297 Ga. 132
FINAL COPY
S15A0612. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.
S15A0613. BESSENT v. THE STATE.
MELTON, Justice.
Following a joint trial, Roderick Taylor1 and Abdul Bessent2 were found
1
On February 11, 2009, Taylor was indicted for conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, conspiracy to possess cocaine, three counts of aggravated assault
against separate victims, and three counts of felony murder against separate
victims. Following a jury trial, Taylor was found guilty of all counts, except one
count of aggravated assault and one count of felony murder, both regarding the
same victim. The trial court ultimately sentenced Taylor to two consecutive life
imprisonment terms for felony murder, two concurrent twenty year terms for
aggravated assault, and merged the conspiracy charges for purposes of
sentencing. On January 24, 2012, Taylor filed a motion for new trial, later
amended on September 26, 2013 and October 28, 2013. The motion was denied
on November 5, 2014, Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case,
submitted for decision on the briefs, was docketed to the April 2015 term of this
Court.
2
On February 11, 2009, Bessent was indicted for conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, conspiracy to possess cocaine, three counts of aggravated assault
against separate victims, and three counts of felony murder against separate
victims. Following a jury trial, Bessent, like Taylor, was found guilty of all
counts, except one count of aggravated assault and one count of felony murder,
both regarding the same victim. The trial court sentenced Bessent to two
consecutive life imprisonment terms for felony murder, two concurrent twenty
year terms for aggravated assault, and merged the conspiracy charges for
purposes of sentencing. On January 31, 2012, Bessent filed a motion for new
guilty for the felony murder of Michael Key and Phyllis Frazier, the aggravated
assault of Roney Wilson and Meagan Molix, conspiracy to commit armed
robbery, and conspiracy to possess cocaine. Both defendants appeal,
contending, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient because the
testimony of a co-defendant linking them to the crimes was not sufficiently
corroborated. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Taylor’s convictions,
but we must reverse the judgment in Bessent’s case.
1. In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that Robert
Brown, a co-defendant of Bessent and Taylor, testified that, during the day on
December 21, 2008, Brown and Taylor were playing football in Jacksonville,
Florida. At some point, Taylor told Brown that Bessent “needed to get
something up in Georgia.” Brown understood this to be a trip to purchase
drugs, and Brown agreed to drive Taylor, Bessent, and Joseph Stuckey from
Florida to Kingsland, Georgia. According to Brown, Bessent used Stuckey’s
cell phone to make calls to Michael Key, the dealer, and told Brown, who was
trial, later amended on December 4, 2013. The motion was denied on October
15, 2014. Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case, submitted for
decision on the briefs, was docketed to the April 2015 term of this Court.
2
driving the vehicle, how to get to Key’s apartment. Phone records later obtained
by police proved that phone calls were made from Stuckey’s cell phone to
Key’s cell phone at 5:54 p.m., 6:16 p.m., and 6:32 p.m. A call was also made
from Key’s cell phone to Stuckey’s cell phone at 6:37 p.m., and one last call
from Stuckey’s cell phone to Key’s cell phone at 6:39 p.m., shortly before the
shootings in Key’s apartment.
At the apartment complex, again according to Brown, Bessent, Taylor,
and Stuckey, who had an AK-47 assault rifle with him, went inside. After a few
minutes, Brown, who stayed in the car, heard shots fired, and he then saw
Bessent, Stuckey, and Taylor run out of the apartment. At that point, a pickup
truck had pulled up next to Brown’s vehicle in the parking lot, and Brown
testified that, when Stuckey saw the truck, Stuckey began shooting at it.
Jermaine Banks, who was in the truck, testified that, when he and Jamie Riddle
pulled into the parking lot, Banks heard gunshots and then noticed someone
running down from Key’s apartment with a gun. Banks then saw two other
individuals run down from Key’s apartment.
Meagan Molix was roommates with Key, Frazier, and Wilson. On the
date in question, Molix and Wilson were in bed in their bedroom and heard
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voices in the hallway. At that time, Key and Frazier were in the kitchen. Molix
recounted that a short male with a gun opened the bedroom door and turned on
the light. The short male entered the room with a taller male. According to
Molix, the shorter male kept asking where “it” was, while the taller one
searched the closet and around the foot of the bed. At trial, Molix identified
Taylor as the taller guy, but, on cross-examination, she expressed considerable
uncertainty about the identification.3 The two males then left the room, and
Molix observed the taller one start searching inside the hallway closet. Molix
then heard another voice, belonging to a third person, ask Key, “Where’s it at
. . . . Where’s the drugs at,” and she heard Key say he did not have anything. At
this point, she heard shots fired and called 911.
Medical personnel and law enforcement officers were dispatched to the
apartment around 6:45 p.m. Upon arrival, they found the deceased bodies of
Key, Frazier, and Jamie Riddle, the driver of the truck who had pulled up next
to Brown in the parking lot. They also identified Banks, a passenger in Riddle’s
truck, who had been shot in the left thigh. Two different types of shell casings
3
Molix had not been able to identify any of the assailants prior to trial.
