NO. 4-04-0043 Filed: 9/7/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Livingston County
MICHAEL J. SINGLETON, ) No. 03CF125
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Harold J. Frobish,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the
court:
In November 2003, a jury found defendant, Michael J. Singleton, guilty of
burglary, theft over $300, animal torture, and aggravated cruelty to a companion animal.
In January 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent, five-year prison
terms on the offenses of burglary and animal torture.
On appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to inform the
jury that a codefendant had pleaded guilty, and (3) statements made by two of the
State's witnesses were not admissible as impeachment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2003, a grand jury indicted defendant on three counts of burglary
(count I, III, and IV) and single counts of arson (count II), theft over $300 (count V),
animal torture (count VI), and aggravated cruelty to a companion animal (count VII).
Count III alleged defendant committed the offense of burglary on October 29, 2002,
when, without authority, he knowingly entered Scotty's Place, with the intent to commit a
theft therein. Count IV alleged defendant committed the offense of burglary on October
31, 2002, when, without authority, he knowingly entered Buck's Garage with the intent
to commit a theft therein. Count V alleged defendant committed the offense of theft
over $300 when he knowingly exerted unauthorized control over property of James
Sewell with the intent to permanently deprive Sewell of the benefit of the property.
Count VI alleged defendant committed the offense of animal torture in that defendant,
without legal justification, tortured a dog by beating it about the head with a hammer or
mallet so as to inflict extreme physical pain and motivated by the intent to increase or
prolong the dog's pain. Defendant pleaded not guilty. The trial court severed counts I
and II and proceeded to trial on counts III through VII.
In November 2003, defendant's jury trial commenced. Chris Gordon
testified he and defendant broke into Scotty's Place in Pontiac on October 29, 2002, and
then fled when the burglar alarm sounded. On October 31, 2002, Gordon and
defendant entered Buck's Garage and found "power tools for working on cars." Gordon
stated they put the tools in a box and put them in his car. Gordon stated a black or
brown dog was in the garage walking around and barking. The dog "barked and
growled a bit, at first," and after awhile it acted like it wanted to be petted. Gordon
testified defendant hit the dog with a sledgehammer. He then "hung it from a chain."
Gordon testified he left his car out in the country a few days later, walked to a
farmhouse with defendant, and took a van. Gordon's car was later recovered and he
was questioned about the tools.
Gordon testified he remembered being charged for the burglary of Buck's
Garage but not Scotty's Place. He "vaguely" remembered talking to police officers in a
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series of interviews about the burglaries. He also remembered court hearings concern-
ing whether statements he made could be used against him. Defense counsel
objected, stating the questioning was irrelevant and immaterial. The trial court
overruled the objection, finding defense counsel invited the line of questioning. Gordon
pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges arising out of taking the van. He also received
immunity from further prosecution as to the events at Buck's Garage and Scotty's Place
as long as he testified truthfully in court.
On cross-examination, Gordon testified he went to retrieve his dad's car in
the country but it was no longer there. He then called the police to report it stolen. The
tools taken from Buck's Garage were in the back of the car. On redirect examination,
Gordon testified he told the police about his involvement in the crimes and that of
defendant as well.
John Crain testified he is defendant's brother. Defendant spent some
nights at Crain's house in Bradley during October and November 2002. During that
time, defendant mentioned being wanted in Pontiac and the police questioning him
about a dog. Defendant mentioned he had been drinking and his friends beat a dog to
stay quiet sometime in June "when we was [sic] out at Rock Creek swimming." The
following exchange then occurred:
"Q. Did you tell some U.S. Marshals back on
February 6 of 2003 that I asked, he said he was drinking and
the dog wouldn't shut up, so his friends beat it to quiet it?
A. No. I told them a way bigger story than that, but
they told me only to write that.
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Q. Did you write that?
A. Yes. I had to. They said they were going to put
me in jail and I was going to lose my job. I would be in
federal prison if I didn't."
The State asked Crain to identify People's exhibit No. 16 as the written statement he
gave to the marshals on February 6, 2003.
