NO. 4-05-0488 Filed: 3/28/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
RICHARD L. GROVE and SHIRLEY T. GROVE, ) Appeal from
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
CARLE FOUNDATION HOSPITAL; CARLE CLINIC ) No. 03L7
ASSOCIATION; DR. DAVID ORCUTT; and DR. )
PAUL TENDER, ) Honorable
Defendants-Appellees. ) Heidi Ladd,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________
________
JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:
On March 1, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs'
motion to amend the complaint. On May 13, 2005, the trial court entered an order
finding that its denial of the motion to amend was a final and appealable order under
Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Plaintiffs appeal, seeking reversal of
the trial court's order of March 1, 2005. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2001, plaintiff, Richard L. Grove, was admitted to Carle
Foundation Hospital for a routine colonoscopy to be performed by Dr. Eugene
Greenberg. During the procedure, a wire snare became incarcerated around a tumor in
plaintiff's colon. Greenberg could not remove the wire snare. As a result of that
complication, further emergency surgery was required to remove both the tumor and the
wire snare. The emergency surgery did not allow time to treat plaintiff prophylactically
with antibiotics 24 hours prior to the procedure, as is typically done. Dr. David Orcutt
and Dr. Paul Tender performed the second surgery that same day. Plaintiff developed
a postoperative wound infection during his hospitalization, for which he was treated by
Orcutt and Tender. Plaintiff remained in the hospital until January 27, 2001.
Within two years of the colonoscopy, on January 13, 2003, plaintiffs,
Richard L. Grove and his wife, Shirley T. Grove, filed a complaint for personal injuries
against defendants, Carle Foundation Hospital, Carle Clinic Association, Dr. David
Orcutt, and Dr. Paul Tender. The original complaint alleged negligence against Orcutt
and Tender for their treatment of the infection after the second surgery. The original
complaint alleged negligence against the hospital for the actions of Orcutt and Tender
under a theory of respondeat superior. Further, the original complaint asserted acts and
omissions that took place during the Greenberg surgery but did not assert that those
acts deviated from an acceptable standard of care.
On December 9, 2004, plaintiffs deposed Dr. Samuel Feinburg, a
subsequent treating physician. Plaintiffs assert it was not until the Feinburg deposition
that they became aware that Greenberg's conduct and surgical techniques, in
attempting to remove a tumor with a colonoscopic wire snare, may have fallen below
the minimum standard of medical care.
On December 14, 2004, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint in
order to add additional elements of negligence based on information gained during the
Feinburg deposition. The amendment did not seek to add Greenberg as a defendant.
Instead, the amendment sought to add the following substantive changes, as indicated
by the italicized language below:
"At all times mentioned herein, defendants Orcutt and
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Tender, as well as Dr. Eugene Greenberg, were employees
and/or agents of Carle Clinic and Carle Foundation Hospital
and were acting within the scope of their employment."
(Emphasis added.) (Paragraph 6)
"As a result of complications during the colonoscopic
surgical procedure performed on January 18, 2001, by Dr.
Eugene Greenberg, further emergency surgery was required
and necessitated to remove a wire snare that was
incarcerated in the colon of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the
aforesaid complication and the entrapment of the wire
snare, and the resulting emergency surgery, was a result of
the improper utilization, technique or application by Dr.
Eugene Greenberg of the wire snare for the purpose or
procedure he was attempting to perform." (Emphases
added.) (Paragraph 8) (language specifying that the
subsequent surgery was performed by Tender and Orcutt
was removed in the amended paragraph).
"In disregard [of] their duty to plaintiff in connection with his
medical care and treatment, defendants were then and there
guilty of one or more of the following negligent acts or
omissions:
(a) Failed to perform a deep tissue culture of the wound
infection;
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(b) Failed to administer type[-]IV antibiotics longer than 3
days;
(c) Following cessation of type[-]IV antibiotics, failed to
place the plaintiff on oral antibiotics at discharge for a period
of time to be determined through out-patient follow-up;
(d) Improperly utilized and/or applied the wire snare
device for the purpose or procedure Dr. Eugene Greenburg
was attempting to perform, which purpose or procedure was
beyond the scope of his skills or medical specialty as well as
beyond the manufacturer's design or intended purpose or
usage of the device." (Emphasis added.) (Paragraph 13).
On January 12, 2005, defendants filed an objection to the motion for leave
to amend the complaint, arguing (1) that the amended complaint sought to add
elements of negligence based on conduct of which plaintiffs were aware both at the time
the conduct occurred and at the time the original suit was filed; (2) that the amended
complaint sought to add a new legal theory which raised facts and issues not previously
raised and not previously the subject of any discovery; and (3) that the new legal theory
was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
On January 28, 2005, plaintiffs filed a response to defendant's objection to
the motion to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court should allow the
amendment pursuant to the relation-back exception to the statute of limitations. 735
ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2004).
On February 22, 2005, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion to
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amend. Defendants claimed surprise and prejudice, arguing that the original complaint
never focused on conduct in the original surgery; rather, it focused on negligence
occurring as a result of the infection that manifested itself after the original surgery.
Also at the February 22 hearing, the trial court vacated the case-management order that
had previously required all discovery to be completed by February 5, 2005, allowing
more time for further discovery.
