NO. 4-06-0113 Filed 4/18/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: JEROME S., Alleged to be a ) Appeal from
Delinquent Minor, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) McLean County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 04JD150
v. )
JEROME S., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) G. Michael Prall,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent minor, Jerome S. (born July 24, 1991),
appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence, which resulted in his delinquency adjudication for
unlawful use of a weapon and revocation of court supervision. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 5, 2004, the State filed a petition for
adjudication of wardship, alleging Jerome S. had resisted a
police officer. Jerome S. admitted the allegation. On March 28,
2005, the trial court sentenced Jerome S. to 12 months of court
supervision.
On November 8, 2005, the State filed a supplemental
petition for adjudication of wardship. The petition alleged
unlawful use of a weapon and attempted disarming of a police
officer stemming from events that occurred in Miller Park in
Bloomington on the evening of November 5, 2005.
Jerome S. filed a motion to quash his arrest and
suppress evidence, urging he was illegally arrested without a
warrant or probable cause. At a hearing on the motion on Decem-
ber 6, 2005, Jerome S. offered the testimony of his sister,
Jolene S., and four of his sister's friends, Sharee Conely, Shea
Brown, Jessica Burkes, and Margiana Jackson, all of whom were
with him in the park on November 5.
Each testified that they went to the park with a group
of friends to fight another group of girls, whom Brown identified
as "Dub City" girls. Jerome S. went along. Conely, Brown,
Burkes, and Jackson gave various estimates that there were
between 10 and 15 people in their group. The other group was
larger, about 20 or 30 people, according to Brown and Burkes.
The two groups of girls did not fight. Instead, Jerome
S. fought with another boy. Burkes testified she heard but did
not see Jerome S. try to use a taser on the boy. Jackson also
indicated she did not see Jerome S. with a taser but saw elec-
tricity coming from a taser. Conely, Brown, and Jolene did not
mention whether Jerome S. tried to use a taser during the fight.
The fight broke up, apparently because the groups
spotted a police officer, though Jolene testified she did not see
the officer until later. Conely, Jolene, Burkes, and Jackson
stated their group turned around and started walking away. Brown
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indicated her group was backing up, still facing the other group.
Conely, Jolene, and Burkes said Jerome S. was yelling at the
other group, but Brown and Jackson denied Jerome S. was doing so.
Conely, Burkes, and Jackson testified the police
officer pulled his car onto the grass near their group, and the
headlights lit the area. Brown and Jolene stated there were no
car lights and the area was very dark. Brown specified that the
officer parked on the street and walked through the park. All of
them testified Jerome S. had nothing in his hand at the time.
Brown testified the officer walked over to the other
group and told them to leave, and they did. Jackson, however,
stated the officer did not tell either group to leave. Burkes
said the other group remained in the area and saw the officer
"jump" on Jerome S., only leaving when the officer called for
backup.
Conely testified Jerome S. was walking away when the
officer told Jerome S. to get down; Jerome S. laid on the ground,
and the officer hit Jerome S. in the head. Brown stated the
officer said Jerome S. needed to calm down. She said Jerome S.
was "moving back" to leave the park, and the officer told him to
get to the ground; Jerome S. did not, so the officer threw him to
the ground and hit him. Jolene, Burkes, and Jackson also testi-
fied their group was leaving the park, but they stated the
officer did not say anything to Jerome S. before knocking him to
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the ground and punching him. Jolene said Jerome S. got up and
the officer put Jerome S. back on the ground, but Jackson testi-
fied Jerome S. pushed the officer off him and punched the officer
before she and the rest of their group grabbed Jerome S.
Jackson testified the officer then told Jerome S. to
get down, so Jerome S. got on his knees, but the officer told
Jerome S. to lay on the ground. All five witnesses agreed Jerome
S. did not grab at or struggle with the officer after the initial
scuffle. At some point more officers arrived. Jolene, Jackson,
and Conely's testimony differed on when that occurred.
