NO. 5-06-0619
NOTICE
Decision filed 09/28/07. The text of
IN THE
this decision may be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
Peti tion for Rehearing or th e
disposition of the same.
FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Crawford County.
)
v. ) No. 05-CF-113
)
JAMES A. BURTRON, ) Honorable
) David M. Correll,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
_________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SPOM ER delivered the opinion of the court:
On February 21, 1978, when asked to consider the deference a reviewing court should
give to a trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial, the United States Supreme Court held,
inter alia, "Unless unscrupulous defense counsel are to be allowed an unfair advantage, the
trial judge must have the power to declare a mistrial in appropriate cases." Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717, 733, 98 S. Ct. 824, 834 (1978).
The defendant in the present case, James A. Burtron, appeals an order of the circuit
court of Crawford County denying his motion to dismiss the criminal charges against him
on double jeopardy grounds, following the trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial
during the defendant's trial on charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-
14(c) (West 2004)). On appeal, the defendant questions the proper standard of review for
a trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, and he contends that because principles
of double jeopardy prevent his retrial following the mistrial, the trial judge erred in denying
his motion to dismiss the criminal charges against him. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
1
For purposes of deciding the issues raised by the defendant on appeal, the
circumstances underlying the criminal charges against the defendant are far less important
than are the events that occurred at the trial. Accordingly, we shall touch only briefly on the
alleged criminal acts. The defendant, who was born on October 2, 1936, was charged by
information with one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(c)
(West 2004)), and he was alleged to have "committed an act of sexual penetration by placing
his finger in the vagina of C.B., a severely and profoundly retarded person at the time said
act was committed." The alleged victim in the case, C.B., was 15 years old at the time of the
alleged July 18, 2005, incident, and she suffered from a medical condition known as
intractable epilepsy. As a result of severe seizures caused by her condition and brain damage
resulting therefrom, on July 18, 2005, C.B. had a developmental age of approximately six
years, three months. The defendant and C.B. lived on the same street in Robinson, several
houses apart, and the sexual assault allegedly occurred when C.B. happened upon the
defendant's house while searching the neighborhood for her lost cat.
The defendant's case came to trial on July 3, 2006. The defendant was represented
at the trial by retained counsel, Roscoe D. Cunningham (hereinafter defense counsel). An
examination of defense counsel's behavior at the trial is necessary to address the issues raised
by the defendant on appeal. A complete review of the record on appeal provided to us by
the defendant clearly shows that defense counsel engaged in a pattern of behavior which
resulted in numerous sidebars and admonitions from the trial judge about defense counsel's
conduct. Defense counsel was combative throughout the pretrial proceedings, as well as
during the trial. From repeatedly asking irrelevant questions to becoming argumentative with
a potential juror and many times with the trial judge, defense counsel's actions crossed the
line from zealous representation to contemptuousness of the court and the rule of law,
leading the trial judge to state, even before opening statements, on the record but outside the
2
presence of the jury, the following to defense counsel:
"You were trying to use a motion that was to determine whether or not the child was
called to testify, whether the child was sufficiently at risk in having to testify, as to
allow for hearsay. You were trying to use that as a method for getting something into
the record that was totally unrelated. Yes, it has been like hand-to-hand combat and
mud wrestling. I do become out of sorts because you are continuously trying to push
the envelope. You know what the rules are and everything is like it becomes a shock.
I have dreaded this, but it's where we are."
Further illustration of defense counsel's testing of the limits of propriety can be seen
in his cross-examination of two law enforcement officers. Some of the questions he asked
were technically inappropriate, lacking a proper foundation, while others were completely
irrelevant and, frankly, downright bizarre. This questioning further exacerbated the situation,
leading the trial judge to admonish defense counsel for interrupting opposing counsel, and
after numerous nonsensical objections from defense counsel, it led the trial judge to respond
that whatever defense counsel's purported objection was, it was overruled. The record
clearly demonstrates the tense and charged atmosphere that had been building throughout the
trial. When the State's Attorney concluded his cross-examination of the defendant, the judge
inquired of defense counsel whether he wished to engage in redirect examination. Defense
counsel then stated, in the presence of the jury, the following:
"Well, Your Honor, this is such a[–]such a serious case, I'm going to make an
unusual suggestion to the [c]ourt and I hope it's not–that it's permitted. The
[d]efendant would be w illing to submit to a polygraph exam by the Illinois State
Police."