On cross-examination, Crain acknowledged the statement and explained
what defendant had told him about an incident with a dog.
"[Defendant] told me him and his friends go out drinking out
by a farm, out by a cornfield, they kick their lights off on their
car and sit there and they drink. And this dog from one of
the farmhouses kept coming out by the cornfield, and
barking and everything. So one of his buddies had chased
the dog off you know, kicking it, throwing a beer can at it or
whatever to get it to run back to the house so the people
wouldn't come out and catch them out there. Because they
would have been busted for drinking underage."
The trial court ruled the State was precluded from using Crain's prior statement as
substantive evidence but was allowed to impeach him with the statement as to its
reference to defendant having told Crain that his friends had previously beaten a dog.
Matt Mason testified John Crain called him in November 2002 asking for a
ride because his car had run out of gas. Mason then picked up Crain and defendant at
a hotel in Bradley. A discussion ensued, and defendant mentioned "they were trying to
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put him in jail for killing a dog." Defendant denied it. The following exchange occurred:
"Q. Do you remember telling [an officer] that
[defendant] told you that he had killed the dog, and you
telling [defendant] that was stupid?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember--
A. I never told her that he told me that he did it.
Q. What did you tell her?
A. I told her that him and John told me that he was in
trouble, that the cops were trying to put him in jail for it.
Q. Do you remember the business about that was
stupid? Do you remember saying that?
A. For all the trouble he was in, I told him that he was
stupid. And he needed to stay out of trouble.
***
Q. Okay. And you never said to the officers, to the
agent that day, that he killed a dog, that [defendant] said he
killed the dog by slamming a hammer through the dog's
head?
A. No. That is a lie.
Q. Never said that when he told you that he killed the
dog, you said that was stupid?
A. I never said that. I said he was stupid for being in
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trouble, and he needed to stay out of trouble."
Pontiac police commander Roger Newsome testified he interviewed Matt
Mason in February 2003. During the interview, Mason stated defendant told him he had
killed a dog by slamming a hammer through its head. In November 2002, Newsome
conducted a search of defendant's apartment and seized two T-shirts and a gray,
hooded sweatshirt.
Livingston County deputy sheriff Marie Margherio testified that on October
31, 2002, "a distraught male, an elderly gentleman that was crying and shaking very
badly," approached her vehicle and stated his business had been broken into and his
dog had been killed. The elderly gentleman, James Sewell, took her to Buck's Garage
and showed her his dog Sadie suspended "from a log chain that was hanging up over
the rafters." Margherio noticed a hammer and a "large area of red fluid" on the floor.
James Sewell testified he runs a car-repair business out of Buck's Garage.
In the evening of October 30, 2002, he returned to the garage to feed his dog Sadie.
The next morning, Sadie did not meet him at the door. Sewell turned on the lights and
found Sadie hanging by a chain in the back room.
Sergeant Brian McCabe testified a car belonging to Chris Gordon's family
was recovered by police. Gordon's father came to pick up the car, opened the trunk,
and found a large number of tools, some that did not belong to him. He left those tools.
Police officers ultimately determined the tools had been stolen from Buck's Garage.
Officers then interviewed Chris Gordon about the tools.
Jennifer Ayers testified she is the Livingston County animal-control
warden. She removed Sadie from the chains, placed her in a bag, and took her to the
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warden's facility. She then took hair and blood samples from the dog. She said Sadie
was a border collie mix and had broken ribs and indentation markings that led her to
conclude the dog "obviously had been beaten."
Glenn Schubert testified he worked as a forensic scientist with the Illinois
State Police and specialized in the examination of human and animal hairs. He found a
dog hair suitable for comparison taken from defendant's gray sweatshirt and compared
it to the hair standard taken from Sadie. He concluded the hairs were "microscopically
consistent" and could have originated from the same dog. Schubert stated he would put
more weight on his conclusion because the hairs came from a mixed-breed animal,
which has "more unique" characteristics than a purebred animal.
After the State rested its case, the trial court, over defendant's objection,
read to the jury a summary prepared by the State of Chris Gordon's criminal cases.
