NO. 4-06-0344 Filed 6/25/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
MARJORIE O'CASEK, as Special ) Appeal from
Administratrix of the Estate of CARLA ) Circuit Court of
THOMPSON, Deceased, ) McLean County
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No. 04L160
v. )
THE CHILDRENS HOME AND AID SOCIETY OF )
ILLINOIS, a/k/a THE CHILDREN'S )
FOUNDATION; OSF ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL )
CENTER; OSF ST. JOSEPH HEALTHCARE )
SYSTEMS, a/k/a OSF ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL )
CENTER; SUSAN G. EMMERSON, M.D.; and ) Honorable
RICHARD D. CASTILLO, M.D., ) James E. Souk,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
This case arises out of medical treatment given to the
17-year-old decedent, Carla Thompson, in August 2000. Plaintiff,
Marjorie O'Casek, the special administratrix of Thompson's
estate, filed a medical-malpractice claim in August 2002 against
defendants, the Children's Home and Aid Society of Illinois
(CHASI), OSF St. Joseph Healthcare Systems (OSF), and treating
physicians Dr. Susan G. Emmerson and Dr. Richard D. Castillo.
Plaintiff originally filed her complaint in August
2002. She voluntarily dismissed the complaint in February 2003
and refiled in February 2004. Plaintiff's refiled complaint did
not contain the physician's report as required by section 2-
622(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(1)
(West 2004)), and instead plaintiff attached an affidavit under
subsection (a)(2), requesting an additional 90 days to file a
physician's report.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to this
court's decision in Cargill v. Czelatdko, 353 Ill. App. 3d 654,
818 N.E.2d 898 (2004) (Fourth District), appeal denied, 214 Ill.
2d 528, 830 N.E.2d 1 (2005). Cargill held that Public Act 90-579
(Pub. Act 90-579, §5, eff. May 1, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws 48, 48))
resurrected language held unconstitutional in Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). This
"resurrected" language required an affiant requesting a 90-day
extension under subsection (a)(2) to state that she had not
previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same
acts. On April 18, 2005, the trial court, relying on Cargill,
dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, reasoning that
because plaintiff would never be able to state that she had not
previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same
acts, she would never be able to comply with the statute.
On May 17, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider
and, on September 23, 2005, a supplement thereto, alleging for
the first time that Cargill was wrongly decided. The trial court
denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider.
After this court decided Cargill, the legislature
amended section 2-622 by Public Act 94-677 (Pub. Act 94-677,
§330, eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4995-98)). As
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section 2-622(a)(2) stands at the time of this opinion, there is
no language concerning voluntary dismissals. 735 ILCS 5/2-
622(a)(2) (West Supp. 2005). In fact, Public Act 94-677's
prefatory language to the newly amended version of section 2-622
essentially disowned the voluntary-dismissal language that had
been declared unconstitutional in Best, stating the "[t]ext of
[s]ection [2-622] [is] WITHOUT the changes [held unconstitutional
in Best]." (Capitalization in original.) Pub. Act 94-677, §330,
eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws at 4964, 4995). According
to the 2005 legislature, the voluntary-dismissal language
disappeared with Best and was never reenacted. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 29, 2000, decedent Thompson underwent an
elective tonsillectomy procedure at OSF. Thompson was a 17-year-
old, mentally retarded ward of the state who resided at CHASI.
Thompson was sent back to CHASI on the day of her surgery and
apparently fell into cardiac and respiratory failure the next
day. Thompson returned to OSF, where she died of broncho-
pneumonia. Plaintiff alleges that defendants did not properly
respond to Thompson's complaints and symptoms of
bronchopneumonia, that they did not properly administer
antibiotics, and that the medical defendants negligently nicked
or stabbed Thompson's uvula (the small, mucus-covered muscle that
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hangs down in the back of the throat), which led to infection.
On August 30, 2002, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint and attached an affidavit under section 2-622(a)(2),
requesting an additional 90 days to obtain a physician's report
as required by section 2-622(a)(1). 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(1),
(a)(2) (West 2002). On December 23, 2002, after more than 90
days had passed, Dr. Emmerson filed a section 2-619 motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had not
complied with section 2-622(a)(1). 735 ILCS 5/2-619, 2-622(g)
(West 2002). On February 18, 2003, before the trial court had
ruled on Dr. Emmerson's motion, plaintiff moved to voluntarily
dismiss the complaint without prejudice, which the trial court
granted.
On February 23, 2004, plaintiff refiled her complaint.
Again plaintiff attached an affidavit stating that plaintiff had
been unable to file the written report as required by section 2-
622(a)(1) and requested a 90-day extension to file the same. On
May 21, 2004, within 90 days of refiling, plaintiff filed a
physician's report authored by Dr. James Bryant.
