Slip Op.
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
CÁMARA NACIONAL DE LAS
INDUSTRIAS AZUCARERA Y
ALCOHOLERA,
Plaintiff,
AMERICAN SUGAR COALITION,
Plaintiff-Intervenor, Before: Mark A. Barnett, Judge
v. Court No. 15-00123
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
IMPERIAL SUGAR COMPANY,
Defendant-Intervenor.
OPINION
[The court finds that Plaintiff failed to establish constitutional standing. Accordingly, the
court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss.]
Dated: October , 2015
Philippe M. Bruno, Irwin P. Altschuler, and Rosa S. Jeong, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, of
Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y
Alcoholera.
Karl S. von Schriltz and Courtney S. McNamara, Attorney-Advisors, Office of General
Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, of Washington, D.C., for Defendant
United States. With them on the briefs was Andrea C. Casson, Assistant General
Counsel for Litigation.
Barnett, Judge: Before the court is Defendant United States’ (“Defendant”)
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”)
Court No. 15-00123 Page 2
Rule 12(b)(1). See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), ECF No. 26. Plaintiff Cámara
Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera (“Plaintiff” or “Mexican Sugar
Chamber”) opposes the motion. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF
No. 32. 1 Plaintiff brings this action for judicial review of the United States International
Trade Commission’s (“ITC” or “Commission”) decision that domestic sugar producers
Imperial Sugar Company (“Imperial”) and AmCane Sugar LLC (“AmCane”) had standing
to request review of suspension agreements pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h),
1673c(h). See generally Compl., ECF No. 9. Defendant moves to dismiss the
Complaint, arguing that “the Court must dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction”
because Plaintiff failed to “identify or allege any injury-in-fact that a favorable decision
from this Court could redress.” MTD at 6.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Mexican Sugar Chamber is an association with a majority of its members
consisting of Mexican sugar producers. See Compl. ¶ 3. The Mexican Sugar Chamber
was a party to the ITC proceeding, which is the subject of this action. See generally
Compl. On April 17, 2014, the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”)
initiated antidumping and countervailing duty (“AD” and “CVD,” respectively)
investigations of sugar imported from Mexico. See Sugar from Mexico, 79 Fed. Reg.
22,795 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 24, 2014) (initiation of antidumping duty investigation);
1Plaintiff-Intervenor American Sugar Coalition (ECF No. 25) and Defendant-Intervenor
Imperial Sugar Company (ECF No. 17) did not submit any briefs in this motion.
Court No. 15-00123 Page 3
Sugar from Mexico, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,790 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 24, 2014) (initiation
of countervailing duty investigation).
On May 12, 2014, the ITC found a “reasonable indication” of material injury to the
sugar industry in the United States by reason of subject imports. See Sugar from
Mexico, 79 Fed. Reg. 28,550 (USITC May 16, 2014). Commerce issued an affirmative
preliminary determination in the CVD investigation on August 25, 2014. See Sugar from
Mexico, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,956 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 2, 2014) (preliminary
affirmative countervailing determination and alignment of final countervailing duty
determination with final antidumping duty determination). Commerce also issued an
affirmative preliminary determination in the AD investigation on October 24, 2014. See
Sugar from Mexico, 79 Fed. Reg. 65,189 (Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 3, 2014)
(preliminary determination of sales at less-than-fair-value and postponement of final
determination).
Shortly thereafter, on October 27, 2014, the United States, the Mexican
government, and the Mexican sugar industry initialed proposed agreements suspending
the AD and CVD investigations. See Compl. ¶ 9. Commerce then invited interested
parties to comment on the proposed agreements. See id. ¶ 10. Imperial and AmCane
entered appearances before Commerce and submitted comments. See id. The final
Suspension Agreements were signed on December 19, 2014, and Commerce
suspended the AD and CVD investigations accordingly. See id. ¶ 11. Before entering
appearances to comment on the proposed suspension agreements, Imperial and
AmCane submitted responses to the Commission’s questionnaires but did not otherwise
Court No. 15-00123 Page 4
participate “actively” in the Commission’s investigations. Id. ¶ 12. Imperial first entered
an appearance on December 9, 2014, during the final phase of the ITC’s investigations,
and AmCane first entered an appearance on January 2, 2015, during the final phase of
the ITC’s investigations and after the signing of the suspension agreements. See id.
On January 8, 2015, Imperial and AmCane petitioned the ITC to review the
suspension agreements pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h) and 1673c(h). See id. ¶ 13.