On March 1, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs'
motion to amend the complaint. The court held that the proposed amendment was
untimely because it did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint.
On May 13, 2005, the trial court entered an order finding that its earlier
order denying plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint was a final and appealable order
under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Our Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before proceeding to the merits of this appeal, we must first consider
defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that we lack jurisdiction under
Supreme Court Rule 304(a) to review the denial of plaintiffs' motion to amend the
complaint. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).
An order must be final for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over an
appeal. Rice v. Burnley, 230 Ill. App. 3d 987, 990, 596 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1992). An
order is final if it terminates litigation between parties on the merits or disposes of rights
of parties, either on the entire controversy or on a separate branch thereof. Hull v. City
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of Chicago, 165 Ill. App. 3d 732, 733, 520 N.E.2d 720, 721 (1987).
Rule 304(a) permits appeals from orders that do not dispose of an entire
proceeding:
"'If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are in-
volved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties
or claims only if the trial court has made an express written
finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement
or appeal.' " (Emphasis added.) Rice, 230 Ill. App. 3d at
990-91, 596 N.E.2d at 107 (1992), quoting 134 Ill. 2d R.
304(a).
Defendants argue that the order denying plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend is not a final order and is, therefore, not appealable. See Hull, 165 Ill. App. 3d at
733, 520 N.E.2d at 721. We recognize that Rule 304(a) does not enable a trial court to
confer appellate jurisdiction simply by using the Rule 304(a) language that there is no
just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. Rice, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 991, 596
N.E.2d at 107. Further, we recognize that stating a single claim of negligence in several
ways, by multiple subparagraphs, does not warrant separate appeal upon dismissal of
less than all of the subparagraphs. Hull, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 733-34, 520 N.E.2d at 721;
see also Brown v. K.J.S. Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 768, 770, 545 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1989).
We do not believe, however, that the above cases cited by defendants
speak either to the facts of the instant case, the liberality with which amendments
should be allowed, or the policy behind Rule 304(a). None of the cases cited by
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defendants involves a ruling as to finality on a motion for leave to amend. The Illinois
Supreme Court has long recognized that substance, not form, determines whether an
order is final. Pfaff v. Chrysler Corp., 155 Ill. 2d 35, 62-63, 610 N.E.2d 51, 63 (1992),
citing St. Joseph Data Service, Inc. v. Thomas Jefferson Life, 73 Ill. App. 3d 935, 938,
393 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1979). "The law is more than a game of semantics. *** [F]inality
of the judgment or order depends on the basis and substance of the dismissal and the
effect of the adjudication." (Emphasis added.) Martin v. Masini, 90 Ill. App. 2d 348,
354, 232 N.E.2d 770, 773 (1967).
Here, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the
complaint, because the proposed amendment was not timely filed, was barred by the
statute of limitations, and did not relate back to the original complaint. The court
thereby treated the proposed amendment as a separate claim. In so denying the
proposed amendment, the court made a final disposition as to that separate claim. For
these reasons, we find the court correctly conferred appellate jurisdiction under Rule
304(a), and we deny defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal.
B. Motion for Leave To Amend
Illinois law supports a liberal policy of allowing amendments to the
pleadings so as to enable parties to fully present their alleged cause or causes of
action. Simon v. Wilson, 291 Ill. App. 3d 495, 508, 684 N.E.2d 791, 800 (1997).
Moreover, medical malpractice plaintiffs in particular are to be afforded every
opportunity to establish a case, and amendments to the pleadings are to be liberally
allowed to enable the action to be heard on the merits, rather than brought to an end
because of procedural technicalities. Castro v. Bellucci, 338 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391, 789
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N.E.2d 784, 787 (2003), citing Avakian v. Chulengarian, 328 Ill. App. 3d 147, 154, 766
N.E.2d 283, 290 (2002).
Litigants, however, have no absolute right to amend their complaint.
Hadley v. Ryan, 345 Ill. App. 3d 297, 303, 803 N.E.2d 48, 54 (2003). The court
generally considers four factors in determining whether an amendment to a complaint
should be allowed: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure a defect in the
pleading, (2) whether the proposed amendment would surprise or prejudice the
opposing party, (3) whether the proposed amendment was timely filed, and (4) whether
the moving party had previous opportunities to amend the complaint. Board of Directors
of Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass'n v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 419, 432, 712
N.E.2d 330, 337 (1999).
The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides further guidance as to the
factors of timeliness and prejudice, stating that any cause of action set up in an
amended pleading shall not be time-barred, and shall be said to relate back to the date
of the filing of the original pleading, so long as (1) the original pleading was timely filed
and (2) it appears from the original and amended pleadings that the cause of action
asserted grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading.
735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2004). Additionally, a "pleading may be amended at any
time, before or after judgment, to conform the pleadings to the proofs, upon terms as to
costs and continuance that may be just." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West 2004).
The standard of review for the trial court's decision to allow or deny a
motion to amend a complaint is whether the court abused its discretion. Bloomfield
Club, 186 Ill. 2d at 432, 712 N.E.2d at 337.
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Plaintiffs first argue that the amendment to the complaint should have
been allowed because the purpose of the amendment was to conform the pleadings to
what plaintiffs believed the evidence at trial would be, based upon facts adduced during
the course of discovery. Plaintiffs' primary position is that the amendment did not assert
a new cause of action and should have been allowed under section 2-616(c). We do
not find adequate grounds, under the authority of section 2-616(c), to interfere with the
trial court's discretion in denying the amendment.
