Opinion issued April 25, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-11-00918-CV
———————————
SYLVIA RIVAS, Appellant
V.
GERALD R. JACO, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 09FD0419
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal of the trial court’s order in a suit affecting the parent-child
relationship. Appellant Sylvia Rivas brings four issues, and we affirm.
Background
The trial court determined that appellee Gerald A. Jaco is the father of
Rivas’s child and appointed Rivas as sole managing conservator and Jaco as
possessory conservator. The court found that the standard possession order applied
and ordered Jaco to pay monthly child support of $577.25.
The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, including that Jaco’s
2008 annual net income was $12,000, his 2009 gross annual income was $47,529,
and that no evidence was presented of his 2010 income. The court also found the
following: “Although Rivas testified she believes Jaco’s income is over $100,000
per year, her belief is based solely upon bolstering comments Jaco allegedly made
to her during the two months the parties dated.” The court determined that Jaco’s
annual gross income is $47,529 and his current gross monthly income is $3,906.75.
Discussion
In her first issue, Rivas contends the trial court erred “in ordering a standard
possession outside the agreement of the parties as the issue of possession was tried
to the court.” Rivas later states that “it is clear that the issue of possession and
access was not tried to the court.” Based on the two-page argument in her brief, it
appears that Rivas is complaining that the court granted a standard possession
order without evidence to support that order.
2
Family Code section 153.252 provides, “In a suit, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the standard possession order in Subchapter F: (1) provides
reasonable minimum possession of a child for a parent named as a possessory
conservator or joint managing conservator; and (2) is in the best interest of the
child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.252 (West 2008). Rivas has the burden to
rebut the presumption of the standard possession order, and makes no argument on
appeal to demonstrate that she sustained that burden at trial.
We overrule issue one.
Rivas’s second issue challenges finding of fact 34, in which the trial court
found Jaco’s annual gross income to be $47,529 and his current gross monthly
income to be $3,906.75. Four pages of Rivas’s brief point to evidence in the
record of distributions made to Jaco from a family trust, a line of credit from the
trust, stock-market expenses, and other expenses. Nowhere does Rivas make a
legal argument that this is evidence of Jaco’s income or other net resources subject
to a child-support order. Further, the trial court specifically found that “[n]either
Rivas nor the Attorney General presented any evidence of Jaco’s income for
2010.” Rivas concludes her argument by stating that “a parent’s child support
obligation is not limited to that parent’s ability to pay form [sic] current earnings;
rather it extends to his or her financial ability to pay from any and all available
sources,” citing McLane v. McLane, 263 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Tex. App.—Houston
3
[1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). But nothing in McLain suggests that the phrase “all
available sources” judicially extends the legislative definition of “net resources” on
which child-support liability is calculated. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.062
(West Supp. 2012).
Rivas does not explain why the evidence she cites constitutes “net
resources” under Family Code section 154.062, does not specifically challenge
finding 47 through 65 regarding the family trust, nor demonstrate how the trial
court committed reversible error in calculating Jaco’s net resources for the purpose
of determining child-support liability. See id. A court’s order of child support will
not be disturbed on appeal unless the complaining party can show a clear abuse of
discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); McLane, 263
S.W.3d at 362. As Rivas has made no such showing, we overrule issue two.
In her third issue, Rivas challenges finding of fact 14, in which the trial court
found the total cost of prenatal and postnatal care was $6,894.26. 1 The trial court
ordered Jaco to pay an equitable portion of these expenses in the amount of
$3,450.00. Rivas argues that the evidence supported a total cost of $12,358.55, of
which she requested fifty percent.
The trial court’s findings 13 and 14 show that the court considered the
invoices and receipts admitted into evidence and determined that they totaled
1
In her brief Rivas erroneously identifies the amount as $7,955.33.
4
$7,955.33, with a discount of $1,698.13, for a net total of $6,894.26 that Rivas was
required to pay. In her one-paragraph appellate argument, Rivas relies on her trial
testimony that the receipts and invoices total $12,358.77, as well as the single-page
summary of the receipts and invoices that accompanied them. Rivas does not
substantively challenge the trial court’s calculation of the actual receipts and any
permissible offsets.
Here the receipts and invoices themselves comprise the evidence, rather than
Rivas’s opinion statement of the total prenatal and postnatal care costs. Rivas does
not specify on appeal whether she contends that the trial court improperly
considered amounts that she attributed as her expenses or whether the court
miscalculated.
Because there is not conclusive evidence of the total cost of prenatal and
postnatal care, the trial court served as fact-finder in reviewing the receipts and
invoices and determining the proper total amount. Without the ability to conduct a
thorough analysis of all the evidence in order to challenge the sufficiency of the
trial court’s finding, we hold that Rivas has not presented this Court with adequate
briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring brief to contain clear and concise
argument for contentions made with appropriate citations to authority and record);
see, e.g., Harris Cnty. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 48 v. Mitchell, 915 S.W.2d 859, 866 &
5
n.15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (discussing failure to
adequately brief). Accordingly, we overrule issue three.
In her fourth issue, Rivas asks this Court to “reconsider” her request for
retroactive child support in light of Jaco’s alleged true income. Rivas’s
three-sentence argument, however, contains no citations to authority or the record.
Accordingly, we hold that Rivas has not presented this Court with adequate
briefing and we overrule her fourth issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see, e.g.,
Mitchell, 915 S.W.2d at 866 & n.15.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jim Sharp
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.
6