Opinion issued November 8, 2012
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-11-00354-CR
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BRYAN MATTHEW OLIVAREZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 184th Judicial District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1203764
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Bryan Matthew Olivarez pleaded guilty, without an agreed
recommendation as to punishment, to the first-degree felony offense of attempted
capital murder of a peace officer with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 15.01 (West 2011) (attempt); id. § 19.03(a)(1) (capital murder). The trial
court sentenced him to 45 years in prison. In his sole issue, Olivarez argues that a
law enforcement officer’s allegedly false testimony violated his due process right
to a fair trial and was fundamental error. We affirm the conviction of the trial
court.
Background
On February 15, 2009, Harris County Constable Deputy H. Menz stopped
Olivarez for driving his truck in reverse at a high speed. Menz approached the
truck, but Olivarez fled to his mobile home. Menz pursued, and when he arrived at
the mobile home, Olivarez opened fire with a handgun. In response, Deputy Menz
called for backup and returned fire. Approximately ten minutes later, other police
officers arrived and arrested Olivarez. After his arrest, Olivarez berated the police
officers, uttering profane personal remarks and saying that he “had every right” to
shoot at Menz because he came to his house.
Olivarez was charged with attempted capital murder of Menz, and he
pleaded guilty to the offense without an agreed recommendation on punishment.
The court ordered that a pre-sentence investigation be conducted. At the
punishment hearing, Menz testified about the crime and how it had personally
affected him. In addition to this testimony, the State offered into evidence a video
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recording from Menz’s patrol car depicting the events and Olivarez’s statements on
the night he was arrested.
On direct examination by the State, Menz testified about where the bullets
fired by Olivarez went:
STATE: Do you know where the shots that the defendant
fired at you ended up at that scene?
MENZ: Yes.
STATE: Where did they end up?
MENZ: One went to—equivalent of being right by my
head through a fence behind me; two of them were
found right by one of my—where my feet would
be, by the edge of my tire; one was found
underneath my patrol car; and the other one that
bounced off my patrol car was never found.
Olivarez did not object to this testimony. On cross-examination, he questioned
Menz about the crime scene investigation:
DEFENSE: Now, you said that Mr. Olivarez—the Crime
Scene Unit found one bullet on the fence, the back
fence; is that correct?
MENZ: That is correct.
DEFENSE: And they found—to your knowledge, was there
any trajectory analysis done by any Crime Scene
Unit at the scene, if you know?
MENZ: Not to my knowledge.
DEFENSE: Now you’ve indicated to the Judge that the
vehicle, the front part of your vehicle, you said a
bullet bounced off it? Did I misunderstand you,
what you said?
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MENZ: No. That’s correct.
DEFENSE: Now, I’ve gone through the reports. There are no
photographs or anything done of any damage to
your vehicle. Were you aware of that?
MENZ: No.
DEFENSE: Now you would agree with me that if a Crime
Scene Unit gets there—I think you also said that
there were some shots that were fired to, I guess,
the tires of your vehicle. Is that what I heard?
MENZ: By the tires, sir.
DEFENSE: By the tires. Okay. And you would agree with me
that there were no bullets that were recovered by
the Crime Scene Unit fired from the defendant, if
you know?
MENZ: I’m not aware of that, sir.
DEFENSE: You would agree with me that they discovered not
only the shell cases fired from—by Mr. Olivarez
but the shell cases fired by you; is that correct?
MENZ: That’s correct.
DEFENSE: And you are aware of that; is that correct?
MENZ: That’s correct.
Olivarez’s psychiatrist and six of his family members testified at the
punishment hearing. The psychiatrist testified that she evaluated Olivarez more
than a year after the shooting, and she concluded that he was bipolar and suffered
from anxiety. She believed that Olivarez could overcome his mental illnesses with
proper treatment and eventually reintegrate into society. Olivarez’s grandparents,
father, aunt, and two uncles testified about his good nature, improvements since he
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started taking medication, and their willingness to help him if the judge granted
him probation. They asked that the trial judge grant Olivarez probation.