Case law presented by plaintiffs in support of allowing the amendments
under section 2-616(c) is not persuasive as applied to the facts of the instant case. See
Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 605 N.E.2d 493 (1992); Mills v. County
of Cook, 338 Ill. App. 3d 219, 788 N.E.2d 169 (2003); Zook v. Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co., 268 Ill. App. 3d 157, 642 N.E.2d 1348 (1994); Giacalone v. Chicago Park District,
231 Ill. App. 3d 639, 596 N.E.2d 731 (1992).
Amendments conform the pleadings to the proofs, and are allowed
pursuant to section 2-616(c), if the evidence that supports the amendments is
"inextricably intertwined" with evidence relating to other alleged acts and omissions
already alleged in the original complaint. Zook, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 167, 642 N.E.2d at
1356. Thus, the focus is on whether the amendment alters the nature and quality of
proof required for the defendant to defend itself. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 469, 605 N.E.2d at
509.
The proposed amendment in the present case would require defendants
to produce different testimony than the testimony required to defend against the original
complaint. Allegations in the original complaint required defendants to defend
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themselves against the claim that the treatment of plaintiff by Dr. Tender and Dr. Orcutt,
including plaintiff's infection, fell below the reasonable standard of care. Thus,
defendants would need to present evidence relating to the original alleged acts or
omissions of failure to perform a deep-tissue culture, failure to administer type-IV
antibiotics for longer than three days, and failure to place plaintiff on oral antibiotics at
discharge. Such testimony would inevitably include testimony from surgical and
infectious disease experts regarding Dr. Tender's and Dr. Orcutt's treatment of plaintiff's
infection. In contrast, evidence supporting the allegations contained in the proposed
amendment would at the very least require (1) testimony regarding Dr. Greenberg's
training, skills, and experience to determine if the procedure was "beyond the scope of
his skills or medical specialty" and (2) testimony regarding the wire snare's design and
intended purpose. The evidence supporting the amendment is not "inextricably
intertwined" with the evidence supporting the alleged negligent acts or omissions
already present in the original complaint. See Zook, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 167, 642 N.E.2d
at 1356.
Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that section 2-616(b) provides an
avenue by which the proposed amendment should have been allowed. Section 2-
616(b) does not require that the amendment state the same cause of action as the
original pleading, or even a substantially similar cause of action; rather, the test is
whether the amended pleadings state a cause of action that grew out of the same
transaction or occurrence. Zeh v. Wheeler, 111 Ill. 2d 266, 272-73, 489 N.E.2d 1342,
1345 (1986). Section 2-616(b) aims to limit the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving
party in a motion for leave to amend the complaint while still providing claimants an
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opportunity to fully present their cause or causes of action: a defendant will not be "
'prejudiced so long as his attention [is] directed, within the [statute-of-limitations period],
to the facts that form the basis of the claim asserted against him.' " Zeh, 111 Ill. 2d at
273, 489 N.E.2d at 1345, quoting Simmons v. Hendricks, 32 Ill. 2d 489, 495, 207 N.E.2d
440, 443 (1965). The true inquiry, in this careful balance of interests, is whether the
plaintiff is "'attempting to slip in an entirely distinct claim in violation of the [statute] of ***
limitations act.'" Simmons, 32 Ill. 2d at 497, 207 N.E.2d at 444, quoting O. McCaskill,
Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated 126-27 (Supp. 1936).
Defendant Carle Foundation Hospital argues that it is prejudiced because
the original complaint did not focus on the actions of Greenberg but instead focused on
the actions of Tender and Orcutt. The original complaint pleaded that the first surgery
was performed by Dr. Greenberg on January 18, 2001, and that it was the initial
occurrence for the events that led up to the infection at issue. The original complaint
dates the Greenberg surgery as occurring on January 18, 2001; dates the plaintiff's
hospitalization between January 18, 2001, and January 27, 2001; and dates the
infection as occurring sometime between January 18, 2001, and January 27, 2001.
Also, the original complaint indicated that "complications" arose during the colonoscopy
performed by Dr. Greenberg and that, because things did not go as planned, "further
surgery was required."
We find the facts in the instant case to be disparate from those in Figueroa
relied upon by plaintiffs. Figueroa v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 288 Ill. App. 3d
921, 681 N.E.2d 64 (1997). In Figueroa, the original complaint alleged negligence for
failure to use proper skill and treatment following plaintiff's caesarian section. Just as
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the original complaint in the present case noted the Greenberg colonoscopy procedure
but failed to allege that this procedure fell below the standard of care, the original
complaint in Figueroa noted the procedures that occurred prior to and during delivery,
but did not allege that such procedures deviated from an acceptable standard of care.
Figueroa, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 923, 681 N.E.2d at 65. Nearly four years after the original
complaint was filed, the plaintiff filed interrogatory answers that disclosed the opinion of
their expert that the defendant had acted negligently prior to and during delivery. The
plaintiffs in Figueroa sought leave to file an amended complaint, alleging the defendant
acted negligently prior to and during delivery. The Figueroa court found that the
amended complaint related back to the original because the "defendants were made
aware that plaintiffs' claims were predicated upon the treatment that took place during
[her] hospitalization." Figueroa, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 925, 681 N.E.2d at 66-67.