Between February and April 2005, defendants each filed
motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, pursuant to
section 2-622(a)(2), in order to benefit from the 90-day
extension period, plaintiff's affidavit must indicate that
plaintiff had not previously voluntarily dismissed an action
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based on the same or substantially the same acts. 735 ILCS 5/2-
622(a)(2) (West 2004). Defendants argued that because plaintiff
would never be able to truthfully state that she had not
previously voluntarily dismissed the action, plaintiff could
never comply with the requirements of section 2-622.
On April 18, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on
defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiff did not dispute the
precedential legitimacy of Cargill at the motion-to-dismiss
hearing. The trial court found that section "[2-]622 says what
it says, which is that on a refiling after a voluntary dismissal,
*** you don't get a second [chance to refile the] certificate
within 90 days."
On May 17, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider, and on September 23, 2005, plaintiff filed a
supplement to said motion. Plaintiff basically argued that
Cargill, which held that Public Act 90-579 reenacted language
prohibiting 90-day extensions upon refiling after a voluntary
dismissal, was wrongly decided. Plaintiff argued that, when she
refiled her complaint in February 2004, the statute did not
prohibit 90-day extensions for plaintiffs who had previously
voluntarily dismissed.
In November 2005, defendants filed motions to strike
plaintiff's motion to reconsider and supplement thereto on the
ground that plaintiff inappropriately raised new arguments that
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could have been raised at the motion-to-dismiss hearing. On
February 28, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff's
motion to reconsider and supplement thereto. Defendants' primary
argument was that the trial court should not even reach the
merits of plaintiff's new Cargill argument because it was not
timely made. On the merits, defendants argued that Cargill was
correctly decided. The trial court stated that it would take the
matter under advisement.
On March 22, 2006, the trial court denied plaintiff's
motion to reconsider in a docket entry. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The issue in this case involves the relationship
between Public Act 89-7, addressed by this court in our 2004
Cargill decision, and the legislature's subsequent amendment,
Public Act 94-677, effective August 25, 2005.
A. The Cargill Decision and the Legislative History of
Section 2-622 Through the Release of Cargill
In Cargill, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
complaint because they were unable to obtain a physician's report
as required by section 2-622(a)(1). The plaintiffs then refiled
their complaint and asked for a 90-day extension to obtain the
physician's report. In sum, the defendants argued that the
version of section 2-622 in effect at the time the plaintiffs
refiled their complaint did not allow 90-day extensions for
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plaintiffs who had previously voluntarily dismissed an action
based on the same acts. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 656, 818
N.E.2d at 901. This court agreed.
In 1995, the legislature passed the sweeping Civil
Justice Reform Amendments and, through Public Act 89-7, amended
section 2-622(a)(2) to prohibit 90-day extensions for those
plaintiffs who had previously voluntarily dismissed their
complaints. Pub. Act 89-7, §15, eff. March 9, 1995 (1995 Ill.
Laws 284, 291 (amending 735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 1994))). Pursuant
to Public Act 89-7, subsection (a)(2) contained the following
underlined additions:
"[Plaintiff's attorney shall attach an
affidavit that states] [t]hat the plaintiff
has not previously voluntarily dismissed an
action based upon the same or substantially
the same acts, omissions, or occurrences and
that the affiant was unable to obtain a
consultation required by paragraph 1 because
a statute of limitations would impair the
action." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-
622(a)(2) (West 1996) (hereinafter referred
to as the "civil-reform" version of section
2-622).
In 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court in Best, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689
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N.E.2d 1057, found "core provisions" of Public Act 89-7
unconstitutional and voided the entire act on the principle of
inseverability. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 818 N.E.2d at
902. The effect of Best was to make the civil-reform version of
section 2-622 void ab initio. See, for example, People v.
Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 390, 553 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1990) (when a
statute is declared unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void
ab initio). The law is returned to its state prior to the
adoption of the unconstitutional statute. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at
390, 553 N.E.2d at 283. As applied here, this means that the
pre-1995 version of section 2-622 once again became effective.
The pre-1995 version of section 2-622(a)(2) did not contain any
language regarding voluntary dismissals or any other
qualifications on the 90-day extension period.
On February 4, 1998, less than two months after the
Best decision was released, the legislature passed Public Act 90-
579 (Pub. Act 90-579, eff. May 1, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws 48)).
Section 5 of Public Act 90-579 added the following underlined
language to subsection (a)(1):
"If the affidavit is filed as to a defendant
who is a physician licensed to treat human
ailments without the use of drugs or
medicines and without operative surgery, a
dentist, a podiatrist, a psychologist, or a
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naprapath, the written report must be from a
health professional licensed in the same
profession." Pub. Act 90-579, §5, eff. May
1, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws 48, 49) (hereinafter
referred to as the "naprapath" amendment to
section 2-622).