The ITC subsequently initiated the requested review. Id. The notice of institution stated
that the ITC determined that Imperial and AmCane were “interested parties who were
parties to the underlying investigations at the time the petitions were filed, and
consequently are appropriate petitioning parties.” Id. ¶ 14. The Mexican Sugar
Chamber participated in the reviews and opposed Imperial and AmCane’s petitions,
arguing that the suspension agreements eliminated the injurious effect of subject
imports and should remain in place. See Sugar from Mexico, Inv. Nos. 704-TA-1, 734-
TA-1 (Review), USITC Pub. 4523 at 5 (Apr. 2015), A.R. 148, ECF No. 31; 80 Fed. Reg.
16426 (Mar. 27, 2015).
The Mexican Sugar Chamber challenged Imperial and AmCane’s standing to
petition the ITC for the review of the suspension agreements via a letter dated January
13, 2015. See Views of the Commission (“Views”) at 4-5 n.13, A.R. 148, ECF No. 31.
Specifically, the Mexican Sugar Chamber requested that the Commission reject the
petitions for review because neither Imperial nor AmCane qualified as “an interested
party which is a party to the investigation” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h) and
1673c(h). Id. The ITC “rejected these arguments” and affirmed that Imperial and
Court No. 15-00123 Page 5
AmCane were proper petitioning parties because they were interested parties and
parties to the investigations pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h) and 1673c(h). See id.
The ITC agreed with the Mexican Sugar Chamber’s position, however, on the effect of
the suspension agreements, finding that the agreements “eliminate completely the
injurious effect of subject imports.” Sugar from Mexico, USITC Pub. 4523 at 1.
Accordingly, the suspension agreements remained in effect.
Thereafter, Imperial and AmCane independently filed summonses with this court,
challenging the ITC’s injurious effects determination regarding the suspension
agreements. See Imperial Sugar Co. v. United States, Court No. 15-00118, AmCane
Sugar LLC v. United States, Court No. 15-00122. The Mexican Sugar Chamber
intervened as of right as a defendant-intervenor in both actions. See Court No. 15-
00118, ECF Nos. 12, 13; see also Court No. 15-00122, ECF Nos. 12,13.
On April 27, 2015, the Mexican Sugar Chamber filed this action (ECF No. 1,
Summons) and filed its complaint on May 26, 2015 (ECF No. 9). The Mexican Sugar
Chamber subsequently sought the consent of Imperial, AmCane, and the ITC to
consolidate its case with Imperial Sugar Company, Court Number 15-00118, and
AmCane Sugar LLC, Court Number 15-00122, under the lead caption Imperial Sugar
Co. v. United States. See generally Mot. Consol., ECF No. 12. Imperial and AmCane
gave their consent, but the ITC opposed consolidation. See Mot. Consol. at 2. The
court consolidated Imperial and AmCane’s actions on June 19, 2015, but held in
abeyance a ruling on consolidation of this case, pending resolution of the Commission’s
motion to dismiss. See Consol. Order, ECF No. 28.
Court No. 15-00123 Page 6
The Mexican Sugar Chamber’s Complaint challenges the ITC’s determination
that Imperial and AmCane have standing to request a review of agreements suspending
AD and CVD investigations pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h) and 1673c(h).
See Compl. ¶¶ 18-19. Specifically, the Mexican Sugar Chamber contends that the
determination was unsupported by substantial evidence and otherwise not in
accordance with law because, it alleges, Imperial and AmCane were not “parties to the
investigations” and thus were not “proper petitioning parties” within the meaning of
those statutory sections. Id.
Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
CIT Rule 12(b)(1). See MTD at 1. The Commission contends that the Mexican Sugar
Chamber failed to demonstrate any injury-in-fact sufficient to establish constitutional
standing to bring this claim. See id. at 5-7. The Commission avers that, because the
Mexican Sugar Chamber prevailed on the merits of the review of the suspension
agreements, the subsidiary finding that Imperial and AmCane had standing to petition
for the review is insufficient to provide the injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing.
See id. at 7-8.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To adjudicate a case, a court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims presented. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95
(1998). “[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
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court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
514 (2006).
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See Norsk
Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When subject-
matter jurisdiction is challenged at the motion to dismiss stage, courts must presume
that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988). The
allegations, however, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The showing
must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
“The Constitution ‘limits the judicial power of the United States to the resolution of
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hein v. Freedom Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597
(2007) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). A key component of a case or
controversy is standing. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of standing is an essential
and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”). As the
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Supreme Court explained, “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations
omitted). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is “fairly traceable to
the challenged action” and that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has noted, “[a]s a
general rule, the prevailing party in a proceeding may not appeal the proceeding just
because he disagrees with some of the findings or reasoning.” Freeport Minerals Co. v.