Unlike the caesarian section in Figueroa, where the original complaint was
for negligence in the treatment of that triggering condition, the amendment propounded
by plaintiffs in this case seeks to add a completely distinct procedure to their complaint
of negligence. While it is true that but for the problematic result of the colonoscopy, no
referral for emergency surgery would have been required, two separate and distinct
surgical procedures are at issue.
In McCorry v. Gooneratne, 332 Ill. App. 3d 935, 775 N.E.2d 591 (2002),
the plaintiff was first treated at the defendant hospital during a neurosurgery
consultation in which the hospital's agents performed a preoperative MRI. The plaintiff
then underwent surgery to alleviate pain from disc herniations at two locations. When
the plaintiff woke from surgery, plaintiff was unable to move his legs. Agents of the
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defendant hospital then performed a postoperative MRI. McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at
938, 775 N.E.2d at 594. The plaintiff sued the hospital for negligence under a theory of
respondeat superior. McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 938, 775 N.E.2d at 595. The original
complaint referenced only the preoperative MRI and alleged that it had been misread
and misinterpreted. McCorry, 332 Ill. App.3d at 938, 775 N.E.2d at 594. After the
statute of limitations had passed, the plaintiff moved to file an amended complaint,
which added a new count for direct liability against the hospital for failure to have certain
policies regarding transmittal of postoperative MRI evaluations and for failure to timely
perform and interpret the plaintiff's postoperative MRI. McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 938,
775 N.E.2d at 598. In holding that the amended complaint did not relate back to the
original complaint, the McCorry court noted that the original complaint did not even
assert that the plaintiff had a postoperative MRI. McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 775
N.E.2d at 599. As in McCorry, the claim arising from Dr. Greenberg's colonoscopy and
the subsequent surgery by Dr. Tender and Dr. Orcutt are not of the same causative and
interrelated nature. The plaintiff in McCorry was already paralyzed before the
postoperative MRI took place.
Defendants next cite Bailey v. Petroff, 170 Ill. App. 3d 791, 797, 525
N.E.2d 278, 282 (1988), in which the original complaint alleged negligence for the
prescription of a certain drug during the plaintiff's pregnancy. The amended complaint
alleged negligence for a failure to recommend prenatal testing and a failure to diagnose
the baby's genetic disorder. Bailey, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94, 525 N.E.2d at 280. The
original complaint did not assert alleged acts or omissions regarding prenatal testing, let
alone assert that anything had gone wrong during prenatal testing. Bailey 170 Ill. App.
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3d at 793-94, 525 N.E.2d at 279. Further, the amended complaint dropped all
references to the alleged negligence in prescribing the drug. Bailey, 170 Ill. App. 3d at
794, 525 N.E.2d at 280. The court found that the amendment did not relate back and
that the nature of the incidents of the alleged malpractice was "quite different" from that
alleged in the original complaint. Bailey, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 797-98, 525 N.E.2d at 282.
While all of the claims stemmed from the plaintiff's prenatal treatment, the
original claim did not provide the defendant notice of the facts underlying the later claim.
Bailey, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 798, 525 N.E.2d at 282. The amended complaint in Bailey
dropped all references to the original claim of negligence in prescribing the drug and
replaced it with a completely different allegation. Bailey, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 525
N.E.2d at 280. The amended complaint in the instant case did not drop any of the
substantive allegations of the original; rather, the amended complaint alleged that acts
or omissions already described in the original complaint did in fact constitute
negligence. The reference in the original complaint to the colonoscopy performed by
Dr. Greenberg serves only to set out a historical fact. It does not establish a single
cause of ongoing treatment for which defendant Carle was put on notice as to its
potential liability.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the order of the trial court denying leave to file
their amended complaint pursuant to the relation-back exception to the statute of
limitations is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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STEIGMANN, J., specially concurs.
COOK, J., dissents.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:
After extensive (and respectful) discussion of the issues this case
presents, my colleagues and I have been unable to reach agreement. On the merits,
they disagree over whether this court should affirm the trial court's order denying
plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. My preference is to dismiss this appeal and
not reach the merits because I do not believe we have jurisdiction under Rule 304(a).
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However, (1) because a 1-1-1 decision of this court is untenable and (2) affirming the
trial court's judgment is closer to my preference of dismissing this appeal, I join Justice
Appleton's decision to affirm.
Justice Appleton's decision quotes Rule 304(a), makes reference to Rice,
Hull, and Brown, and then states the following:
"[W]e recognize that [the statement of] a single claim of
negligence in several ways, by multiple subparagraphs, does
not warrant separate appeal upon dismissal of less than all
of the subparagraphs." Slip op. at 6.
Justice Appleton's decision (joined on this point by Justice Cook) then goes on to
explain why this analysis of Rule 304(a) does not apply to the present case. However, I
disagree with the effort to distinguish the above three cases. In my judgment, those
cases fully apply to this one and, based upon their holdings, we should dismiss this
appeal.