Public Act 90-579 then repeated the civil-reform version of
section 2-622(a)(2), which prohibited a 90-day extension upon
refiling after a voluntary dismissal, showing no additions or
deletions were made by Public Act 90-579. Cargill, 353 Ill. App.
3d at 660-61, 818 N.E.2d at 904-05.
As stated above, we held in Cargill that Public Act 90-
579, which contained the naprapath amendment, resurrected the
civil-reform version of section 2-622. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d
at 659-60, 818 N.E.2d at 904-05. We went on to hold that the
civil-reform version of section 2-622(a)(2) plainly stated that
if a physician's report is not attached to the complaint, the
plaintiff must attach an affidavit indicating she has not
previously dismissed an action based on the same or substantially
the same acts. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 661, 818 N.E.2d at
905. Further, we held that because the plaintiffs would never be
able to truthfully state that they had not voluntarily dismissed
their complaint, the plaintiffs' complaint was rightfully
dismissed with prejudice. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 818
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N.E.2d at 906.
In holding that Public Act 90-579 resurrected the
civil-reform version of section 2-622(a)(2), this court relied on
the presumption that where statutes are enacted after judicial
opinions are published, the legislature acted with the knowledge
of prevailing case law. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 818
N.E.2d at 903. In other words, any repetition of the language
contained in the civil-reform version of section 2-622 must have
been a purposeful reenactment of said version because the
legislature was presumably aware that the civil-reform version
had been declared unconstitutional in Best.
B. Legislative Actions Subsequent to Cargill
In 2005, in amending section 2-622 through Public Act
94-677, the legislature explicitly rejected the civil-reform
version of section 2-622, stating the "[t]ext of [s]ection [2-
622] [is] WITHOUT the changes made by P.A. 89-7, which has been
held unconstitutional." (Capitalization in original.) Pub. Act
94-677, §330, eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4995).
Public Act 94-677 repeated the pre-1995 version of section 2-622
as a source or template (with the exception that the "naprapath"
amendment made by Public Act 90-579 was inserted into the pre-
1995 version of subsection (a)(1)), and made the following
underlined additions to subsection (a)(2):
"2. That the affiant was unable to
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obtain a consultation as required by
paragraph 1 because a statute of limitations
would impair the action and the consultation
required could not be obtained before the
expiration of the statute of limitations. If
an affidavit is executed pursuant to this
paragraph, the affidavit and written report
required by paragraph 1 shall be filed within
90 days after the filing of the complaint.
No additional 90-day extensions pursuant to
this paragraph shall be granted, except where
there has been a withdrawal of plaintiff's
counsel." 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(2) (West Supp.
2005) (as enacted by Pub. Act 94-677, §330,
eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws 4964,
4997)).
In repeating the pre-1995 version of section 2-622 as a source to
surround the amendments made by Public Act 94-677, the
legislature was fulfilling its requirements under section 8(d) of
the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d).
Section 8(d) requires that a bill amending a law shall set forth
completely the section amended. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
§8(d). Generally, portions of the old law that are repeated
either literally or in substance should not be taken as a "new
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enactment" but rather as a "continuation" of the old law. People
v. Bullard, 61 Ill. 2d 277, 281, 335 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1975); U.S.
Bank National Ass'n v. Clark, 216 Ill. 2d 334, 354, 837 N.E.2d
74, 86 (2005); 5 ILCS 70/2 (West 1998).
Given the 2005 passage of Public Act 94-677 and its
accompanying amendments to section 2-622, the question now
becomes "when did the civil-reform language, including the
voluntary-dismissal language, disappear from the statute"?
According to Public Act 94-677, the civil-reform language
disappeared with Best and was never reenacted. This is clear
from the fact that the legislature specifically rejected the
civil-reform version of section 2-622 as a source for its 2005
amendments and instead "continued" the pre-1995 version of the
statute (with the exception of the naprapath amendment). The
legislature recognized Public Act 90-579 for its naprapath
amendment, but not, in contradiction to Cargill's assessment of
Public Act 90-579's effect, for any reenactment of the civil-
reform language.
D. Remaining Arguments
Though not dispositive of our ruling, we address
defendants' remaining arguments. Defendants argue that the
principles of waiver, stare decisis, and statutory interpretation
should have prevented us from reexamining Cargill.
Where new issues are raised for the first time in a
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motion to reconsider or supplement thereto, and where there is a
reasonable explanation for why the additional issues were not
raised at the original hearing, the trial court has the
discretion to address them. Delgatto v. Brandon Associates,
Ltd., 131 Ill. 2d 183, 195, 545 N.E.2d 689, 695 (1989).