United States, 758 F.2d 629, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The parties in Freeport disputed
what constitutes a reviewable determination by an aggrieved party. In that case,
domestic producer Freeport challenged a court affirmed remand determination because
“it wasn’t until [Commerce’s] 1983 [remand] notice [(“1983 notice”)] revoking the order
[as to Chevron] that Freeport believed it was aggrieved.” Id. at 633.
In contrast, Commerce and defendant intervenor, Chevron, countered that
Freeport’s action was untimely because Freeport should have challenged the original
determination in 1982 [(“1982 notice”)], despite the fact that the order remained in place
as to Chevron, and Freeport, therefore, was not aggrieved. See id. According to
Commerce and Chevron, the 1982 notice “constituted the final administrative review of
the antidumping finding for the period under review.” Id.
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The CIT had agreed with Commerce and Chevron and dismissed Freeport’s
case as untimely. See Freeport Minerals Co. v. United States, 7 CIT 65, 583 F. Supp.
586 (1984). On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed on the grounds that “since the end
result of the [original] notice was favorable to Freeport, there was no point in its
challenging [Commerce] then” and stated that “under the [CIT’s] remand, [Commerce]
made a new determination under section 1675 based on the same finding.” Freeport
Minerals, 758 F.2d at 634. The appellate court viewed “the publication of the 1983
[remand] notice as a publication of that determination as required under section
1675(a).” Id. The Federal Circuit further found that the other two issues in Freeport—
the doctrines of collateral estoppel and laches—“[founder] on the same rock of
confusion” as the standing issue raised by Commerce and Chevron. Id. at 636. Thus,
these doctrines did not bar Freeport from challenging the 1983 notice. See id.
Based upon Freeport and its progeny, this court has repeatedly held that a party
lacks standing to challenge a subsidiary finding in an administrative determination in
which it prevailed on the merits. See, e.g., Zhanjiang Guolian Aquatic Prods. Co. v.
United States, 38 CIT __, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (2014); Royal Thai Gov’t v. United
States, 38 CIT at __, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (2014); Rose Bearings Ltd. v. United States,
14 CIT 801, 751 F. Supp. 1545 (1990). Consequently, “[i]t is well-settled in this court
that when a [party] challenges an administrative proceeding in which it has prevailed
there is no case or controversy, and thus no jurisdiction lies.” Zhanjiang Guolian, 991 F.
Supp. 2d at 1342 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Court No. 15-00123 Page 10
Notwithstanding this court’s well-settled law, the Mexican Sugar Chamber
asserts that it may nonetheless seek recourse on the original determination and either
cannot or should not wait for any possible remand determination reversing the ITC’s
original determination. Plaintiff argues that the ITC’s determination as to Imperial and
AmCane’s standing is the type “from which legal consequences flow, having a
substantial impact on the rights of the parties,” as required for Article III standing. Pl.’s
Opp’n at 6-7 (citing Internor Trade, Inc. v. United States, 10 CIT 826, 830, 651 F. Supp.
1456, 1460 (1986)). The Mexican Sugar Chamber contends that, in Internor, the CIT
held that a plaintiff had a stake in the outcome of an action to review an affirmative less-
than-fair-value determination by Commerce, although no antidumping duty order was
issued, due to a negative injury determination by the ITC. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-7
(citation omitted). The Mexican Sugar Chamber urges that it is similar to the Internor
plaintiff in that a dumping finding by Commerce would be to its detriment if a future
investigation resulted in an adverse determination. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7 (citation
omitted). The Mexican Sugar Chamber thus analogizes its appeal of the ITC’s standing
determination as akin to “a protective cross-appeal filed by a defendant that has
prevailed on the issue of damages but has lost on liability.” Id. (citing Internor, 10 CIT at
830, 651 F. Supp. at 1460).
The court’s decision in Internor is readily distinguishable, however. First, in
Internor, the plaintiff’s right to appeal Commerce’s affirmative less-than-fair-value
determination, despite a separate negative injury determination by the ITC, was
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expressly provided for by statute. 2 See Internor, 10 CIT at 828-29, 651 F. Supp. at
1458-59 (citation omitted). There is no similar statutory right to appeal a subsidiary
standing determination by the ITC within a broader decision otherwise favorable to
plaintiff. Further, the remaining challenges to the plaintiff’s cause of action in Internor
related to whether legal consequences flowed from the agency decision, which is the
test for assessing whether a case is ripe for review. As the Internor court explained,
[t]he purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent courts through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
2 As the Internor court stated,
Section 1516a(a)(2) of Title 19, U.S.C. has provided for commencement of
actions in this Court of International Trade within 30 days of publication in
the Federal Register of antidumping-duty orders to review final affirmative
ITA determinations underlying such orders. In 1984, Congress enacted
the Trade and Tariff Act, section 623 of which was entitled “Elimination of
Interlocutory Appeals.” Subparagraph (a)(4) of this section stated:
Redesignate paragraph (3) [of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1979)]
as paragraph (4) and after paragraph (2) insert the following:
(3) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding the limitation imposed by
paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this subsection, a final affirmative
determination by the administering authority under section
705 or 735 of this Act may be contested by commencing an
action, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(2)(A), within thirty days after the date of publication in the
Federal Register of a final negative determination by the
Commission under section 705 or 735 of this Act.