Rule 304(a) provides that if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are
involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an explicit
written finding that no just reason exists for declining enforcement on appeal. 134 Ill. 2d
R. 304(a). At issue here is whether this case presents multiple claims or a single claim,
as that term is used in Rule 304(a). For the reasons that follow, I believe this case
presents a single claim of negligence, albeit pleaded in different ways.
In Hull, the plaintiff sued the city of Chicago for negligence regarding its
maintenance and repair of the roadway where an automobile accident occurred.
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Paragraph 7 of count I of the complaint described the city's negligent acts or omissions
in 12 separate subparagraphs. Hull, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 733, 520 N.E.2d at 721. On the
defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed all but one of those subparagraphs, leaving
only the subparagraph that alleged that the defendant was negligent in permitting a
chunk or block of concrete to remain on the roadway's driving lanes. The trial court then
made a Rule 304(a) finding, and the plaintiff appealed. Hull, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 733, 520
N.E.2d at 721.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, explaining as follows:
"Plaintiff's action involves a single claim of negligence
against one defendant. Although paragraph 7 of plaintiff's
complaint alleged various negligent acts or omissions, only
one theory of recovery was advanced--negligence. The
statement of a single claim in several ways, by multiple
subparagraphs, does not warrant a separate appeal upon
dismissal of less than all of those subparagraphs. [Citation.]
Thus, the dismissal of subparagraphs (b) through (1), which
left subparagraph (a) standing, did not determine the merits
of a separate cause of action or terminate any litigation
between the parties. The order of dismissal merely
determined which allegations of negligence would be
allowed to remain. The order was not final and appealable.
[Citation.]
The Rule 304(a) [citation] finding *** is intended to
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apply only where multiple claims or parties are involved. It is
not designed to permit appeals from orders that dispose of
less than all of the issues in an action involving a single party
and a single claim." Hull, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 733-34, 520
N.E.2d at 721.
In Rice, the First District Appellate Court followed its earlier decision in
Hull and similarly dismissed an appeal that had been brought purportedly on the basis
of Rule 304(a). The Rice court explained as follows:
"As in Hull, the plaintiff here has advanced only one theory of
recovery--negligence. *** While the dismissed counts and
the remaining counts deal with different acts or omissions,
they advance the same theory of recovery--namely,
negligence--and accordingly we conclude that the dismissal
of counts VII and VIII did not determine the merits of a
separate claim, and therefore is not a final order." Rice, 230
Ill. App. 3d at 992, 596 N.E.2d at 108.
In Brown, the Second District Appellate Court also followed the reasoning
in Hull and dismissed the appeal purportedly brought pursuant to Rule 304(a),
explaining as follows:
"Plaintiff's single-count, second amended complaint did not
involve multiple claims, but only a single claim of negligence,
as does the third amended complaint. While plaintiff's
second amended complaint alleged various sources of a
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duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, it only advanced one
theory of recovery, negligence. [Citing Hull, 165 Ill. App. 3d
at 733, 520 N.E.2d at 721] It is well established that the
statement of a single claim in several ways, even by multiple
counts, does not warrant a separate appeal." Brown, 189 Ill.
App. 3d at 770-71, 545 N.E.2d at 556.
As in the foregoing cases, this case presents a single claim of negligence
couched in different terms. In December 2004, when plaintiffs sought to amend their
complaint against the hospital, the complaint already alleged the hospital was
responsible (under a theory of respondeat superior) for the negligent conduct of Orcutt
and Tender. The proposed amendment did not change plaintiffs' claim of negligence;
instead, it merely sought to add a third actor, Greenberg, for whose negligent conduct
the hospital was also supposedly responsible, again under the theory of respondeat
superior. Because the complaint at issue, whether amended or not, presents a single
claim of negligence, Rule 304(a) does not apply.
My distinguished colleagues conclude that Hull, Rice, and Brown are
distinguishable because they do not "speak either to the facts of the instant case, the
liberality with which amendments should be allowed, or the policy behind Rule 304(a)."
Slip op. at 6. I disagree with each of these alleged distinctions.
First, while it is true that the facts in this case differ from those in Hull,
Rice, and Brown, that observation does nothing to defeat the precedential effect of
those cases regarding the meaning and application of Rule 304(a) to this case. The
complaint at issue here, whether amended or not, presented a single claim against the
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hospital--namely, negligence based upon respondeat superior. That being so, the
holdings in Hull and its progeny--that the statement of a single claim does not warrant a
separate appeal under Rule 304(a) when some aspect of that single claim has been
dismissed--apply fully to this case.
Second, whatever "liberality" governs in amending complaints is irrelevant
to whether this appeal meets the requirements of Rule 304(a), thereby permitting us to
exercise jurisdiction. This court is not permitted to consider in any way the merits of the
issue that a given appeal would present to us when deciding whether we have
jurisdiction to hear that appeal. To hold otherwise would mean that although a given
appeal does not technically meet the standards for appealability set by our supreme
court, we can nonetheless hear that appeal if we think the trial court judgment sought to
be appealed is really, really wrong. Such a rule is not what the supreme court had in
mind when it promulgated the rules governing when the Illinois Appellate Court may
exercise jurisdiction.
Last, the policy considerations underlying Rule 304(a) are for the supreme
court, not this court, to address. Just a few months ago, the supreme court emphasized
how this court must strictly abide by its rules, writing as follows:
"As this court has repeatedly stated, *** the appellate and
circuit courts of this state must enforce and abide by the
rules of this court. The appellate court's power 'attaches
only upon compliance with the rules governing appeals.'