4
were discovered inside the apartment, but only Wolf brand casings suitable for
an AK-47 were found outside. One unused Wolf brand bullet was later found
in Stuckey’s home.
Brown testified that, after the shooting, he drove back to Jacksonville and
dropped Bessent, Taylor, and Stuckey off at Stuckey’s house. Shajuana Jones,
Stuckey’s girlfriend at the time of the shooting, testified that, on the evening in
question, she witnessed Stuckey being dropped off with Taylor. She also saw
Bessent move into the front seat from the back at the same time.
In addition to this evidence, certain lyrics from a rap song written by
Taylor in his jail cell were admitted. These lyrics state:
[M]E AND STUCKEY GOT THE CHOPPAS, ANY REASON
WE SPRAYIN’, AND THAT’S WHEN A LOT OF SH-T
CHANGE; AND [M]E AND LIL STUCKEY HAD ANGER
BUILT UP IN US. NOW ME, HIM, CODEFENDANTS.
There was evidence presented that “choppa” is a street term referring to an AK-
47 rifle.
2. Both Taylor and Bessent argue that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict because Brown’s testimony was never corroborated and
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there was no other evidence that they participated in the crimes. Under former
OCGA § 24-4-8, “[in] felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice,
the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient. Nevertheless, corroborating
circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony of a second
witness. . . .”4 Furthermore,
sufficient corroborating evidence may be circumstantial, it may be
slight, and it need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction
of the crime charged. It must, however, be independent of the
accomplice testimony and must directly connect the defendant with
the crime, or lead to the inference that he is guilty. Slight evidence
from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participant
in the criminal act is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to
support a verdict.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549, 551 (1) (748
SE2d 400) (2013). “[C]orroboration of only the chronology and details of the
crimes is not sufficient, and there must be some independent evidence tending
to show that the defendant himself was a participant in the crimes. West v.
State, 232 Ga. 861 (2) (209 SE2d 195) (1974).” Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898,
901 (1) (757 SE2d 102) (2014).
4
Georgia's new Evidence Code, effective for trials conducted on or after
January 1, 2013, provides that to sustain a felony conviction, the testimony of
an accomplice must be corroborated. See OCGA § 24-14-8.
6
Brown’s testimony that Taylor participated in the crimes was
corroborated both by Molix’s identification of Taylor at trial as well as the rap
lyrics Taylor composed in his jail cell which referenced the use of an AK-47
that resulted in becoming Stuckey’s co-defendant. We note that Taylor
accurately points out the equivocal nature of Molix’s identification testimony;
however, the weight to be given to this equivocal testimony was a matter for the
jury to decide. See Johnson v. State, 294 Ga. 86 (4) (750 SE2d 347) (2013).
The evidence, therefore, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor was guilty of the crimes for
which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61
LE2d 560) (1979).
Brown’s testimony that Bessent participated in the crimes was
corroborated only by Jones’s testimony that she saw Bessent in Brown’s
vehicle with Stuckey and Taylor on the evening after the murder. This
evidence, however, does nothing to indicate that Bessent actually participated
in the crimes. At best, it merely shows that Bessent was with his co-defendants
in Florida after the crime was committed. As a result, Brown’s testimony was
not sufficiently corroborated with regard to Bessent, and the evidence was
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insufficient to enable the jury to find Bessent guilty of the crimes for which he
was convicted. Id. The fact that a number of phone calls were made from
Stuckey’s phone prior to the murders does not change this result, as there is no
evidence corroborating Brown’s testimony that Bessent actually made these
phone calls using Stuckey’s phone.5 Bessent’s convictions must be reversed.
3. Taylor contends that the trial court erred by allowing the admission of
redacted rap lyrics found in his jail cell, arguing that the lyrics were irrelevant
and unduly prejudicial. We disagree. The exclusion of evidence that “is
objected to on the ground of relevancy lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse
of discretion.” O'Neal v. State, 254 Ga. 1, 3 (3) (325 SE2d 759) (1985). In this
case, the rap lyrics explicitly referenced the use of an AK-47 resulting in Taylor
becoming a co-defendant with Stuckey. These lyrics, then, were relevant to the
crimes for which Taylor was charged on their face. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting this relevant evidence. See, e.g., Castillo v. State,
5
Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 901 (1) (757 SE2d 102) (2014), relied
on by the State, is distinguishable from the case at hand. In Crawford, cell phone
records regarding the defendant’s phone were used to corroborate the testimony
of a co-defendant.
8
281 Ga. 579 (7) (a) (642 SE2d 8) (2007).
4. Given the fact that his convictions must be reversed due to the
insufficiency of the evidence, we need not reach Bessent’s remaining
enumerations of error.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S15A0612. Judgment reversed in Case
No. S15A0613. All the Justices concur.
Decided May 11, 2015.
Murder. Camden Superior Court. Before Judge Harrison.
Jimmonique R. S. Rodgers, Michael W. Tarleton, for appellant (case no.
S15A0612).
Clare Nolan, for appellant (case no. S15A0613).
Jacquelyn L. Johnson, District Attorney, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Rocky
L. Bridges, Assistant District Attorney; Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.
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