No. 3B05B0261
Filed March 13, 2006.
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D. 2006
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit
) Will County, Illinois
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No. 04-TR-121458
v. )
)
ANGELA L. MATYSIK, ) Honorable
) Kathleen Kallan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:
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The defendant, Angela Matysik, was issued a traffic citation
for approaching, overtaking and passing a school bus. See 625
ILCS 5/11--1414(a) (West 2002). After a bench trial, the
defendant was found guilty. Pursuant to statute, her driver=s
license was suspended for three months and she received a $150
fine. 625 ILCS 5/11--1414(f) (West 2002).
On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) her conduct in making
a right-hand turn from a stop sign in front of a school bus did
not violate Illinois law; (2) she did not violate the statute in
question because the school bus driver placed her in an
extraordinary and unanticipated circumstance; and (3) she was not
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTS
The record reflects that at 8:55 a.m. on November 4, 2004,
the defendant was driving to work in her automobile when she
approached the intersection of Brickstone and Rainford Streets in
Frankfort, Illinois. Rainford Street runs north and south and
Brickstone Street runs east and west. The defendant was
proceeding south on Rainford.
The defendant testified that there was a stop sign at the
corner of Brickstone and Rainford Streets. As she stopped at the
stop sign, the defendant saw a school bus to her left. The
school bus was stopped facing west on Brickstone Street.
The defendant looked at the bus driver and saw that the bus
driver was waving her arms at her. The defendant did not know
why the bus driver was waving her arms. She thought the bus
driver may have wanted to turn down the street that the defendant
was coming out of because there were vehicles parked on both
sides of the street. Therefore, she made a right turn and
proceeded west on Brickstone Street. She did not see the school
bus stop arm extended out.
Lori Dattulo testified that she was a school bus driver for
Lincoln Way Transportation in school district 210. According to
Dattulo, at around 8:55 a.m. on November 4, 2004, she approached
the corner of Brickstone and Rainford Streets. She turned on her
yellow flashers which are located at the top of the school bus,
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and she extended the flashing four-foot stop sign which is
located on the side of the bus. At that time, she was Ahitched
around the corner@ of Brickstone and Rainford Streets in a north-
westerly direction. The designated bus stop was at the corner of
Brickstone and Rainford Streets, not at a specific address.
Dattulo was waiting for two kindergarten children to board the
bus.
The first student walked across the street and boarded the
bus. The second student was in his mother=s car as his mother
was trying to get out of his car seat. As Dattulo waited for him
to board the school bus, she saw a red vehicle pass between her
bus and parked vehicles. Dattulo honked her horn, and the driver
continued around the corner. According to Dattulo, the driver of
the vehicle was putting on her mascara. Dattulo identified the
defendant as the driver of the red vehicle.
Dattulo radioed the base station about the incident. When
she returned to the station she filled out a report indicating
the type of vehicle, gender of the driver, license plate number,
and the location of the incident.
Will County sheriff=s deputy Steven Kirsch testified that on
November 10, 2004, he received a report of a school bus stop arm
violation from the Lincolnway school district. Kirsch ran the
license plate number through the Secretary of State computer and
learned that the defendant was the registered owner of the
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vehicle. Kirsch then issued a citation to the defendant.
After hearing all the evidence, the trial court believed the
defendant's claim that she did not see the school bus stop arm
extended. However, the court did find that the school bus was
stopped and that the stop arm was extended.
The trial court also found that the school bus was stopped
straddling the intersection of Brickstone and Rainford Streets.
In that location, the trial court held, vehicles were required to
stop in all directions. Therefore, the trial court found the
defendant guilty of the charged offense. See 625 ILCS
5/11--1414(a) (West 2002).
II. ANALYSIS
A. AMeeting or overtaking, from either direction@
On appeal, the defendant first argues that as a matter of
law, the phrase Ameeting or overtaking, from either direction@
contained in the statute in question is not meant to include a
vehicle making a right-hand turn from a stop in a direction away
from a school bus. See 625 ILCS 5/11--1414(a) (West 2002).
Section 11--1414 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code)
provides, in pertinent part:
AThe driver of a vehicle shall stop such
vehicle before meeting or overtaking, from
either direction, any school bus stopped for
the purpose of receiving or discharging
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pupils ***. Such stop is required before
reaching the school bus when there is in
operation on the school bus the visual
signals as specified in Sections 12-803 and
12-805 of this Code. The driver of the
vehicle shall not proceed until the school
bus resumes motion or the driver of the
vehicle is signaled by the school bus driver
to proceed or the visual signals are no
longer actuated.@ 625 ILCS 5/11--1414(a)
(West 2002).
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v.
Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 830 N.E.2d 556 (2005). Undefined terms in
a statute shall be given their ordinary and popularly understood
meaning. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d at 325, 830 N.E.2d at 560.