Defense counsel had succeeded in pushing the envelope off the table. The State's Attorney
began to say something, but he was interrupted by the judge, who ordered the attorneys into
3
his chambers. Although no transcript exists for the proceedings in the judge's chambers,
affidavits from the State's Attorney and defense counsel indicate the following: (1) the entire
amount of time spent in chambers was less than two minutes, (2) the trial judge in chambers
commented that he had never in his career had a defense attorney deliberately destroy a trial
by doing something that he knew to be inappropriate, (3) defense counsel asked that the trial
be allowed to continue, (4) the trial judge asked defense counsel how the problem that
defense counsel had created could be fixed, (5) defense counsel did not offer any suggestions
for correcting the problem he had caused, (6) the trial judge stated that any corrective
instruction he could give would have to be so prejudicial to the defendant that the instruction
would itself create a mistrial, and (7) the State's Attorney stated that he did not believe the
State could ask for or prevent a mistrial from being declared. Following the discussion in
chambers, the judge returned to the bench and made the following announcement to the jury:
"Ladies and gentleman, something just took place that I have never had take
place before. It has created a mistrial. You are discharged from your duties at this
time. Thank you very much for your attendance through this trial. You have my most
sincere apology."
The jury was then excused, and the judge stated for the record that he would reserve a ruling
on the "contempt element" of the case until the parties submitted legal authority on that issue.
Defense counsel subsequently paid $1,505.94 to the court as reimbursement for the
jurors' fees, postage, meals, and bailiff expenses related to the trial. Defense counsel also
stated, in a subsequent affidavit, "I did not make the statements I did concerning a polygraph
with the intent to cause a mistrial[,] nor is it my desire to create a mistrial."
Defense counsel subsequently withdrew from the case, and the defendant filed, inter
alia, a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that double jeopardy
prevented his retrial on those charges. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on
4
November 27, 2006. At the hearing, the defendant's replacement counsel suggested that the
trial judge had acted prematurely and should have crafted a curative instruction rather than
declaring a mistrial, particularly where, as happened in the case at bar, the defendant wanted
the trial to continue. In response, the trial judge stated, on the record, the following:
"Well, there is no question that defense counsel wished to have the trial
continue. Defense counsel wished to have the trial continue because he already had
the benefit of his misconduct in front of the jury. The intentional misconduct of the
defense counsel was found at that time to have been so prejudicial that it, in fact,
created the manifest necessity for the mistrial. Defense counsel was asked in
chambers if he had any instruction that he would suggest that might be appropriate
and would be able to cure the prejudice that had been created by his intentional act.
He was unable at that time to supply any[,] and I made the determination that if I were
to so instruct the jury in such a fashion that it would cure the prejudicial impact of
what he had done, that [sic] that instruction would be so inflammatory that it, in and
of itself, would deny the [d]efendant a fair trial. So with this situation having been
clearly created by defense counsel's blatant conduct, that then created the manifest
necessity for the mistrial."
The motion to dismiss was denied, and this appeal followed.
The first issue raised by the defendant on appeal involves the proper standard of
review for a trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. The defendant proposes that
this court apply a de novo standard of review "as is done in cases which involve a motion to
suppress," because in the case at bar "there is no dispute regarding the events which
transpired at the time of trial." The defendant provides no legal authority, and no persuasive
argument, in support of his proposition, and we are aware of no cases that support it.