10 CIT at 828-29, 651 F. Supp. at 1458-59. The court concluded that it must permit the
claim to proceed because “[t]he text of the provision at issue is not ambiguous, and this
court is not at liberty to interpret that language as if it were otherwise.” Id. (citations
omitted).
Court No. 15-00123 Page 12
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties.
10 CIT at 830, 651 F. Supp. at 1460 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
148-49 (1967) (internal quotations omitted)). Here, the parties do not dispute that the
agency decision is final, and thus there is no question as to ripeness. The pertinent
question before this court is whether the Mexican Sugar Chamber has suffered an injury
given that it prevailed on the merits of the underlying review. The court discerns no
basis in the Internor decision to depart from the significant precedent that holds a party
cannot establish injury-in-fact under such circumstances.
Plaintiff contends, however, that it suffered an injury-in-fact because of the
“uncertainty” surrounding the validity of the suspension agreements created by the
review and pending appeal. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8. Such uncertainty does not establish
injury-in-fact for standing purposes. Injury-in-fact requires a showing of “actual and
imminent” harm. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also Zhanjiang Guolian, 991 F. Supp.
2d at 1342 (“the fact that no CVD order has been issued means that Plaintiff is not
suffering any injury due to the errors it alleges the ITC committed”). The Mexican Sugar
Chamber’s Complaint fails to allege that it is currently suffering any harm and cannot
make an imminent harm allegation in good faith because the suspension agreements
remain in effect. See Royal Thai, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 1333 (dismissing case where
plaintiff “is currently not suffering any actual or imminent injury in fact”). Moreover, this
court has rejected the contention that the existence of an appeal establishes an injury-
Court No. 15-00123 Page 13
in-fact because it requires the court to adjudicate a hypothetical negative outcome. 3
The court therefore concludes that the Mexican Sugar Chamber has not established an
injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes.
Finally, the Mexican Sugar Chamber appeals to the court’s notions of fairness. It
urges that it may have no opportunity to be heard on the standing issue if the court does
not hear the issue now. It contends that it may not be able to raise the issue on
remand, should Imperial and AmCane prevail in their appeals, because the issue will be
outside the scope of the remand order. In addition, the Mexican Sugar Chamber argues
that it may be unable to raise its claim about Imperial and AmCane’s standing in the
parallel proceedings because a cross-claim will be subject to the same constitutional
standing requirements as its claim in this action. Moreover, it notes that such a cross-
claim may be untimely at this stage of the litigation.
These arguments do not change the fundamental problem that the Mexican
Sugar Chamber has failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing. Case
law is unequivocal that a plaintiff may not challenge subsidiary determinations where it
has prevailed in the overall proceeding, and, as discussed above, Freeport makes it
clear that, should the parallel proceeding result in a remand determination adverse to
3 The court will not speculate about future administrative reversals. See Zhanjiang
Guolian, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (“Speculation of an administrative reversal is
hypothetical, and hypothetical harm cannot provide jurisdiction.”); see also Rose
Bearings, 14 CIT at 802-03, 751 F. Supp. at 1546 (“Rose’s not-so-rosy scenario, that
the court may remand the case and that the ITA may reverse its finding as to spherical
plain bearings, is precisely the type of situation which calls for an advisory opinion, and
the court is barred explicitly from issuing such a ruling.”).
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the Mexican Sugar Chamber, it would then have the opportunity to obtain judicial review
of this claim, assuming that it meets any relevant procedural requirements. Because it
has suffered no injury, the Mexican Sugar Chamber lacks standing to pursue this action.
Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction, and accordingly, grants Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF
No. 26) and denies the Mexican Sugar Chamber’s motion to consolidate as moot (ECF
No. 12). Judgment will follow.
/s/ Mark A. Barnett
Mark A. Barnett, Judge
Dated: October , 2015
New York, New York