Jerome S. also testified. He stated he had gone to the
park to fight the other group. The two groups were still yelling
at each other when the officer came, but he denied yelling that
he was part of "Dub City," as that is a different group of kids.
Jerome S. said his group was walking away and the other
group was following them when the officer drove between the two
groups. Though he looked back to yell at the other group, his
body faced away from them. When he saw the lights from the
police car come from behind the group, he turned around. The
officer then attacked him without saying anything. Jerome S. got
up and the officer punched him in his cheek. Jerome S. admitted
he was getting ready to hit the officer when members of his group
grabbed him.
Jerome S. testified the officer told him to get on the
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ground, so he got on his knees. The officer again told him to
get on the ground, so he laid on his stomach. The officer
handcuffed Jerome S. and searched his pockets. Jerome S. denied
grabbing at or struggling with the officer but admitted yelling
at the officer.
The State offered the testimony of John Swartzentruber,
the Bloomington police officer involved in the November 5, 2005,
incident. Swartzentruber stated that when he responded to a call
about a potential fight in the park, he saw a group of about 50
kids. He parked his squad car on the street and spoke with the
group, who said they were going to play ball. Swartzentruber
started to leave but stopped to speak with a woman who was
standing on her porch. She told him she had heard some kids talk
about fighting. He said he would make sure the kids left.
Swartzentruber then saw another group of about 20
people standing more closely together and yelling. He drove near
to that group, and a young female told him a young, black male
wearing a white T-shirt had a stun gun. She pointed toward the
smaller group, which was about 100 feet away, before she walked
away from Swartzentruber. He called other units and walked
toward the group. As he walked, he heard the ticking sound of a
stun gun.
At that time, the smaller, more compact group was
walking away and yelling "Dub City." The larger group was spread
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out, walking toward the smaller group and yelling "Fuck Dub
City." Swartzentruber identified himself as a police officer and
told the larger group to leave. Those people walked out of his
line of sight. He then told the smaller group to stop. When he
told them a second time, they turned and faced him. Jerome S.,
who was with the smaller group, was a black male wearing a white
T-shirt. Jerome S. had a stick in his hand, which he dropped
when Swartzentruber said to do so.
As a young female talked to Swartzentruber about the
other group, Jerome S. walked in the direction the other group
had headed. Jerome S. was mumbling, "You want a piece of me,"
and other things of that nature.
Swartzentruber pointed at Jerome S. and told him to
stop three or four times. When Jerome S. kept walking,
Swartzentruber pushed him to the ground and attempted to take him
into custody. Though Swartzentruber admitted he did not say
anything to Jerome S. when he pushed Jerome S. down,
Swartzentruber testified he intended to take Jerome S. into
custody for "obstructing."
Jerome S. got to his knees and wrapped his arms around
Swartzentruber's waist. Members of the smaller group began to
pull at Swartzentruber from behind, and the officer felt someone
pulling at his duty weapon from the front. When Swartzentruber
pushed Jerome S. away, Jerome S. stood up and swung at
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Swartzentruber. The officer hit Jerome S. and called for more
officers.
As Swartzentruber was waiting for backup, he directed
his taser at the group. He told Jerome S. he was under arrest
and to get down on the ground. After the third command, Jerome
S. complied. Other officers arrived, and Swartzentruber got on
top of Jerome S. to handcuff him. Jerome S. was cursing at
Swartzentruber and would not cooperate when Swartzentruber began
to search his pockets, so the officer forced Jerome S. to his
side. Swartzentruber found a stun gun in Jerome S.'s left
pocket.
The trial court denied Jerome S.'s motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence, finding that because Jerome S.
failed to comply with the officer's demands to stop, the officer
had a right to stop and arrest him. Alternatively, the court
found that the officer had probable cause to arrest Jerome S. for
disorderly conduct "because certainly, approaching a hostile
group in a fight situation is going to cause a, potentially a
major problem."
The parties then stipulated that the trial court could
consider the testimony from the hearing as evidence for Jerome
S.'s trial on the charges. The State also presented the testi-
mony of two other Bloomington police officers, Martin Krylowicz
and Bill McGonnigal, who arrived at Miller Park on November 5,
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2005, as Swartzentruber had Jerome S. face down on the ground.