Although the defendant has requested, and has been granted, permission to cite as additional
5
authority the recent Second District case of People v. Longoria, No. 2-06-0353, slip op. at
5 (July 26, 2007), in Longoria the only reason a de novo standard of review was employed
was that the issue before the reviewing court was whether the trial court had applied the
correct legal standard, which is clearly an issue of law. In the case at bar, there is no doubt
that the trial court applied the correct legal standard, which, as explained in detail below, is
whether there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. At the hearing on the motion to
dismiss held on November 27, 2006, discussed above, the judge expressly stated that in this
case defense counsel's "blatant conduct *** created the manifest necessity for the mistrial,"
proof positive that the judge knew and applied the correct legal standard in this case.
Accordingly, we do not believe that Longoria is at all applicable to the case at bar, and we
are unpersuaded by the defendant's attempts to invoke a de novo standard of review for this
case.
The State, on the other hand, points to a long and uncontradicted line of cases holding
that the proper standard of review in a case such as this is the abuse-of-discretion standard.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717, 733, 98 S. Ct. 824,
834-35 (1978) (a trial judge's declaration of a mistrial "is entitled to great deference");
People v. Friason, 22 Ill. 2d 563, 566 (1961) (the reviewing court "must consider whether
the trial judge abused his discretion"); People v. Barfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d 578, 584 (1997)
(the discretion accorded to a trial judge "is not only broad but must be applied flexibly to the
unique situation of each individual case"); People v. Largent, 337 Ill. App. 3d 835, 839
(2003) (expressly rejecting the contention that the declaration of a mistrial should be
reviewed de novo). Although throughout this appeal–in his opening brief, in his reply brief,
and at oral argument–in an effort to strengthen his case, the defendant has framed his
arguments in language suggestive of de novo review, we decline to disturb well-reasoned and
well-settled law in the absence of a compelling reason to do so, and we are not persuaded
6
that a compelling reason to do so exists in this case. Accordingly, we shall consider the
defendant's second argument on appeal–that because principles of double jeopardy prevent
his retrial following the mistrial, the trial judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
charges against him–under the abuse-of-discretion standard that has governed claims such
as his for more than 40 years in Illinois.
We begin by stating the legal precepts pertinent to the defendant's position. It is well-
settled that the government "may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense."
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717, 726, 98 S. Ct. 824, 829 (1978).
Jeopardy attaches before a judgment becomes final, so the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy extends to the defendant's right, if the defendant so desires, to have his or
her trial completed before a particular tribunal. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 503, 54 L. Ed. 2d at
727, 98 S. Ct. at 829. This is true because a second trial, before a different tribunal,
inevitably "increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused, prolongs the period
in which [the accused] is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may
even enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted." Arizona, 434 U.S. at
503-04, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 727, 98 S. Ct. at 829. Although a retrial is automatically barred
when a trial ends with an acquittal or a conviction, the same is not true when a criminal
proceeding ends before a final resolution of the merits of the charges against the accused is
reached. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 728, 98 S. Ct. at 830. A variety of
circumstances may make it necessary to discharge a jury prior to the conclusion of a trial,
and because those circumstances do not always result in unfairness to the accused, the
accused's "valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes
subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to
present [the State's] evidence to an impartial jury." Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505, 54 L. Ed. 2d
at 728, 98 S. Ct. at 830. Nevertheless, in light of the importance of the accused's right, and
7
because that right is frustrated, to some extent, by any mistrial, the State shoulders the
"heavy" burden of justifying the mistrial and must demonstrate a manifest necessity for any
mistrial that has been declared over the objection of the accused. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505,
54 L. Ed. 2d at 728, 98 S. Ct. at 830.
The question then becomes, of course, What constitutes a manifest necessity?
According to the United States Supreme Court, the word necessity must not be interpreted
literally; rather, a "high degree" of necessity is required before a mistrial may be deemed
appropriate. Arizona, 434 U.S. at 506, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 729, 98 S. Ct. at 831. Our colleagues
in the Fourth District have held that the requirement of a manifest necessity "stands as a
command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's right to have a particular tribunal
decide his fate until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that
the ends of public justice would not be served by con tinuing the proceedings." People v.