The trial court in Gordon's case granted his motion to suppress statements, and Gordon
pleaded guilty to the offenses of criminal trespass to a vehicle (the stolen van) and theft
(tools from Buck's Garage). The court sentenced Gordon to 158 days in jail on both
offenses with 158 days' credit for time served. Gordon received immunity from further
prosecution and was required to testify truthfully in the prosecution of defendant.
Joshua Crain testified he is defendant's half-brother as they share the
same mother. Crain stated he saw defendant at Crain's apartment around 5 p.m. in the
evening of October 30, 2002. Defendant stayed with him until 7:30 a.m. on October 31,
2002, when he called for a ride home.
Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied breaking into Scotty's
Place and Buck's Garage. He also denied killing a dog. He testified he stayed at his
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half-brother's house on October 30, 2002, until the next morning when his sister picked
him up. Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal trespass to a van that occurred on
Halloween night. He later traveled to Georgia to spend Thanksgiving with his
grandmother. He was arrested on December 18.
Following closing arguments and several jury questions, the jury found
defendant guilty of count IV (burglary of Buck's Garage), count V (theft over $300),
count VI (animal torture), and count VII (aggravated cruelty to a companion animal) and
not guilty of count III (burglary of Scotty's Place).
In December 2003, defendant filed a motion for a new trial and other
posttrial relief. In January 2004, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court
sentenced defendant to five years in prison on count IV and a concurrent sentence of
five years on count VI. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt where the primary evidence against him was the testimony of an accomplice, no
corroboration testimony was presented, and defendant presented an alibi defense. We
disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence in a criminal case, the relevant inquiry is whether,
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 322, 830 N.E.2d 556, 559 (2005).
The trier of fact has the responsibility to determine the credi-
bility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony, to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable infer-
ences from that evidence. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 7,
809 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (2004). A court of review will not over-
turn the verdict of the fact finder "unless the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt." People v. Evans, 209
Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004).
The testimony of an accomplice witness has inherent
weaknesses, and the trier of fact should accept it "only with
caution and suspicion." People v. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 429,
793 N.E.2d 571, 583 (2002). "Nevertheless, the testimony of an
accomplice witness, whether corroborated or uncorroborated, is
sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction if it convinces the
jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 429, 793 N.E.2d at 583.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude
a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of the charged crimes.
Defendant's accomplice, Chris Gordon, testified that in the early morning hours of
October 31, 2002, he and defendant entered Buck's Garage. Upon entry, the two found
power tools and put them in a box. The box of tools ended up in Gordon's car. While
inside the business, Gordon testified defendant hit the dog with a sledgehammer and
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then hung it from a chain.
Gordon also testified that later in the week, Gordon, defendant, and two
females were riding in Gordon's car. Gordon abandoned the car in the country, walked
to a farmhouse with defendant, and took a van. Tiffany Hulbert testified she was riding
in Gordon's car when it broke down. Defendant and Gordon went to a nearby house to
borrow a van. After being stopped by police, defendant and Gordon fled. Police
recovered Gordon's car, and Sewell identified the tools found in the car as the tools
taken from the garage.
James Sewell testified he found his dog Sadie hanging by a chain.
Jennifer Ayers found Sadie had broken ribs and markings indicating she had been
beaten. Glenn Schubert compared hair standards taken from Sadie and a gray
sweatshirt from defendant's residence and found them to be "microscopically
consistent" and could have originated from the same dog. Schubert's conclusion was
entitled to more weight, he contended, because the hairs came from a mixed-breed
animal, which has "more unique" characteristics than a purebred animal.
The jury was well aware of Gordon's participation in the burglaries, his
guilty plea, and the immunity he received in exchange for his truthful testimony. The
trial court instructed the jury that accomplice testimony was subject to suspicion, should
be viewed with caution, and should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence
in the case. The jury had the responsibility to determine the credibility of witnesses and
resolve conflicts in the evidence. A rational trier of fact could have found defendant
committed the burglary of Buck's Garage and animal torture in connection with the
death of Sadie.