Krylowicz helped arrest Jerome S., and McGonnigal ordered back
the 10 to 15 people who were nearby yelling at Swartzentruber.
The trial court adjudicated Jerome S. a delinquent
minor. It found Jerome S. committed the offense of unlawful use
of a weapon but found him not guilty of attempting to disarm an
officer.
On December 16, 2005, the State filed a petition to
revoke court supervision alleging Jerome S. had violated his
supervision by committing the weapon offense. The trial court
revoked Jerome S.'s supervision on December 19, 2005. At a
hearing on January 31, 2006, the court resentenced Jerome S. to
12 months of probation. The court also imposed 30 days' deten-
tion, with credit for the 44 days Jerome S. had already served.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Jerome S. contends Swartzentruber did not have probable
cause to arrest him for obstructing a peace officer because
Jerome S. merely ignored Swartzentruber. He also urges no
probable cause existed to arrest him for disorderly conduct, as
the trial court alternatively found, because there was only a
potential that his actions would disturb the peace in the future.
Accordingly, Jerome S. argues the trial court should have granted
his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
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"Review of a motion to suppress presents both questions
of law and fact." In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 373,
841 N.E.2d 945, 960 (2005). "A trial court's credibility deter-
minations and findings of historical fact will be upheld on
review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence." Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 373, 841 N.E.2d at 960.
However, we review de novo the ultimate legal question of whether
the evidence should be suppressed. Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d
at 373, 841 N.E.2d at 960.
As an initial matter, we note that the trial court
rejected the testimony of Jolene, Burkes, Jackson, and Jerome S.
that Swartzentruber did not say anything to Jerome S. before
knocking Jerome S. to the ground. Instead, the court found that
Swartzentruber repeatedly ordered Jerome S. to stop and Jerome S.
failed to comply with the officer's demands. The court also
found that Jerome S. had been "approaching a hostile group in a
fight situation" when Swartzentruber knocked Jerome S. down to
the ground. Because the court was in the best position to
determine the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot say these
factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence,
especially in light of the inconsistencies in Jerome S.'s wit-
nesses' testimony.
Both the fourth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) and article I, section 6, of the
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Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6) protect
against unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Moss, 217
Ill. 2d 511, 518, 842 N.E.2d 699, 704-05 (2005). An arrest
without probable cause violates an individual's right against
unreasonable seizures. People v. Washington, 363 Ill. App. 3d
13, 23, 842 N.E.2d 1193, 1202 (2006). The State and Jerome S.
agree that Swartzentruber arrested Jerome S. when the officer
first made physical contact with Jerome S. by knocking him to the
ground. See Washington, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 842 N.E.2d at
1202 ("An arrest occurs when a person's freedom of movement is
restrained by physical force"); People v. Fortney, 297 Ill. App.
3d 79, 86, 697 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1998) ("No formal declaration *** is
necessary for an arrest to occur"). Accordingly, the question
before us is whether Swartzentruber had probable cause to arrest
Jerome S. at that time.
"[P]robable cause exists if the facts and surrounding
circumstances are sufficient to justify a reasonable belief by
the arresting officer that the defendant is or has been involved
in a crime." People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 115, 847 N.E.2d
82, 88 (2006). "The standard for determining whether probable
cause is present is probability of criminal activity, rather than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d
476, 485, 828 N.E.2d 237, 244 (2005).
Swartzentruber testified at the suppression hearing
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that he intended to arrest Jerome S. for "obstructing" when he
knocked Jerome S. to the ground after Jerome S. ignored his
commands to stop. Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961
provides:
"A person who knowingly resists or ob-
structs the performance by one known to the
person to be a peace officer *** of any
authorized act within his official capacity
commits a Class A misdemeanor." 720 ILCS
5/31-1(a) (West 2004).