Street, 316 Ill. App. 3d 205, 211 (2000). The Street court also noted that a reviewing court
must consider whether a manifest necessity warranted a mistrial "based on the facts of each
individual case," and it laid out a noncomprehensive list of factors for reviewing courts to
consider. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 211-12. The Street court ultimately determined that, in the case
before it, the trial judge's declaration of a mistrial over the objection of the defendant was
not an exercise of sound discretion where the record did not show "that the trial judge
considered the State's suggestion of a curative instruction, or any other alternative," before
declaring the mistrial and did not show "that the judge articulated any reasons for rejecting"
alternative measures. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 213.
In another opinion from our colleagues in the Fourth District, People v. Largent, 337
Ill. App. 3d 835, 843 (2003), the court concluded that the trial court's sua sponte declaration
of a mistrial, over the defendant's objection, because of an emergency in one juror's family
was not an exercise of sound discretion because the presence of that juror at the bedside of
8
the family member who had experienced the emergency–a broken leg–"might have been
comforting, but it was not highly necessary." Our colleagues in the Second District recently
weighed in on the issue of manifest necessity as well. In People v. Dahlberg, 355 Ill. App.
3d 308 (2005), they considered, inter alia, the relationship between the exercise of sound
discretion and hasty decisionmaking. The Dahlberg court stated that the declaration of a
mistrial could not be condoned where the actions of the trial court were irrational or
irresponsible, and the court expressly held that the amount of time the court devoted to the
decision to declare a mistrial was "of major importance." 355 Ill. App. 3d at 315. That is
because a "hasty decision, reflected by a rapid sequence of events culminating in a
declaration of a mistrial, tends to indicate insufficient concern for the defendant's
constitutional rights." Dahlberg, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 315. The Dahlberg court ultimately
held that in the case before it, the trial judge "acted hastily in response to the State's request
for a mistrial, failed to consider any alternatives before declaring a mistrial, and took little
time for reflection." 355 Ill. App. 3d at 316.
As explained above, the proper standard of review in a case such as this is the abuse-
of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514, 54 L. Ed. 2d
717, 733, 98 S. Ct. 824, 834-35 (1978) (a trial judge's declaration of a mistrial "is entitled
to great deference"); People v. Friason, 22 Ill. 2d 563, 566 (1961) (the reviewing court "must
consider whether the trial judge abused his discretion"); People v. Barfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d
578, 584 (1997) (the discretion accorded to a trial judge "is not only broad but must be
applied flexibly to the unique situation of each individual case"); People v. Largent, 337 Ill.
App. 3d 835, 839 (2003) (expressly rejecting the contention that the declaration of a mistrial
should be reviewed de novo). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision made by the
trial judge is " 'clearly against logic.' " Largent, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 839 (quoting Bodine
Electric of Champaign v. City of Champaign, 305 Ill. App. 3d 431, 435 (1999)). A
9
reviewing court does not consider whether it would have made the same decision if placed
in the position of the trial court; rather, a reviewing court considers whether the decision of
the trial court was arbitrary, made without conscientious judgment, or otherwise made in
such a way that, " 'in view of all of the circumstances, the [trial] court exceeded the bounds
of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.' "
Largent, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 839-40 (quoting Bodine Electric of Champaign, 305 Ill. App.
3d at 435).
It is with this standard of review firmly in mind, and against the backdrop of both the
admonition of the United States Supreme Court that "[u]nless unscrupulous defense counsel
are to be allowed an unfair advantage, the trial judge must have the power to declare a
mistrial in appropriate cases" (Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717,
733, 98 S. Ct. 824, 834 (1978)) and the admonition of our colleagues on the appellate court
that a "hasty decision, reflected by a rapid sequence of events culminating in a declaration
of a mistrial, tends to indicate insufficient concern for the defendant's constitutional rights"
(People v. Dahlberg, 355 Ill. App. 3d 308, 315 (2005)), that we consider the case before us
today.