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Defendant, however, contends the evidence of his alibi defense
outweighed the State's evidence. "Even if a defendant denies his guilt and the defense
witnesses corroborate his alibi, his alibi defense does not, in and of itself, create a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." People v. Liner, 356 Ill. App. 3d 284, 298,
826 N.E.2d 1274, 1288 (2005). "Juries may reject uncontradicted alibi witnesses
[citations], and those whose testimony is contradicted. [Citations.] The familial ties of
the alibi witnesses may bring their veracity under scrutiny such that their testimony may
be rejected." People v. Garza, 92 Ill. App. 3d 723, 729, 415 N.E.2d 1328, 1334 (1981).
In the case sub judice, defendant's alibi witnesses were related to him.
Joshua Crain is defendant's half-brother, Brandy Crain is his sister-in-law, and Terri
Singleton is his sister. Moreover, Joshua and Brandy Crain did not come forward until
shortly before trial. After being contacted by a private investigator, they claimed they
were mistaken as to the dates the crimes were committed and once believed they had
no testimony worth offering. Brandy testified the dates did not become important until
she and her husband talked about and looked through his notes concerning the
offenses. Her husband talked with someone and realized "he had his days wrong."
A reasonable jury could find the testimony of defendant's relatives was not
credible and their delay in coming forward was to be viewed with skepticism. The
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony were matters
within the province of the jury. A reasonable jury could have believed Gordon's
testimony and not that of defendant or his alibi witnesses and found him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
B. Gordon's Prior Convictions
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Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to inform the
jury that codefendant Gordon had pleaded guilty, contending the court failed to employ
the balancing test set forth in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695
(1971). We disagree.
Whether evidence is relevant and admissible is a matter within the trial
court's discretion. People v. Ursery, 364 Ill. App. 3d 680, 686, 848 N.E.2d 146, 152
(2006). A court's decision as to the admissibility of evidence
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.
Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d at 436, 793 N.E.2d at 586.
During opening statements, defense counsel stated that after being
charged with the offenses, Gordon "made a deal" and was willing to "point the finger" at
defendant and receive immunity for testimony against him. Defense counsel indicated
Gordon had "total immunity" and it "was only by coming up with the story about
[defendant] that he walks scot free." Further, all Gordon had to do was pick defendant
as the perpetrator and "he walked free."
The State sought admission of certified copies of the common-law record
in Gordon's criminal cases relating to the burglaries as found in People's exhibit Nos.
17, 18, 19, and 20. The State argued defense counsel's opening statement asserted
that Gordon was given immunity to "rat out" defendant. The State contended it had a
right to respond to the "misleading" characterization.
The trial court indicated the jury could be left with the reasonable
impression that the State chose not to prosecute Gordon because he was going to "rat
out" defendant. The court indicated the State should have the opportunity to explain to
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the jury that the prosecution of Gordon pertaining to the two burglaries ended because
his statements were suppressed and a plea agreement was reached. The court refused
to admit the exhibits but allowed a three-page summary of Gordon's case history pre-
pared by the State to be read to the jury.
In this case, we find the trial court's decision to read the summary of
Gordon's case histories was not an abuse of discretion. Defense counsel's opening
statement left the jury with the impression that Gordon made a deal with the authorities
to blame defendant for the crimes in exchange for immunity. Further, counsel intimated
Gordon was given total immunity and walked away "scot free." Thus, defense counsel's
argument invited a response from the State as to the accurate facts surrounding
Gordon's criminal cases and testimony against defendant. Gordon was charged but did
not plead guilty to criminal trespass and misdemeanor theft until after his inculpatory
statements had been suppressed. Further, he did not get off "scot free," as he served
158 days in jail and received probation. The immunity he received was in exchange for
providing truthful testimony against defendant. "[A] defendant cannot complain about a
line of inquiry that he has invited." People v. Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d 793, 805, 753
N.E.2d 1193, 1204 (2001). As the court found defense counsel's opening statements
regarding Gordon invited the State's response, we find no abuse of discretion in the
court's reading of the summary to the jury.