[Citation.] '[N]either the trial court nor the appellate court has
the "authority to excuse compliance with the filing
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requirements of the supreme court rules governing
appeals."' [Citation.] ***
*** The appellate court's jurisdiction turns on litigants'
compliance with our rules ***." (Emphasis in original.)
People v. Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d 210, 216-17, 840 N.E.2d 1187,
1191 (2005).
Lyles should serve as a reminder that when deciding whether we have
jurisdiction, we must strictly enforce and abide by the "policy considerations" the
supreme court took into account when it promulgated its rules governing appellate court
jurisdiction.
My colleagues may be correct that hearing this appeal now would be good
policy and further the ends of justice. However, until such time as the Supreme Court of
Illinois amends supreme court rules accordingly, our personal views about policy in this
area simply do not matter.
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JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court's decision and direct
that the amendment be allowed.
I. JURISDICTION UNDER RULE 304(a)
I agree with Justice Appleton's opinion that we have jurisdiction under
Rule 304(a) because the trial court treated the proposed amendment as a separate
claim. Slip op. at 8. Whether the same claim is involved is also an issue on the merits:
whether the amendment should be allowed under section 2-616(b) because it "grew out
of the same transaction or occurrence." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2004). It would be
intolerable if we had jurisdiction to affirm (because there was a separate claim) but had
no jurisdiction to reverse (because there was then not a separate claim). Once it is
determined that the court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the controversy, "its
jurisdiction will not be destroyed by its exercise." Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 392,
143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957) (considering long-arm jurisdiction if a person has
committed a tortious act within the state); 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice '6.5, at 68
(1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial).
I disagree with Justice Steigmann's special concurrence that we do not
have jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) because only a single claim, only counts advancing
the same theory of recovery, is involved here. Rule 304(a) is limited to cases where
there is "a final judgment." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). The rule does not apply to evidentiary
rulings, or other interlocutory orders, where there is no final judgment. The striking of a
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pleading with a denial of leave to amend, as here, is a final judgment. Many cases have
allowed an appeal under Rule 304(a) and gone on to hold that amendment should be
allowed under section 2-616(b) because it grew out of the same transaction or
occurrence. See, e.g., Castro, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 789 N.E.2d at 792 (only
difference between vicarious liability complaints identity of doctor); Avakian, 328 Ill. App.
3d at 157-58, 766 N.E.2d at 291 (same).
When do we have the "multiple claims for relief" required for a Rule 304(a)
final judgment? Do we look to the res judicata definition of "claim"? "Claim" is defined
very broadly for res judicata purposes: "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the action arose." Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
'24(1), at 196 & Comment c (1982). That broad definition comports with the goal of res
judicata to require a plaintiff to seek all relief in a single action. For res judicata
purposes, almost every case involves only a single claim; if that is the test for Rule
304(a), it is difficult to imagine any appeal that could be taken under Rule 304(a). For
res judicata purposes, even separate theories do not give rise to separate claims.
There is a single transaction, a single claim, despite different harms, substantive
theories, measures, or kinds of relief. Restatement (Second) of Judgments '24,
Comment c (1982); Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 491, 626
N.E.2d 225, 228 (1993). "Claim" must have a different meaning for purposes of Rule
304(a) than it does for res judicata.
The supreme court has taken a broad view of what constitutes a "claim"
under Rule 304(a). "[Rule 304(a)] was intended to apply wherever a final judgment
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determines fewer than all the rights and liabilities in issue." Cunningham v. Brown, 22
Ill. 2d 23, 25, 174 N.E.2d 153, 154 (1961) (court accepted jurisdiction and held that
dramshop action was the only remedy against tavern operators). Cunningham made it
clear that the res judicata definition of "claim" did not apply to Rule 304(a). "[I]t does not
matter, in determining whether multiple counts allege multiple claims for relief, that
recovery under one would bar recovery of additional damages under the others."
Cunningham, 22 Ill. 2d at 25, 174 N.E.2d at 154.
All that is necessary for a Rule 304(a) appeal is that the bases for
recovery under the counts that are dismissed be "different" than those under the counts
left standing. Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp., 99 Ill. 2d 344, 348, 459 N.E.2d
935, 938 (1984). "This may occur when the grounds for recovery under the various
counts derive from different statutes or common law doctrines (Cunningham v. Brown)
or when the various theories of recovery require 'different elements *** to establish a
proper claim' or involve 'differing standards of plaintiff's conduct which will bar recovery.'
" Heinrich, 99 Ill. 2d at 348, 459 N.E.2d at 938, quoting Freeman v. White Way Sign &
Maintenance Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 884, 891, 403 N.E.2d 495, 500 (1980). In Heinrich, the
court accepted jurisdiction, holding that dismissal of a count seeking either contribution
or indemnification is not rendered unappealable by survival of a count seeking the other.
Under Cunningham and Heinrich, different theories of recovery were one
way to show that different claims were involved, but not the only way. Later cases
seem to have elevated the presence of different theories into an absolute requirement.