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed on a de novo
basis. In re Justin M.B., 204 Ill. 2d 120, 787 N.E.2d 823
(2003). The trial court=s factual determinations regarding the
defendant=s conduct will not be reversed unless they are against
the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196
Ill. 2d 425, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001).
We have reviewed section 11--1414 of the Code and find that
its terms are not ambiguous. 625 ILCS 5/11--1414 (West 2002).
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It clearly prohibits meeting or overtaking a stopped school bus
from either direction. 625 ILCS 5/11--1414(a) (West 2002). The
word Ameeting@ is defined as to come near by approach from
another direction. Webster=s Third New International Dictionary
1404 (1993). To Aovertake@ is to catch up with and pass someone
or something. Webster=s Third New International Dictionary 1611
(1993).
Here, the trial court found credible Dattulo=s testimony
that the school bus was straddling the intersection of Brickstone
and Rainford Streets. That position would require vehicles in
all directions to stop. While the school bus was stopped, the
defendant drove her vehicle into the intersection and passed the
school bus on the driver=s side between the school bus and the
curb. In doing so, the defendant met or overtook the school bus
and thereby violated the statute. 625 ILCS 5/11--1414 (West
2002).
For these reasons, we find: (1) the phrase Ameeting or
overtaking, from either direction@ contained in the statute in
question is meant to include a vehicle making a right-hand turn
from a stop in a direction away from a school bus; and (2) the
trial court=s findings that the defendant=s conduct violated the
statute are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See
625 ILCS 5/11--1414 (West 2002).
B. Extraordinary and Unanticipated Circumstance
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Next, the defendant argues that as a matter of law, the
statute in question does not require that an operator of a
vehicle be held liable when the driver of the school bus places
the operator of the vehicle in an extraordinary and unanticipated
circumstance. See 625 ILCS 5/11--1414 (West 2002).
Specifically, the defendant argues that Dattulo=s improper
behavior in blocking the intersection created an unsafe traffic
situation which precluded the application of the statute.
Again, findings of fact made by the trial court are entitled
to great deference on appeal and will not be reversed unless they
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v.
Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001). The remaining
issue of whether the defendant=s conduct is excused under the
statute if the bus driver had stopped in an inappropriate place
is a question of statutory interpretation subject to de novo
review. In re Justin M.B., 204 Ill. 2d 120, 787 N.E.2d 823
(2003).
Here, the trial court found that the school bus was stopped
in a position straddling the intersection which required traffic
coming from all directions to stop. Dattulo testified that the
designated bus stop was at a corner and not at a specific
address. There was no evidence presented to suggest that this
was an inappropriate place for the school bus to stop or that it
would have been safer for children to board the school bus in a
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different location. Since Dattulo was not stopped in an
inappropriate location, we reject the defendant=s contention that
Dattulo=s inappropriate behavior in straddling the intersection
precluded application of the statute. See 625 ILCS 5/11--1414
(West 2002).
C. Reasonable Doubt
Finally, the defendant argues that she was not proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, she contends:
(1) she came to a complete stop; and (2) she did not pass the
school bus in Aeither@ direction, as required by the statute in
question (625 ILCS 5/11--1414 (West 2002)).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d
267 (1985).
Determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence are responsibilities of the trier
of fact. People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 535 N.E.2d 889
(1989). A reversal is warranted only if the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that it leaves a reasonable doubt
regarding the defendant=s guilt. People v. Flowers, 306 Ill.
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App. 3d 259, 714 N.E.2d 577 (1999).
Section 11--1414 of the Code requires the driver of a
vehicle to stop before meeting or overtaking from either
direction a school bus that is stopped at any location for the
purpose of receiving or discharging pupils. 625 ILCS 5/11--
1414(a) (West 2002). The driver of the vehicle must remain
stopped until the school bus resumes motion or the driver of the
vehicle is signaled by the school bus driver to proceed or the
visual signals are no longer activated. 625 ILCS 5/11--1414(a)
(West 2002).
The defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
At trial, Dattulo testified that she saw the defendant proceed
into the intersection without stopping, pass the school bus on
the driver=s side, travel between the school bus and the curb,
and turn away from the bus. According to Dattulo, the defendant
was putting on mascara while she engaged in these maneuvers.
Dattulo did not give defendant permission to proceed through the intersection.
Even the defendant admitted that she drove into the intersection and turned
away from the school bus. However, she claimed that she only did so after she stopped
at the stop sign and Dattulo waved her through the intersection.
The trial court heard the testimony of both Dattulo and the defendant. It is clear
from the record that the trial court found Dattulo=s testimony to be more credible. We
are not convinced that such a finding is in error. The evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, showed that the defendant passed the stopped school bus
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in violation of the statute. See 625 ILCS 5/11--1414(a) (West 2002).
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McDADE and LYTTON, J.J., concur.
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