At first blush, it might appear in this case that the decision made by the trial court was
a hasty one, devoid of reflection and the contemplation of alternatives, particularly given the
uncontradicted assertion that the time the parties spent in chambers with the judge before he
stated that he was going to declare a mistrial did not exceed two minutes. Indeed, both the
defendant and our dissenting colleague contend that the hasty-decision analysis found in
Dahlberg is directly applicable to this case and should control its outcome. We do not agree.
We begin by noting that the defendant's repeated assertion that the trial judge in this case
took less than two minutes to reach his decision to sua sponte declare a mistrial over the
objection of the defendant is unduly speculative and does not completely and accurately
10
reflect what happened in this case. As the recitation of some of the facts at the beginning of
this opinion amply demonstrates, defense counsel's statement that the defendant would
willingly submit to a polygraph examination was the last in a series of blatant indiscretions
that included, inter alia, the following: (1) repeated attempts to abuse the rules of trial
procedure, even after being warned not to do so, (2) excessive and repeated argument with
the judge, even after being warned not to do so, and (3) repeated improper commentary
before the jury regarding objections by, and other conduct of, the State's Attorney, again after
being warned not to do so. Whether these and defense counsel's other indiscretions,
described above, were the result of mere incompetence, or of the variety of unscrupulous
intransigence and obstructionism against which the Arizona Court chastens, or of a
combination thereof is not clear from the dry paper record presented to us for review; what
is clear from the record is that all of these indiscretions were committed in the presence of
the trial judge. We have thoroughly reviewed the entire record presented to us, and it is clear
from that record that until defense counsel's outburst about the polygraph, the trial judge
dealt with defense counsel's many indiscretions in a patient, calm, and professional manner.
The defendant's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, we do not believe that the record
supports the conclusion that the judge in this case conceived and executed the remedy of a
mistrial in less than two minutes. Rather, the record, taken as a whole, suggests that a
cognizance of defense counsel's many indiscretions and their potential impact on the jury
contributed to the judge's ultimate decision to declare a mistrial, a decision that might well
have been carefully weighed, as a potential necessity if matters grew worse, for a number of
hours prior to defense counsel's outburst about the polygraph. Support for this conclusion
is also found in the judge's statement to defense counsel on the record, a full day before
declaring the mistrial, that interacting with defense counsel had been "like hand-to-hand
combat and mud wrestling," because defense counsel was "continuously trying to push the
11
envelope" when defense counsel knew "what the rules [were]," and in his admonition to
defense counsel that the province of a motion in limine was "to avoid something being said
that creates a mistrial." Accordingly, we find Dahlberg to be readily distinguishable from
the case at bar.
We reiterate as well that in cases such as this one it is not the province of the
reviewing court to consider whether it would have made the same decision if placed in the
position of the trial court; rather, we must only consider whether the decision of the trial
court was arbitrary, made without conscientious judgment, or otherwise made in such a way
that, " 'in view of all of the circumstances, the [trial] court exceeded the bounds of reason and
ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.' " People v.
Largent, 337 Ill. App. 3d 835, 839-40 (2003) (quoting Bodine Electric of Champaign v. City
of Champaign, 305 Ill. App. 3d 431, 435 (1999)). Here, our review of the record does not
convince us that the trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial over the defendant's
objection was clearly against logic, arbitrary, made without conscientious judgment,
excessive of the bounds of reason, or ignorant of recognized principles of law. The mistrial
in this case was declared late in the proceedings, after the judge had ample time to assess the
demeanor and motivations of the parties involved, including defense counsel, throughout the
trial. Given defense counsel's repeated misconduct, the judge reasonably could have
concluded that a curative instruction (such as the instruction given by the trial court and
characterized as "appropriate" by the reviewing court in People v. Finley, 312 Ill. App. 3d
892, 895-97 (2000)) would not have been sufficient to overcome the prejudice injected into
the proceedings by defense counsel. Likewise, although defense counsel later averred that
he "did not make the statements [he] did concerning a polygraph with the intent to cause a
mistrial[,] nor [was] it [his] desire to create a mistrial," strikingly absent from defense
counsel's affidavit is any assertion that he did not know it was improper to make his
12
statements or that he did not intentionally inject error into the trial for reasons other than to
create a mistrial (e.g., to improperly bolster the credibility of his client before the jury), and
the trial judge reasonably could have concluded, after observing defense counsel throughout
the trial, that defense counsel's outburst about the polygraph was a knowing and intentional
escalation of his previous misconduct and that defense counsel's misconduct would have
continued at the same pace, or perhaps grown worse, even after a curative instruction was
given.