"While the dismissed counts and the remaining counts deal with different acts or
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omissions, they advance the same theory of recovery--namely, negligence--and
accordingly we conclude that the dismissal of counts VII and VIII did not determine the
merits of a separate claim, and therefore is not a final order." Rice, 230 Ill. App. 3d at
992, 596 N.E.2d at 108. I suggest that such rigidity is inappropriate. In the present
case, the fact that the dismissed count sounded in negligence and the remaining counts
sound in negligence should not bar a Rule 304(a) appeal. Where there is a final order,
the discretion of the trial court under Rule 304(a) to allow immediate appeal should be
recognized where the trial court concludes that immediate appeal will aid in the
resolution of the case. Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Development Corp., 908
F.2d 1363, 1367 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the federal counterpart
to Rule 304(a)); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 n.2, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 1, 11 n.2, 100 S. Ct. 1460, 1465 n.2 (1980) (immediate appeal of certified claims
would facilitate settlement of remaining claims).
Immediate appeal will certainly aid in the resolution of the present case.
Consider how the amendment issue would have to be presented if we did not accept
jurisdiction under Rule 304(a). We would dismiss the appeal and the case would return
to the circuit court for trial. After the trial was completed, the case would again be
appealed, at which time we would decide whether the amendment should have been
allowed. If we decided the amendment should have been allowed, the case would
return to the trial court for a second trial. A great deal of time and money would have
been wasted. We can easily decide the question of the amendment now, and we
should proceed to do so. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to find "that
there is no just reason for delaying *** appeal" (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) in this case. The
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bases for recovery under the dismissed count are "different" from those under the
counts left standing. Heinrich, 99 Ill. 2d at 348, 459 N.E.2d at 938. Even if the bases
for recovery are not different, the trial court believes they are and must intend for its
ruling to have some consequences at trial.
II. AMENDMENT UNDER SECTION 2-616(b)
Section 2-616 carries forward the policy of the Code of Civil Procedure
that formalism in pleadings is to be avoided, that no pleading is bad in substance that
contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the
claim or defense that he or she is called upon to meet. 735 ILCS 5/2-612(b) (West
2004). Under section 2-616, pleadings may be amended at any time, even after
judgment. Under section 2-616, pleadings may even be amended after the statute of
limitations has expired, so long as "the cause of action asserted *** grew out of the
same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading, even though the original
pleading was defective." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2004); Castro, 338 Ill. App. 3d at
390, 789 N.E.2d at 787 (purpose is to insure fairness, not enhance technical consider-
ations of common-law pleadings). The concern here is whether plaintiff is " ' "attempting
to slip in an entirely distinct claim in violation of the spirit of the limitations act." ' "
Sompolski v. Miller, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1091, 608 N.E.2d 54, 57 (1992), quoting
Simmons, 32 Ill. 2d at 497, 207 N.E.2d at 444, quoting O. McCaskill, Illinois Civil
Practice Act Annotated 126-27 (Supp. 1936). For example, if I sue my neighbor over a
boundary-line dispute, I am not at liberty to add a count against him for an earlier
automobile accident on which the statute of limitations had run.
There is no "entirely distinct claim" in this case. Dr. Greenberg performed
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the colonoscopy on January 18, 2001. Drs. Orcutt and Tender performed the
emergency surgery that same day. The events in the present case occurred during a
single stay in the hospital, involved only a single patient, and occurred during a relatively
brief period of time. (Plaintiff left the hospital on January 27, 2001.) "Among the factors
relevant to a determination whether the facts are so woven together as to constitute a
single claim are their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether,
taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes." Restatement (Second)
of Judgments '24, Comment b, at 199 (1982). The original complaint alleged
negligence against the hospital for the actions of Orcutt and Tender under a theory of
respondeat superior and set out acts and omissions that took place during the
Greenberg surgery. The amended complaint again alleged negligence against the
hospital under a theory of respondeat superior but this time added the assertion that
Greenberg's use of the wire snare was inappropriate and constituted negligence. The
amendment would have been proper even if the original complaint had not named any
employees. Avakian, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 158, 766 N.E.2d at 293.
Section 2-616(b), which allows amendments so long as the cause of
action asserted "grew out of the same transaction or occurrence" (735 ILCS 5/2-616(b)
(West 2004)), anticipated the supreme court's adoption of the more liberal transactional
test for res judicata purposes. "[T]he transactional test permits claims to be considered
part of the same cause of action even if there is not a substantial overlap of evidence,
so long as they arise from the same transaction." River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland
Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311, 703 N.E.2d 883, 893 (1998), citing Restatement (Second) of
Judgments '24, Comment b, at 199 (1982). The 1933 amendment that created the
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predecessor of section 2-616(b) shifted from the common-law requirement that the
amended pleading set up the same cause of action as the original pleading to a test of
identity of transaction or occurrence. Zeh, 111 Ill. 2d at 272, 489 N.E.2d at 1345 (1933
amendment omitted the words "and is substantially the same as"); Avakian, 328 Ill. App.
3d at 154, 766 N.E.2d at 290 (section no longer required that the original and amended
pleadings state the same cause of action). Under River Park, transaction and cause of
action are now the same thing. The two complaints here were the same cause of
action. It is clear that plaintiffs could not have filed a respondeat superior action against
the hospital for the actions of Orcutt and Tender and, after that action was resolved,
filed a new respondeat superior action against the hospital for the actions of Greenberg.