Olivarez testified, admitting that he drove his truck and carried two guns
while under the influence of Xanax. He said that he did not know that a police
officer had pulled him over or pursued him until Menz arrived at his grandmother’s
house. Despite his guilty plea, he testified that he was “not guilty of attempted
capital murder.” He said that he pleaded guilty because he thought “Officer Menz
would testify maybe he thinks, you know, I was trying to kill him. I was not trying
to attempt to commit murder of a police officer.” But Olivarez conceded that he
panicked when he realized Menz was a police officer and started shooting:
Q: So, at the time that you decide to pull out your gun and
shoot, you didn’t shoot in front of your car . . . . In other
words, you pulled out and shot behind you, right?
A. Yeah. I started shooting—
Q. Behind you, right, Mr. Olivarez?
A. You could say that, more or less, behind me.
Q. And you knew the police officer was behind you, right?
A. No. No. No. No. My truck was stopped. When he
came in, I just started shooting.
Q. Not in the air, correct?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know—
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Q. Well, you know based on talking to your attorney and
reviewing the offense report and hearing the testimony,
seeing the video—
A. I know—
Q. Let me finish my question—that it was not you just
shooting in the air, right, Mr. Olivarez?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And that you were shooting towards the police officer; is
that correct?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Then who were you shooting at?
A. I wasn’t shooting at anyone.
Q. But you knew there was a police officer behind you?
A. Right. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And you knew you wanted that police officer to try and
shoot and kill you; is that correct?
A. I knew there was a police officer when he came in my
backyard, and so I started shooting so he would kill me
but not at him.
The court sentenced Olivarez to 45 years in prison, and Olivarez appealed.
Analysis
In his sole issue on appeal, Olivarez argues that Menz’s testimony was false,
and therefore he was deprived of a fair trial in violation of his right to due process.
Specifically, Olivarez argues that based upon cross-examination, “it was clear that
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Deputy Menz’s claim that bullets were recovered from the scene was mistaken or
fabricated.” Olivarez made no objection to this evidence at trial. No complaint
about the admission of this evidence has been preserved for appellate review. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (requiring that to preserve error for appellate review, the
record must show that the defendant raised his complaint by making a timely and
specific objection and obtaining a ruling from the trial court); Moore v. State, 371
S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Olivarez argues that no objection was required to preserve what he
characterizes as fundamental error. All but the most fundamental rights may be
forfeited if not insisted upon by the party to whom they belong. Saldano v. State,
70 S.W.3d 873, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Even constitutional error may be
waived by failure to object at trial. Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990).
An exception applies to two “relatively small” categories of error:
(1) violations of waivable-only rights; and (2) denials of absolute, systemic
requirements. Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);
Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 888; see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10, 111
S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (fundamental error occurs when certain constitutional
rights are violated, such as the right to counsel, the right to an impartial judge, the
right for there not to be unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race
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from the grand jury, the right to self-representation at trial, or the right to a public
trial); see also TEX. R. EVID. 103(d) (providing that courts are authorized to “tak[e]
notice of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the court”).
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be violated
when the State uses false testimony to obtain a conviction, regardless of whether it
does so knowingly or unknowingly.” Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 459
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Testimony need not be perjured to constitute a due-
process violation; rather, ‘it is sufficient that the testimony was false.’” Ex parte
Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Robbins,
360 S.W.3d at 459). “The question is whether the testimony, taken as a whole,
gives the jury a false impression.” Id. (citing Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d
470, 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). To constitute a due-process violation, the
allegedly false testimony must also be material, i.e., there must be a reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony affected the defendant’s conviction or sentence.
See Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 208.
Olivarez has not shown a fundamental error. Nothing in the record on
appeal demonstrates that Menz’s testimony was false. Menz testified that Olivarez
shot at him. Though Olivarez contends that he was not aiming at Menz, he
conceded that he knew a police officer was behind him and he fired shots in that
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direction. No matters outside the record from the punishment hearing have been
developed, preserved, or presented for our review in this direct appeal, as may be
the case in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g., Ex parte Chavez,
371 S.W.3d at 208; Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 446. Olivarez has not shown
that any testimony about recovery of bullets from the crime scene was material to a
disputed sentencing issue. He had already pleaded guilty to the offense. His
sentence was within the statutory range of punishment, and he has not shown that
Menz’s challenged testimony, which amounted to little more than his statement
that he did not know certain details about the investigation of the crime scene,
affected his sentence.
We overrule Olivarez’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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