgment. Id. And, since a trial court
has the continuing power to enforce its judgments after they become final, see Arndt v.
Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982); Custom Corporates v. Security Storage, Inc.,
207 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding); Comm'n
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for Lawyer Discipline v. DeNisco, 132 S.W.3d 211, 214-15 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th
Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 308 (providing that a “court shall cause its
judgments and decrees to be carried into execution; . . . .”), common sense tells us that
an attempt to have the court enforce its judgment, as was done here, is tantamount to
the continuation of an aspect of the underlying suit. i.e. the effectuation of what was
adjudicated. So, a settlement agreement, like that at bar, executed while the parties
were attempting to sway the trial court to enforce its judgment logically falls within the
scope of “any suit pending” for purposes of Rule 11.1
Furthermore, we find of record an agreement signed by all parties. That it may
have been signed via duplicate copies (i.e. one or more signatories executing multiple
copies of the same instrument) is of little import because each signature of each party
does eventually appear under the same terms to which all agreed. Pierson v. Pierson,
596 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ) (stating that a
contract may be valid though signed by the parties thereto via conforming copies).
Therefore, we overrule the contention that the agreement was unenforceable because
no one document contained all the signatures.
Issue Two – Misapplication of Rule 11
In their second issue, the Coales believe that the Rule 11 agreement was
unenforceable because they allegedly withdrew their consent to it before the trial court
ordered its enforcement. We disagree.
1
According to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11:
Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys or parties
touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the
papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.
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Rule 11 requires that the agreement be filed of record before the court may
enforce it. Alcantur v. Okla. Nat. Bank, 47 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth
2001, no pet.). If the accord is in writing, signed by the parties or their attorneys, and
filed of record, it does not matter whether a party no longer agrees to it when the trial
court is finally asked to enforce it. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex.
1995); West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. App.–Austin
2002, no pet.). This is so because the agreement becomes a contract when executed,
not when the trial court attempts to enforce it. Indeed, the trial court’s order is simply a
judgment enforcing a binding contract. Id.
Overruling all issues raised by the Coales, we affirm the trial court’s order
enforcing the Rule 11 agreement.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
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