River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311-12, 703 N.E.2d at 893. (Plaintiffs, however, could file a
subsequent action against new parties not named in the original action. See Saichek v.
Lupa, 204 Ill. 2d 127, 137, 787 N.E.2d 827, 833 (2003).)
The hospital's argument that "the original complaint did not focus on the
actions of Greenberg but instead focused on the actions of Tender and Orcutt" (slip op.
at 10), is a formalistic pleadings argument inconsistent with modern practice. The true
question is whether defendant was on notice, before the expiration of the statutory time
period, of the facts on which the claim set out in the amended complaint is based.
Castro, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 391, 789 N.E.2d at 788; McArthur v. St. Mary's Hospital of
Decatur, 307 Ill. App. 3d 329, 335, 717 N.E.2d 501, 505 (1999). In McArthur, the
allegations of respondeat superior were not made in the original complaint, but we
allowed them to be made in the amended complaint after the statute of limitations had
run. "Because these allegations were made against the hospital's codefendants and
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were at the heart of plaintiffs' case, the hospital was aware of them and knew the extent
of the involvement of its own personnel." McArthur, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 335, 717 N.E.2d
at 505. A similar argument was addressed in Castro. "Though Family Medicine claims
to have been prejudiced by the lack of focus on the actions of Dr. Belluci-Jackson, we
find that it was nevertheless supplied with the essential information necessary to
prepare a defense to a claim related to her part in the same occurrence ***." Castro,
338 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 789 N.E.2d at 791. It is inconceivable that the hospital here was
unaware of the actions of Greenberg, its employee, who performed the surgery in its
operating room. From the very beginning, the hospital had knowledge of those actions,
better knowledge than did plaintiffs.
It is interesting to contrast the obligations imposed on plaintiffs to proceed
with litigation despite their imperfect knowledge. There is a discovery rule that tolls the
running of the statute of limitations; however, "[t]he rule does not mandate that a plaintiff
know with precision the legal injury that has been suffered, but anticipates that plaintiff
be possessed of sufficient information to cause plaintiff to inquire further in order to
determine whether a legal wrong has occurred." Martin v. A & M Insulation Co., 207 Ill.
App. 3d 706, 710, 566 N.E.2d 375, 378 (1990). Just as precise knowledge should not
be required for plaintiffs, precise knowledge should not be required for defendants.
I disagree with the statements in McCorry and Bailey that the original
complaint must provide the defendant "with all of the information necessary for
preparation of the defense for the claim asserted later." (Emphasis added.) McCorry,
332 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 775 N.E.2d at 599. Again, those statements take a view of
- 29 -
pleadings that has now been discarded. "Today the function of informing an opponent
of one's position is largely accomplished through discovery, a function that was largely
fulfilled by the pleadings at an earlier time." 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice '23.1, at 300
(1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial); Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc., 143 Ill. 2d 44, 46-48,
570 N.E.2d 327, 328-29 (1991) (defendants provided with notice of correct location of
occurrence before expiration of statute of limitations through depositions and production
requests). McCorry concedes that discovery may satisfy the notice requirement but
adds a further requirement, that "the defendant must have notice not only of the
operative facts, but also of the plaintiff's intention to assert a claim on the basis of those
facts." McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 946, 775 N.E.2d at 601. There is no support in the
statute or the decisions of the supreme court for that additional requirement. A litigant
investigating a case does not limit his investigation to his opponent's allegations but
attempts to learn everything he can about the incident. We should not encourage
litigants to close their eyes to facts that are readily apparent.
I disagree with the argument that if the amendment sets up a new theory
or a new focus, it cannot be allowed. Illinois is a fact-pleading state. It is not necessary
to plead any specific theory of recovery. "A complaint need only allege facts which
establish the right to recovery; not only are allegations of law or conclusions not
required, they are improper." Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 488-89,
639 N.E.2d 1282, 1291 (1994); 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice '24.2, at 340 (1989) (Civil
Procedure Before Trial). "A motion to dismiss does not lie as long as a good cause of
action is stated even if that cause of action is not the one intended to be asserted by the
plaintiff." Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d at 488, 639 N.E.2d at 1291. Precise pleadings are
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not required. Amendment may be allowed "even though the original pleading was
defective." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 2004). The relation-back doctrine is predicated
upon a defendant's awareness of the occurrence or transaction that is the basis for the
claim and not upon what diligence a plaintiff exerts. Avakian, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 158,
766 N.E.2d at 293.
Finally, what will now happen on remand under the majority's order? Will
plaintiffs be
limited in the
evidence
they present
at trial? Will
they be
foreclosed
from
discussing
the conduct
of Dr.
Greenberg?
Will the
damages be
limited to that
caused by
the other
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defendants?
I suggest
not. The
injury to
Richard
appears to
be an
indivisible
one for which
all
defendants
are jointly
liable. See
Burke v. 12
Rothschild's
Liquor Mart,
Inc., 148 Ill.
2d 429, 438-
39, 593
N.E.2d 522,
525-26
(1992).
Plaintiff is
- 32 -
entitled to
present a
complete
picture of his
injury.
Evidence of
Dr.
Greenberg's
conduct
would
certainly be
admissible to
explain the
conduct of
the other
defendants.
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