Defendant concedes this case "does not precisely fit as one involving
impeachment under Montgomery." We agree and, based on the foregoing, we need not
address that argument. Defendant also argues the State's closing argument exceeded
the permissible use of a codefendant's guilty plea. However, defendant did not object at
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trial or include this issue in his posttrial motion. Thus, he has forfeited review of this
issue on appeal. See People v. Hestand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 272, 279, 838 N.E.2d 318,
324 (2005) (a defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion to
preserve the issue for review on appeal).
C. Witness Statements as Impeachment
Defendant argues the statements made by Matt Mason and John Crain
were not admissible as impeachment evidence because their testimony was not
damaging to the State's case. We disagree.
Under Supreme Court Rule 238(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 238(a)), the credibility of
a witness can be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.
"A court's witness, or any witness for that matter,
cannot be impeached by prior inconsistent statements
unless his testimony has damaged, rather than failed to
support the position of the impeaching party. The reason for
this is simple: No possible reason exists to impeach a
witness who has not contradicted any of the impeaching
party's evidence, except to bring inadmissible hearsay to the
attention of the jury. Impeachment is supposed to cancel out
the witness' testimony. It is only when the witness' testimony
is more damaging than his complete failure to testify would
have been that impeachment is useful." People v. Weaver,
92 Ill. 2d 545, 563-64, 442 N.E.2d 255, 262-63 (1982).
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Whether a witness' prior statement is inconsistent with his trial testimony is a matter
within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Billups, 318 Ill. App. 3d 948, 957, 742
N.E.2d 1261, 1269 (2001).
1. Mason Testimony
In this case, Matt Mason testified he picked up John Crain and defendant
at a hotel and gave them a ride. During the ride, defendant indicated he was being
accused of killing a dog, but he denied doing it. Mason claimed he never told the
authorities that defendant committed the crime but was "stupid" for being in trouble.
Mason stated he never told officers that defendant had said he killed a dog by slamming
a hammer through its head.
Commander Roger Newsome testified he listened to an interview of
Mason that was conducted by an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms. Mason stated during the interview that defendant had told him he killed a dog
by slamming a hammer through its head. Mason also stated he would not testify in
court.
Here, we find it was proper for the State to impeach its own witness.
Mason's testimony that defendant denied killing the dog significantly damaged the
State's case. The jury was entitled to determine Mason's credibility by hearing the
statements impeaching his testimony. We find no abuse of discretion.
2. Crain Testimony
John Crain testified defendant came to his house in Bradley during the
first two weeks of November 2002 because he was wanted in Pontiac. When the State
asked Crain whether defendant mentioned anything about a dog, Crain stated "not at
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that time. He told me that they were questioning him about a dog, but he didn't tell me
anything about a dog." Crain testified defendant had mentioned an incident around
June regarding his friends beating a dog. When asked if he told United States Marshals
in February 2003 about that incident, Crain stated, "No. I told them a way bigger story
than that." Crain asserted officers told him what to write.
The trial court found Crain was "all over the place" in his testimony. The
court found him to be a hostile witness and stated he had testified inconsistently with his
prior statement. The State was then allowed to impeach Crain with a redacted version
of his prior statement that read:
"My brother Mike came to Bradley from Pontiac to lay
low because of problems back home with the law[.] While
staying in Bradley[,] more rumors came up of a dog being
killed and him being involved[.] I asked[,] he said he was
drinking[,] the dog wouldn't shut up so his friends beat it to
quiet it."
Here, Crain testified defendant did not tell him anything about the dog the
authorities sought to question defendant about. Crain denied defendant ever told him
he broke into a place in Pontiac or that he beat and killed a dog. Crain's testimony
exculpated defendant and was damaging to the State's case. The trial court properly
allowed the State to impeach Crain with his prior statement about defendant's
involvement with beating the dog. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion.
3. Closing Argument
Defendant contends the State exacerbated the alleged errors in closing
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arguments by referring to the prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.
However, defendant made no objection to this portion of the State's closing argument
and did not raise the issue in his posttrial motion. Thus, he has forfeited review of this
alleged error on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Affirmed.
APPLETON and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.
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