Under these circumstances, the judge's conclusion that a curative instruction would
be to no avail in this case cannot be said to be clearly against logic, arbitrary, made without
conscientious judgment, excessive of the bounds of reason, or ignorant of recognized
principles of law. To the contrary, the judge stated for the record that he had considered and
rejected a curative instruction, and he explained why. He also stated that he believed that
defense counsel wanted the trial to continue because defense counsel "already had the benefit
of his misconduct in front of the jury." His decision and reasoning are strongly supported
by the record, and we decline to disturb his ruling.
To hold–in a case in which we have expressly found that the trial judge reasonably
could conclude that intentional misconduct by counsel had injected serious error into the
trial–that the judge nevertheless abused his discretion in concluding, after considering and
rejecting a curative instruction, that a manifest necessity for a mistrial existed effectively
would be to both undermine the abuse-of-discretion standard of review we have reiterated
while purporting to uphold it and, if the trial court was correct in its conclusion, reward the
sort of unscrupulous conduct by counsel the Arizona decision declares must not be tolerated.
Affording the trial judge's decision the deference to which it is entitled, we conclude the
judge did not abuse his discretion in finding a manifest necessity for the declaration of a
mistrial in this case. Because principles of double jeopardy did not and do not bar the retrial
13
of the defendant under these circumstances, the judge did not err in denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss the charges against him.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Crawford County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
DONOVAN, J., concurs.
JUSTICE CHAPMAN, dissenting:
The majority implies that the fact that the judge was fed up with counsel's antics–"the
last in a series of blatant indiscretions" (slip op. at 11)–justifies the court's sua sponte
decision to declare a mistrial. While that may account for the court's hasty reaction, it was
defense counsel's comment about the polygraph that required the judge's careful
consideration. No amount of frustration allows the court to forgo the deliberate process
imperative in safeguarding the defendant's constitutional rights against double jeopardy.
Two minutes is two minutes. A judge cannot undertake the rigorous analysis required and
arrive at a determination that manifest necessity warranted a mistrial in that extraordinarily
short span of time. Despite the judge's pronouncements and the majority's contentions to the
contrary, I do not believe that the court undertook any serious reflection or consideration of
alternatives to preserve the trial's fairness. Based on the facts in this case, the court did not
demonstrate a manifest necessity for a mistrial. I believe that both Street and Dahlberg
support this conclusion. People v. Street, 316 Ill. App. 3d 205 (2000); People v. Dahlberg,
355 Ill. App. 3d 308 (2005). For those reasons, I believe that the judge's decision declaring
a mistrial was clearly against logic and therefore an abuse of discretion. See People v.
14
Largent, 337 Ill. App. 3d 835, 839 (2003). I would rule that double jeopardy barred a retrial
of the defendant.
15
NO. 5-06-0619
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Crawford County.
)
v. ) No. 05-CF-113
)
JAMES A. BURTRON, ) Honorable
) David M. Correll,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: September 28, 2007
___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, J.
Honorable James K. Donovan, J.,
Concurs
Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,
Dissents
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Fred Johnson, Heller, Holmes & Associates, P.C., 1101 Broadway, P.O. Box 889,
for Mattoon, IL 61938-0889
Appellant
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Kendra S. Peterson,
for Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois
Appellee Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864; Hon. Thomas R.
Wiseman, State's Attorney, Crawford County Courthouse, 105 Douglas Street,
Robinson, IL 62454
___________________________________________________________________________________