Defendants argue that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in dismissing plaintiff's motion to reconsider
pursuant to Delgatto. However, the record here does not indicate
that the trial court denied the motion to reconsider based on
untimeliness--the trial court might just have likely denied the
motion because the doctrine of stare decisis would have prevented
the trial court from overruling Cargill in order to find for
plaintiff on the merits. See, for example, Schramer v. Tiger
Athletic Ass'n of Aurora, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1020, 815 N.E.2d
994, 996 (2004) ("a circuit court must follow the precedent of
the appellate court of its district").
On a related note, the doctrine of waiver does not
prevent us from addressing the merits of plaintiff's argument,
especially where plaintiff's argument on appeal invokes this
court's duty to maintain a sound body of precedent. See Illinois
State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan, 216 Ill. 2d 653, 664, 837
N.E.2d 922, 930 (2005); see also In re Estate of Funk, 221 Ill.
2d 30, 96-97, 849 N.E.2d 366, 403 (2006) (waiver is a limitation
on the parties and not on the courts).
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Likewise, the doctrine of stare decisis does not
prevent us from reexamining Cargill. "'The doctrine of stare
decisis "expresses the policy of the courts to stand by
precedents and not to disturb settled points." [Citations.]'"
People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519, 839 N.E.2d 492, 516
(2005), quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 806 N.E.2d
632, 634 (2004). Typically, stare decisis considerations are to
be given great weight in the area of statutory construction.
People v. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d 920, 924, 676 N.E.2d 1374,
1377 (1997) (Fourth District). This is because departure from
the precedent amounts to an amendment to the statute itself.
Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 924, 676 N.E.2d at 1377. Further,
because the legislature is presumed to know of judicial inter-
pretation of statutes, the legislature's inaction suggests
agreement with the judicial interpretation. Antoine, 286 Ill.
App. 3d at 925, 676 N.E.2d at 1377.
Stare decisis is not an "inexorable command." Sharpe,
216 Ill. 2d at 519, 839 N.E.2d at 516. Prior decisions may only
be overturned for good cause, compelling and articulable reason,
or to bring the court's prior ruling on the issue into agreement
with experience and newly ascertainable facts. Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510, 641
N.E.2d 525, 529 (1994). Here, as discussed above, Public Act 94-
677, not in existence when this court decided Cargill, consti-
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tutes "newly ascertainable information" that is sufficiently
compelling to break from the doctrine of stare decisis in order
to reexamine Cargill.
Finally, the rules of statutory construction do not
prevent this court from examining the legislative history of
section 2-622. Defendant Emmerson argues that it is not proper
for this court to examine the legislative history of section 2-
622 where the language of section 2-622 as set forth in Public
Act 90-579 is clear and unambiguous. Land v. Board of Education
of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 426, 781 N.E.2d 249, 257
(2002) ("[o]nly if the statutory language is ambiguous may we
consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative
history, to determine legislative intent"). Defendant Emmerson's
argument misunderstands the issue. The question is not whether
the civil-reform version of section 2-622, if validly
resurrected, plainly prohibits a 90-day extension where a
plaintiff has previously voluntarily dismissed. The question is
whether Public Act 90-579 did in fact resurrect the civil-reform
version of section 2-622. We now conclude it did not.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Public Act 90-579 did not reenact the civil-
reform language regarding voluntary dismissals, plaintiff in the
instant case was not statutorily prohibited from receiving a 90-
day extension to file the medical report. Accordingly, we
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reverse and remand this case to the trial court.
Reversed and remanded.
MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.
KNECHT, J., dissents.
JUSTICE KNECHT, dissenting:
Simply put, Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d 654, 818 N.E.2d
898, appeal denied, 214 Ill. 2d 528, 830 N.E.2d 1 (2005), was
correctly decided, and we should affirm.
The majority uses a flawed approach to the issue. The
legislative correction encompassed by Public Act 94-677 was a
response to what may have been a mistake in Public Act 90-579.
Public Act 90-579 resurrected the voluntary-dismissal language at
issue in this case by printing it in the Act. That may not have
been the legislature's intent. Perhaps no one recognized Public
Act 90-579 would be interpreted to resurrect the voluntary-
dismissal language. If this was a legislative miscue, the chalk
was reapplied by the enactment of Public Act 94-677. However,
during the time period between the miscue in Public Act 90-579
and the correction in Public Act 94-677, the law required an
affiant requesting a 90-day extension to file a physician's
report to state she had not previously voluntarily dismissed an
action based on the same acts.
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The trial court properly relied on our precedent
established in Cargill to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice. The majority proposes to reverse that careful
adherence to precedent by deferring to a later legislative
enactment that attempts to say that is not what the law was
because that is not what we wanted it to be. The legislature
does not interpret its enactments--the courts do. We have done
so, and we should adhere to precedent.
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