In People v. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d 286, 289, 585 N.E.2d
180, 183 (1991), the reviewing court found that because "resis-
tance" and "obstruction" both "imply some physical act or exer-
tion," section 31-1 does not proscribe mere argument with a
policeman, but "only some physical act which imposes an obstacle
which may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent[,] or delay the
performance of the officer's duties."
For example, because the defendants in Hilgenberg only
refused to open the door to a residence or permit the entry of
the sheriff, they did not engage in an act of physical resis-
tance. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 290, 585 N.E.2d at 184.
Similarly, where the State charged the defendants in People v.
Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d 124, 127, 555 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1990),
with "'knowingly refus[ing] *** to remove [themselves] from the
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400 block of Lincoln Highway *** after being instructed to do so
by [a De Kalb police officer],'" the court held their conduct
'"did not constitute a violation of a section 31-1 because they
did not engage in physical acts of resistance.
More recently, in People v. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d
223, 227, 811 N.E.2d 236, 240 (2004), the Second District clari-
fied that "the distinction between acting and refraining from
action is [not] dispositive." The defendant in that case was
convicted of obstructing a peace officer after he refused to
comply with a police officer's four orders to exit his vehicle.
Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 225, 811 N.E.2d at 238. Synnott
cited City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 253 N.E.2d 400,
403 (1969), where our supreme court held the "defendant was
properly convicted [under a city ordinance very similar to
section 31-1] of interfering with the police in the discharge of
their duty to maintain order." "In Meyer, police ordered Vietnam
war protesters and supporters to disperse when the police had
become unable to maintain order among opposing factions and 'the
debate was degenerating to one of physical battle.'" Synnott,
349 Ill. App. 3d at 226, 811 N.E.2d at 239, quoting Meyer, 44
Ill. 2d at 6, 253 N.E.2d at 402.
The Second District distinguished Synnott and Meyer
from Stoudt and Hilgenberg on the basis of whether the officers'
acts were "authorized" as required by section 31-1. In Stoudt,
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the question before the court was whether the refusal to move
constituted an act of resistance, but it had also noted that the
complaints against the defendants were deficient because they did
not properly allege the officer instructing the defendant to move
was engaged in an authorized act. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d at
128, 555 N.E.2d at 828.
Similarly, the court in Hilgenberg determined:
"[A] failure to respond to an officer's
request to open a door or permit entry to
the premises only has legal significance if
the request was authorized within his official
capacity and the response of the defendant
actually impeded an act the officer was author-
ized to perform." (Emphasis added.) Hilgenberg,
223 Ill. App. 3d at 290, 585 N.E.2d at 184.
Because the officer did not have a warrant or probable cause
coupled with exigent circumstances, he was not authorized to
demand entry, and the defendants had a right to refuse his
request. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 585 N.E.2d at 184.
In contrast, the officers giving the orders to the
defendants in Synnott and Meyer were discharging their duties.
The officer in Synnott had stopped the defendant's vehicle after
observing it traveling about 20 miles per hour over the speed
limit; the officer then noticed "indicia of intoxication" and
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repeatedly asked defendant to step out of his car. Synnott, 349
Ill. App. 3d at 224, 811 N.E.2d at 237. The officers in Meyer
were discharging their "duty to maintain order" when they ordered
war protesters to disperse when the protest "was degenerating to
one of physical battle." Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d at 6, 253 N.E.2d at
402.
Here, the trial court credited Swartzentruber's testi-
mony that Jerome S. was walking toward the other group, not out
of the park. It found Jerome S. was "approaching a hostile group
in a fight situation." Given the large number of people in each
group, between 10 and 20 in Jerome S.'s group and between 20 and
50 in the other group, it was obviously imperative and well
within Swartzentruber's duties that he maintain order in the
park. Jerome S.'s act in walking toward the other group despite
Swartzentruber's orders to stop, coupled with the officer's
authority to give such an order, constituted probable cause for
Swartzentruber to arrest Jerome S. Accordingly, the trial court
properly denied Jerome S.'s motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence. Given our conclusion, we need not address the State's
alternative arguments.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
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STEIGMANN, P.J., and APPLETON, J., concur.
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